

HOW PATHWAYS TO LEGAL STATUS AND CITIZENSHIP RELATE TO ECONOMIC
ATTAINMENT AMONG THE CHILDREN OF MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS

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September, 2006

This report is based on data from the research project Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA). Investigators are Rubén G. Rumbaut, Frank D. Bean, Susan K. Brown, Leo R. Chávez, Louis DeSipio, and Jennifer Lee, all from the University of California, Irvine, and Min Zhou, from UCLA. The data collection was funded by the Russell Sage Foundation through a grant to the above investigators, with the exception of the data collection for the Mexican immigrant generation, which was funded by a grant from the Hewlett Foundation to Frank D. Bean. Support for the analyses of the data presented here came from both the Russell Sage Foundation and the Pew Hispanic Center (through a grant to Frank D. Bean).

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Introduction

Immigration reform in the United States has constituted an important legislative focus for nearly half a century. However, it has seldom pre-occupied policymakers to the degree that it has recently, moving this year to front-and-center stage among U.S. public policy issues, at least for a while. Because of worries about both increasing numbers of Mexican migrants and proposals to legalize unauthorized entrants (most of whom are Mexican), the question of Mexican migration has dominated much of the debate (Bean and Lowell 2004). Mexicans are by far the largest of the recent immigrant groups, in the cases of both legal and unauthorized migration. In 2005, for example, 161,445 persons from Mexico became "legal permanent residents" (14.4 percent of the total) (Office of Immigration Statistics 2006). In addition, 300,000 unauthorized Mexicans also established *de facto* residency in 2005, bringing the total number of unauthorized Mexicans to 6.2 million (or 56 percent of all unauthorized persons) (Passel 2006). These numbers dwarf those from any other country. The second largest number of legal entrants in 2005 came from India (84,681 persons, or 7.5 percent of all legal permanent residents), while the second largest number of unauthorized persons living in the country came from elsewhere in Latin America (2.5 million, or 22 percent of the estimated unauthorized total).

Of the main issues driving the policy debate, perhaps the most important involves the nature and degree of Mexican immigrant incorporation (Bean and Stevens 2003). Because most Mexican newcomers are bottom-tier workers with relatively little education, observers often conclude that the prospects for Mexicans joining the American mainstream are dim (Hanson 2003; Camarota 2001). However, such inferences all too frequently are based on the assumption that earlier-arriving immigrants, and even many later-generation members of national origin

groups, share the characteristics of those who have just arrived (see Bean, Brown, and Rumbaut 2006). But the members of immigrant groups change, both as the immigrant generation itself stays longer in the United States and as immigrants give way to their children, and their children to their own children, and so forth. Reaching adequate conclusions about Mexican incorporation thus depends not only on assessing what happens to immigrants after they arrive in the United States, but also on studying differences across the first, second, third, and even later generations. Here, we focus on Mexican immigrants and how the migration and citizenship status of first-generation fathers changes after arrival. We also examine how such trajectories relate to their children's economic status (the acquisition of human capital, occupation, and earnings). Such dynamics not only help to reveal the rapidity with which Mexican immigrants are joining the American economic mainstream, they also provide policy-relevant information about how pathways to legalization and citizenship dampen or enhance the economic progress of the children of immigrants.

Our assessment is based on a new research project that focuses on the children of immigrants in metropolitan Los Angeles, the most ideal city in the country for scrutinizing such dynamics in the case of the Mexican-origin population. Not only is Los Angeles important for its size – more than 17 million people as of 2004 – it is one of the two major immigrant gateway metropolises in the country, along with New York (Sabagh and Bozorgmehr 2003). According to data from the 2004 American Community Survey (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006), nearly a third of LA's population is foreign-born with nearly two-thirds of this group from Latin America. Also important, Los Angeles, more so than any other city, has been a receiving center for Mexicans for generations (Grebler, Moore, and Guzman 1970). It is now home to nearly 6 million persons of Mexican origin, who constitute more than one-third of its population and give

it the largest Mexican-origin population outside the capital of Mexico. Most important, it has long been the major urban destination of unauthorized Mexican migrants (Bean, Passel, and Edmonston 1990). As such, it is the best place in the country to study how changes in the migration and citizenship status of Mexican migrants affect their children.

The results of studying such processes carry great public policy significance. The issue of providing unauthorized immigrants with pathways to permanent residence and citizenship has constituted the major stumbling block to recent Congressional efforts to craft political compromises that might enable the enactment of immigration reform. One reason these legislative endeavors have faltered could be that not enough is known about how legalization and naturalization relate to the attainment of economic status among the children of immigrants. How much does having an unauthorized father handicap such children? Does having the opportunity to become a legal permanent resident increase the chances that a previously unauthorized immigrant will become part of the mainstream? What difference does becoming a citizen make? How do such changes in immigrant status shape the opportunities of the U.S.-born children of these immigrants? How do these various migration status transitions relate to the likelihood that Mexican immigrants and their children become better educated and increase their incomes?

From our research, three major findings emerge:

1. The adult offspring of Mexican immigrants in the Los Angeles sample whose fathers entered the country as unauthorized migrants and then remain unauthorized tend to fare worse economically than the offspring of those whose fathers are able to attain legal status.

2. As a result of the legalization opportunities provided by the 1986 Immigration Control and Reform Act (IRCA), few of the unauthorized fathers in the sample Los Angeles remained unauthorized. Most became legal permanent residents, and of these, many naturalized.
3. The adult offspring of these immigrants whose fathers had legalized or naturalized displayed stronger English language proficiency, higher levels of education, better jobs, and higher earnings than the offspring of those whose fathers remained unauthorized migrants or returned to Mexico.

Data and Approach

The data yielding these findings come from a new survey called Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA), supported by a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation. Conducted in 2004, the study targeted the young-adult children of immigrants from large immigrant groups in Los Angeles and obtained information from 4,780 persons ages 20 to 40 who had at least one immigrant parent. In addition to Mexicans, the groups surveyed included persons whose parents' national origin was Chinese, Filipino, Korean, Vietnamese, Salvadoran or Guatemalan. Because of the centrality of the Mexican origin group to the immigrant experience in Los Angeles, the Mexican sample was designed to be a random probability sample of all Mexican-origin persons (whatever their generational status) residing in households with telephones in the greater urban area (the five-county metropolitan region). The sample size was 1,369.

Here we examine data only for 1.5 and second-generation persons, including information these respondents provided about their fathers. We define the Mexican "1.5" generation as those

who were born abroad to foreign-born parents and who came to the United States before age 16. The first generation consists of those who came at that age or after, by which point they were unlikely to obtain any further formal education in the United States. Members of the second generation are those born in the United States but have at least one immigrant parent. In this report, we identify 935 respondents who reported Mexican birth or ancestry and are classified as 1.5 or second generation. In our empirical analyses, we examine relationships between coming to the United States as an unauthorized migrant, obtaining legal immigration status, and becoming a naturalized citizen, on the one hand, and the economic statuses the children of Mexican immigrants attain by the time they are young adults, on the other. Of particular importance in the latter regard is the children's attainment of human capital (specifically, English language usage and education).

In the IIMMLA survey, we obtained information on father's migration status, both at the time of entry to the United States and at the time of the IIMMLA interview. We also collected data on whether the father had naturalized. Here we examine information only for respondents' fathers. The reason is that, in the case of Mexican immigrants, many fathers migrate as unauthorized labor migrants before other family members do, and then subsequently, sometimes several years later, bring spouses and children to the United States. This can occur either before or after obtaining legal status. Whatever the case, it is usually the fathers' labor migration experience that drives the process (Portes and Bach 1985; Massey et al. 1987; Bean, Gonzalez Baker, and Capps 2001), so it is reasonable to begin an examination of how migration status relates to children's subsequent adult economic attainment by focusing on the father's migration status.

Because we define second-generation respondents as those having at least one immigrant parent, it is important to note that the generational statuses of the parents may differ. In a few cases, mothers were foreign-born but fathers native-born, meaning that the fathers could not have had either a legalization or naturalization experience. Because respondents with native-born fathers nonetheless constitute a meaningful comparison group, we include them here in a separate category because they provide a useful benchmark for children's economic attainment. We thus examine six nativity/migration status/naturalization trajectories for the fathers of the IIMMLA 1.5 and 2.0 generation respondents. These are (together with the terms we use for them) : 1) father native-born (Native-Born); 2) father authorized at entry, later naturalized (Authorized/Citizen); 3) father authorized at entry, not naturalized by interview (Authorized/Green Card); 4) father unauthorized at entry, naturalized by interview (Unauthorized/Citizen); 5) father unauthorized at entry, obtained green card, not naturalized at interview (Unauthorized/Green Card); and 6) father unauthorized at both entry and interview (Unauthorized/Unauthorized).

Findings

How in fact have the various pathways to legalization and citizenship among unauthorized immigrants affected their children's chances of joining the American economic mainstream? In trying to answer this question, we note first that calculating the fraction of our respondents whose fathers came as unauthorized entrants depends on knowing the number of fathers who in fact were immigrants. As noted above, some of the fathers were born in the United States and thus are not immigrants (about 10 percent of fathers. See Table 1). In addition, another 119 never migrated to the United States, a group constituting 12.7 percent of

the sample. We omit both of these groups in calculating fractions of 1.5 and second-generation persons with illegal fathers. But what about the 60 fathers whose status was unknown (because the respondent either did not know the father or did not know the father's migration status at entry)? These fathers could in fact have migrated to the United States. In recognition of this, we calculate two percentages of persons with unauthorized fathers -- one assuming that these fathers were unauthorized and the second assuming they were not. We also calculate these percentages a third way, namely by not including this group of 60 fathers at all. The three resulting sets of percentages are shown in the first three rows of Table 2. They reveal that about half of the 1.5 and second generation respondents' fathers came to the United States as unauthorized migrants (about 46 percent in the case of the middle estimate), meaning also that slightly more than half came as legal entrants. The former is reasonably close to estimates of the fraction of unauthorized migrants coming from Mexico during the '50s, '60s and '70s who became settlers in the United States (Bean, Passel, and Edmonston 1990).

By the time of the IIMMLA interview, most of the unauthorized fathers had become legalized permanent residents. Specifically, only about 5 to 14 percent of the fathers remained unauthorized. If we assume the level of the middle estimate for the percentage that legalized, this would mean that about 9 of every 10 unauthorized entrants had attained legal status by 2004. Overall, it would mean that at least 16 out of every 17 total known entrants either entered legally or had attained legal permanent resident status. This very high percentage of legal fathers among the children of Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles provides testimony to the existence of the legalization pathways provided by of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) (Bean, Vernez, and Keely 1989), as well as to the successful implementation of the law's legalization provisions (González Baker 1990).

How does legalization, including IRCA legalization in the case of many of these fathers, relate to the human capital attainments of their young adult children? In Table 3, we see that those respondents whose fathers were unauthorized entrants and subsequently legalized were about 25 percent less likely to drop out of high school (16.9 percent versus 22.5 percent) and about 70 percent more likely to graduate from college. Similarly, they were over 15 percent more likely to prefer speaking English at home and work in jobs with higher occupational prestige (about 7 percent higher on average) and earnings (about 30 percent higher than those whose fathers did not legalize). Thus, in general, having a father who had the opportunity to legalize, and in fact exercised that opportunity, appears to confer appreciable economic benefits on the 1.5 and second generation children of those Mexican immigrants who entered the country in an unauthorized status.

Are there additional benefits that accrue from citizenship, either among those whose fathers entered legally or among those whose fathers were unauthorized entrants who legalized and also went on to become naturalized citizens? Of the former group, more than two-thirds (66.9 percent) had naturalized by the time of the interview (Table 2). Of the known unauthorized-entrant fathers, about half had naturalized (49.7 percent). Thus, by some 20 to 35 years after our respondents' fathers had come to the country, about three-fifths (59.0 percent) had become citizens, including many who started out as unauthorized entrants. Again, it is worth noting that that most of the fathers would have qualified for legalization and citizenship by virtue of the legalization programs of IRCA, which created two major pathways to legalization for unauthorized migrants in the country at that time (Bean, Keely, and Vernez, 1989). Most of the fathers of our respondents migrated to the United States during an era when almost all of them would have been eligible for one or the other program. Although we did not obtain data on

whether our respondents' fathers in fact became legal through IRCA's programs, about three-fourths of the unauthorized Mexican immigrants estimated to be in the country during the 1980s legalized as a result of IRCA (Bean, Passel and Edmonston 1990; Massey, Durand, and Nolan 2002).

Examining the experiences of the children of immigrants in the Los Angeles sample thus provides a useful illustration of what might occur in the case of unauthorized Mexican immigrants and their children over the next twenty years if new legalization programs and pathways to citizenship were adopted by the U.S. Congress. The IIMMLA data indicate that the legalization and citizenship trajectories of those fathers coming illegally are related in significant ways to their children's outcomes. Our results hold up even when we control for the effects of fathers' education and respondents' age, both of which could affect the outcomes (Table 4). Thus, we note that when fathers who were initially unauthorized changed their legal status, and particularly when they also became naturalized citizens, this pathway is related to a substantially reduced likelihood of educational failure among their children. For example, forty percent fewer such children (those whose fathers entered unauthorized but went on to legalize and then eventually naturalize) failed to finish high school than in the case of children whose fathers stayed unauthorized (13.7 percent versus 22.5 percent for those whose fathers remained unauthorized; see Table 4). In the case of finishing college, the premium for fathers having changing to authorized status is even higher, about 70 percent (18.7 percent of the children of Unauthorized/Green Card fathers graduated from college versus 11.7 percent of the children of Unauthorized/Unauthorized fathers).

To be sure, the number of children going on to college in either of these cases is not inordinately high. Nonetheless, migration status and citizenship trajectories clearly matter, as

indicated by the fact that sizeable premiums attach to occupational prestige, the tendency to speak English, and income among the children of fathers who took advantage of the opportunity to legalize and naturalize compared to those who remained unauthorized (a premium of over 6 percent for occupational prestige; about 31 percent for speaking English; and about 21 percent for income) (Table 4). To be more specific in the case of income, those who had fathers who entered as unauthorized migrants but then went on to legalize (most probably as a result of IRCA, as noted above), as well as to become naturalized citizens, reported an adjusted average income of \$23,234 in 2004. Those who had fathers, however, who entered illegally but then stayed unauthorized (i.e., were still unauthorized at the time of the IIMMLA interview in 2004), reported adjusted incomes that averaged only \$19,230. In other words, the former group made \$4004 more than the latter, or 21 percent higher annual incomes, a considerable income premium for legalization and naturalization.

Discussion and Conclusions

The economic statuses of the children of those remaining unauthorized provides a basis for assessing what might happen to the children of unauthorized Mexican immigrants living in the country today if current legislative proposals were adopted that either provided or did not provide pathways to legalization or citizenship. Our findings suggest that legalization and citizenship possibilities enhance educational attainment, English usage, occupational prestige, and higher incomes on the part of the children of unauthorized immigrants. In short, pathways to legalization and citizenship smooth the way for children of immigrants to become societal stakeholders. A lack of such pathways risks increasing the number of children growing up in poor and vulnerable households and adding to the size of any existing immigrant underclass.

That the lack of legalization and citizenship pathways could limit economic integration is also reinforced by research showing that parental legalization and citizenship are related to more civic engagement in the case of the children of Mexican immigrants, an outcome that has generally been found to foster economic success among immigrants (DeSipio, Bean and Rumbaut 2005).

It is worth noting that the above results do not mean that the fathers' legalization and citizenship cause children's higher economic status *per se*, although they may, particularly by improving access to economic opportunities available only to legal immigrants or citizens. However, it is also possible that our results derive, at least in part, from processes of selectivity. That is, perhaps the smartest and most industrious of the fathers are also the more likely to legalize and obtain citizenship, and the influence of such tendencies helps to account for the gains in education and income among their children rather than legal and citizenship status *per se*. However, even if this were the case, it would not suggest that legalization and citizenship pathways are unimportant. The reason is that the presence of such opportunities, including even the prospect that they might emerge, is a prerequisite for selectivities to occur. Indeed, without legalization and citizenship opportunities, the migration of the motivated and industrious might be substantially reduced, which itself could contribute to the further development of an impoverished, vulnerable, and perhaps alienated under class of unauthorized migrants in the United States. That the chance to become full members of society matters is indicated by the fact so many immigrants, particularly Mexican immigrants, legalized and became citizens when they were presented with the opportunity to do so by IRCA. An important reason was undoubtedly because they perceived that they and their children would benefit.

If legalization and citizenship programs had been unavailable at the time, it is unlikely the fathers would have fared as well in America as they did. They would have had to live and

work underground to a much greater degree, and in all probability would have lacked the resources to provide as well for their children, including the resources to help pay for college. Without the possibility to legalize and become citizens (i.e., in the form of signals of both a welcoming social reception and of the existence opportunities to legalize), they would have been less likely to have tried as hard as they did (Van Hook, Brown, and Bean 2006). In short, even if some of the economic achievements of the children of unauthorized immigrants who legalized and became citizens derived from selectivity, such mechanisms may not operate to benefit children if fathers lack the chance to legalize and become citizens. And in fact, as noted above, when with the IIMMLA data we control fathers' education in regression models predicting children's economic attainment and human capital outcomes, we find that the premiums associated with legalization and citizenship either do not change or actually increase (results shown in Table 4). Migration and citizenship opportunities thus appear to matter considerably. By providing environments that encourage educational attainment and economic achievement among the children of immigrants, legalization and citizenship pathways seem likely to facilitate not only the economic integration of the immigrant generation, but also that of 1.5 and second-generation Mexican immigrants.

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Reform and Immigrant Naturalization." *Social Forces* (forthcoming).

Table 1. Father's Entry Status and Citizenship Trajectories, 1.5 and 2nd Generation Mexican-Origin Respondents

| | All | | Those with Foreign-born Fathers | | Those with Foreign-born Fathers and Known Migration Status | | Those with Foreign-born Fathers Who Could Have Migrated or Did to U.S. | | Those with Foreign-born Fathers and Known to Have Migrated to U.S. | |
|-----------------------------|------------|--------------|--|--------------|---|--------------|---|--------------|---|--------------|
| | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| Status Unknown ^a | 60 | 6.4 | 60 | 7.1 | -- | -- | 60 | 8.3 | -- | -- |
| Never Lived in U.S. | 119 | 12.7 | 119 | 14.1 | 119 | 15.2 | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Not Foreign-Born | 93 | 9.9 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Authorized / Naturalized | 239 | 25.6 | 239 | 28.4 | 239 | 30.6 | 239 | 33.1 | 239 | 36.0 |
| Authorized / Green Card | 118 | 12.6 | 118 | 14.0 | 118 | 15.1 | 118 | 16.3 | 118 | 17.8 |
| Unauthorized / Naturalized | 152 | 16.3 | 152 | 18.1 | 152 | 19.4 | 152 | 21.0 | 152 | 22.9 |
| Unauthorized / Green Card | 114 | 12.2 | 114 | 13.5 | 114 | 14.6 | 114 | 15.8 | 114 | 17.2 |
| Unauthorized / Unauthorized | 40 | 4.3 | 40 | 4.8 | 40 | 5.1 | 40 | 5.5 | 40 | 6.0 |
| Total | 935 | 100.0 | 842 | 100.0 | 782 | 100.0 | 723 | 100.0 | 663 | 100.0 |

a Did not know father or father's status

Table 2. Fathers Entering the Country Showing Various Migration Status and Naturalization Trajectories, 1.5 and 2nd Generation Mexican-Origin Respondents

| | |
|---|------|
| Percent Entering Unauthorized | |
| Low Estimate ^b | 42.3 |
| Middle Estimate ^a | 46.2 |
| High Estimate ^c | 50.6 |
| Percent Unauthorized at Interview | |
| Low Estimate ^b | 5.5 |
| Middle Estimate ^c | 6.0 |
| High Estimate ^a | 13.8 |
| Percent Legalizing of Entrants ^c | 94.0 |
| Percent Naturalizing of Known Legal Entrants | 66.9 |
| Percent Naturalizing of Known Unauthorized Entrants | 49.7 |
| Percent Naturalizing of All Known Eligible | 62.8 |

a Assumes fathers with unknown status were unauthorized

b Assumes fathers with unknown status were authorized

c Only of fathers with known status

Table 3. Levels of Human Capital and Economic Attainment by Father's Legal Status at Entry and at Time of Interview, 1.5 and 2nd Generation Mexican-Origin Respondents

| | |
|-----------------------------------|------|
| Respondent Education | |
| % Less than High School Diploma | |
| Father Not Foreign-Born | 11.8 |
| Authorized at Entry | 13.2 |
| Unauthorized / Authorized | 16.9 |
| Unauthorized / Unauthorized | 22.5 |
| Status Unknown | 26.7 |
| Never Lived in U.S. | 37.0 |
| % Bachelor's Degree or Higher | |
| Father Not Foreign-Born | 19.4 |
| Authorized at Entry | 16.2 |
| Unauthorized / Authorized | 17.3 |
| Unauthorized / Unauthorized | 10.0 |
| Status Unknown | 8.3 |
| Never Lived in U.S. | 8.4 |
| Average Years of Education | |
| Father Not Foreign-Born | 13.5 |
| Authorized at Entry | 13.2 |
| Unauthorized / Authorized | 13.2 |
| Unauthorized / Unauthorized | 13.0 |
| Status Unknown | 12.4 |
| Never Lived in U.S. | 11.8 |
| % Prefer to Speak English at Home | |
| Father Not Foreign-Born | 71.0 |
| Authorized at Entry | 65.5 |
| Unauthorized / Authorized | 50.8 |
| Unauthorized / Unauthorized | 45.0 |
| Status Unknown | 41.7 |
| Never Lived in U.S. | 32.8 |

(Continued on Next Page)

Table 3 (continued). Levels of Human Capital and Economic Attainment by Father's Legal Status at Entry and at Time of Interview, 1.5 and 2nd Generation Mexican-Origin Respondents

| | |
|---|--------|
| Average Occupational Socioeconomic Prestige | |
| Father Not Foreign-Born | 40.4 |
| Authorized at Entry | 42.3 |
| Unauthorized / Authorized | 41.3 |
| Unauthorized / Unauthorized | 38.5 |
| Status Unknown | 39.6 |
| Never Lived in U.S. | 38.8 |
| Average Personal Income | |
| Father Not Foreign-Born | 23,194 |
| Authorized at Entry | 23,847 |
| Unauthorized / Authorized | 22,105 |
| Unauthorized / Unauthorized | 16,988 |
| Status Unknown | 19,567 |
| Never Lived in U.S. | 17,395 |

Table 4. Levels of Human Capital and Economic Attainment by Father's Legal Status and Citizenship Trajectories, 1.5 and 2nd Generation Mexican-Origin Respondents

| | <u>Unadjusted</u> | <u>Adjusted¹</u> |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| Respondent Education | | |
| % Less than High School Diploma | | |
| Not Foreign-Born | 11.8 | 13.0 |
| Authorized / Naturalized | 10.9 | 11.7 |
| Authorized / Green Card | 17.8 | 17.6 |
| Unauthorized / Naturalized | 14.5 | 13.7 |
| Unauthorized / Green Card | 20.2 | 18.7 |
| Unauthorized / Unauthorized | 22.5 | 22.8 |
| Status Unknown | 26.7 | -- |
| Never Lived in U.S. | 37.0 | -- |
| % Bachelor's Degree or Higher | | |
| Not Foreign-Born | 19.4 | 15.9 |
| Authorized / Naturalized | 16.7 | 15.0 |
| Authorized / Green Card | 15.3 | 16.6 |
| Unauthorized / Naturalized | 19.1 | 19.5 |
| Unauthorized / Green Card | 14.9 | 18.7 |
| Unauthorized / Unauthorized | 10.0 | 11.7 |
| Status Unknown | 8.3 | -- |
| Never Lived in U.S. | 8.4 | -- |
| Average Years of Education | | |
| Not Foreign-Born | 13.5 | 13.3 |
| Authorized / Naturalized | 13.3 | 13.2 |
| Authorized / Green Card | 13.0 | 13.1 |
| Unauthorized / Naturalized | 13.3 | 13.3 |
| Unauthorized / Green Card | 13.0 | 13.2 |
| Unauthorized / Unauthorized | 13.0 | 13.0 |
| Status Unknown | 12.4 | -- |
| Never Lived in U.S. | 11.8 | -- |
| % Prefer to Speak English at Home | | |
| Not Foreign-Born | 71.0 | 73.4 |
| Authorized / Naturalized | 69.5 | 72.1 |
| Authorized / Green Card | 57.6 | 64.9 |
| Unauthorized / Naturalized | 61.8 | 72.3 |
| Unauthorized / Green Card | 36.0 | 48.6 |
| Unauthorized / Unauthorized | 45.0 | 55.2 |
| Status Unknown | 41.7 | -- |
| Never Lived in U.S. | 32.8 | -- |

(Continued on next page)

¹ Controlling for Father's Years of Schooling and Respondent's Age

Table 4 (continued). Levels of Human Capital and Economic Attainment by Father's Legal Status and Citizenship Trajectories, 1.5 and 2nd Generation Mexican-Origin Respondents

| | Unadjusted | Adjusted¹ |
|---|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| Average Occupational Socioeconomic Prestige | | |
| Not Foreign-Born | 40.4 | 39.5 |
| Authorized / Naturalized | 42.1 | 41.8 |
| Authorized / Green Card | 42.9 | 43.2 |
| Unauthorized / Naturalized | 41.6 | 41.5 |
| Unauthorized / Green Card | 40.8 | 41.6 |
| Unauthorized / Unauthorized | 38.5 | 39.1 |
| Status Unknown | 39.6 | -- |
| Never Lived in U.S. | 38.8 | -- |
| Average Personal Income | | |
| Not Foreign-Born | 23,194 | 20,683 |
| Authorized / Naturalized | 26,151 | 25,212 |
| Authorized / Green Card | 19,182 | 20,448 |
| Unauthorized / Naturalized | 23,638 | 23,234 |
| Unauthorized / Green Card | 20,061 | 22,519 |
| Unauthorized / Unauthorized | 16,988 | 19,230 |
| Status Unknown | 19,567 | -- |
| Never Lived in U.S. | 17,395 | -- |

1 Controlling for Father's Years of Schooling and Respondent's Age