

## Senses of Race and Place in Berlin and Beyond

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(DRAFT—PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION)

Social scientists interested in migration are, by definition, interested in the movement of people, money, objects, practices and discourses between and/or through two or more geographic localities. These localities may lie within the same polity (as in the case of rural-to-urban migration within a single nation-state), or they may be separated by one or more geopolitical boundaries (as in the case of international migration, transnational migration, or diaspora). Yet it is safe to say, at the risk of stating a truism, that when migration scholars have conceived of migration, they have primarily done so in terms of *translocal* movement(s).

At the same time, migration scholars have also been concerned with people's experiences of settlement following, or in the midst of, migration, as well as with their incorporation into the "receiving society." They have examined the forms of formal and informal association that (im)migrants construct; their relationships with political institutions in both the sending and receiving societies; their involvement in the labor market, small-scale entrepreneurship, the welfare state, and public schools; and their efforts to maintain received identities and orientations and/or construct new ones incrementally. Finally, migration scholars have also attended to immigrants' and their descendants' patterns of residence and movement in receiving societies, perhaps especially when they have been concentrated—or segregated—in zones of disadvantage. Such concerns with the spatial dimensions of immigrants' experiences of settlement and incorporation are evident in some of the earliest social scientific scholarship on migration, including the work of Chicago School urban sociology.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In *The City* (1925), Ernest W. Burgess proposed an ideal-typical model of immigrants' urban spatial distribution based on his research in early twentieth-century Chicago. New arrivals initially settled in slums, in what he called the "zone in transition" or "zone of deterioration" surrounding the central business district. They and their descendants, especially those who achieved a modicum of upward mobility, subsequently moved into working- and middle-class areas further and further away from the city center. The typical trajectory, Burgess asserted, thus consisted of a progressive "outward" movement, and while he admitted that this model could not be perfectly

Yet “settlement” may be a somewhat unfortunate and misleading term if its connotations of “coming to rest” obscure the complexities of immigrants’ (and their descendants’) spatial distribution and circulation “after migration.” For immigrants do not stop moving once they arrive in a particular locale, and space does not cease to be a relevant, even constitutive dimension of their everyday practices and perceptions. In its broadest outlines, then, this paper calls for renewed attention not to those *translocal* movements that social scientists routinely consider “migration,” but to those *localized* forms of residence, mobility, and immobility that immigrants adopt when they “settle.”

In addition, this paper urges social scientists to examine the culturally mediated perceptions, understandings, and resources that inform immigrants’ local spatial practices. To be sure, these practices are conditioned by a variety of material and “structural” exigencies: matters of state policy, political economy, and class reproduction continue to shape immigrants’ aspirations and opportunities in decisive ways. Yet immigrants and their descendants nevertheless reside and move in a manner that cannot be reduced to the decision-making of calculating individuals seeking to maximize their rational (especially economic) self-interest. Nor can it be regarded merely as an index of their positioning in larger class structures and divisions of labor.<sup>2</sup> In order to comprehend immigrants’ local modes of residence and movement, migration scholars must contend with the cultural forms and narratives that not only prevail among immigrants and their descendants, but also define public and interpersonal intercourse in the nation-state(s) where they spend the majority of their lives. In particular, social scientists must take account of the ways that prevalent formations of racial and national identity condition where, how, and why immigrants move, and do not move, through the local landscape. For I would contend that immigrants’ localized modes of residence and movement, in tandem with the cultural understandings that

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replicated in any actually existing city, he insisted that any observed variations were “interesting” but “minor” (1925:54). Burgess’s concern with formulating a general model of immigrant residential distribution is consistent with Robert Park and Roderick McKenzie’s broader project of human ecology, which sought to determine the typical impacts of spatial positioning and relationship on human institutions and behavior (see Park 1925:1-46 and McKenzie 1925:63-80, especially 64). As shall become clear, my own analysis is historically more particularistic, and more attentive to local cultural practices and understandings, in its line of argument and inference.

<sup>2</sup> These points are particularly important given the continued salience of neoclassical economic and structural approaches in recent migration scholarship (Kearney 1986).

motivate them, offer telling insights into the discursive, embodied, and affective dimensions of immigrants' incorporation into their nation(s) of settlement.

I develop these points through an analysis of the “senses of place” with which immigrants from Turkey have invested parts of Berlin and the former East Germany.<sup>3</sup> Anthropologists Steven Feld and Keith Basso (1996:3-11) use the phrase “senses of place” to denote constructions of geographic environs that render particular localities meaningful and that tie them metonymically and metaphorically to collective identities. They thereby call for ethnographically detailed accounts of placed-oriented perception, knowledge, and action that would complement Marxian and postmodern theorizations of space in anthropology and related disciplines.<sup>4</sup>

My primary aim is to contextualize immigrants' spatial sensibilities within histories of discourse, built landscape, and political economy related to Germany's postwar division and reunification. Immigrants' understandings and practices build on prior geopolitical boundaries, like the former course of the Wall, that remain meaningful for all residents of Berlin. Yet these boundaries, and the territories they demarcate, carry culturally specific inflections among those non-white and ethnically non-German residents commonly known as “foreigners” (*Ausländer*), including those of Turkish origins. In turn, much of the specificity of immigrants' sensibilities is drawn from narratives of German nationhood that conjoin race and space, as well as from the ensuing anxieties that immigrants express about becoming the targets of racially motivated violence. Immigrants' concerns in this regard are most pointed in relation to the former East Berlin and East Germany, which many people of Turkish and other origins simply denote as “the East,” and where a disproportionate amount of the anti-foreign violence has occurred since reunification. Yet I must emphasize that such racialized narratives, particularly as they articulated and enacted by actors on Germany's extreme political right, do not exhaustively determine immigrants' senses of place. Social relations and cultural forms that were (and are) operative in Turkey have been

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<sup>3</sup> This article builds on fieldwork that I conducted in Berlin from 1999-2001. My dissertation (Jurgens 2005) treats immigrants and their descendants' spatial practices as one of several key venues of diasporic identity formation among people of Turkish origins in the German capital.

<sup>4</sup> For Marxian work, see Davis (1990), Harvey (1989), Massey (1994), and Zukin (1991), among others. For postmodern theorizations, see Appadurai (1991), Gupta and Ferguson (1997), and Soja (1989), among others.

reconstructed in the course of migration, and they too inform spatial practices and understandings.

Moreover, there are aspects of immigrants' sensibilities that incorporate other elements of German and Turkish public discourse as well as local forms of place attachment.

In an attempt to do justice to such complexity, I shall proceed by moving from Berlin's Turkish immigrant enclaves "outward" to other locales in both the western and eastern parts of the city as well as its hinterlands in the former East Germany. After sketching the relevant history of labor recruitment and immigrant settlement, I first analyze how many people of Turkish origins have come to regard the former West Berlin, and particularly immigrant enclaves like Kreuzberg, as trusted areas where authentically Turkish sensibilities are maintained. I then turn to a discussion of the conventional West Berlin "center," the area surrounding the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church, in order to examine how immigrants have recently appropriated it for nationalist celebrations of Turkish soccer victories. Significantly, these expressions of Turkish nationalism have failed to accord with the shifting sociocultural and spatial texture of Berlin following reunification. Indeed, many people of Turkish origins continue to inhabit the city as if it were still effectively divided, comfortably maneuvering within the former West Berlin while at the very least regarding the former East Berlin with suspicion, if not avoiding it altogether. Accordingly, I next chart some of the spatial tactics (following de Certeau 1984) on which immigrants and their descendants rely to negotiate "border crossings" into the former East Germany in light of, and despite, their anxieties. Here I rely for ethnographic illustration on my fieldwork with the members of a Turkish immigrant soccer club, Anadoluspor ("Anatolia Sport" in Turkish), during a weekend trip to the East German town of Eggersdorf.<sup>5</sup> Finally, I draw on local and federal statistics of reported right extremist activity to consider the extent to which immigrants' senses of place accorded with larger patterns of "anti-foreign" sentiment and violence. In other words, I grapple with the question of how warranted immigrants' anxieties about the former East Germany may have been.

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<sup>5</sup> Anadoluspor was an immigrant soccer club based in Kreuzberg, and it constituted another key ethnographic site during the period of my fieldwork. I belonged to and played for Anadoluspor during the entirety of my time in Berlin. For a more thorough treatment of the club, see Jurgens (2005:206-264).

## **Labor Recruitment and its Aftermath**

More than two million immigrants from Turkey and their descendants currently reside in Germany, and approximately two hundred thousand of them, in turn, live in the capital Berlin. They have established a permanent presence in a nation-state that until the late 1990s did not acknowledge its status as an immigrant-receiving country. Indeed, legitimate membership in the German nation has, since the later nineteenth century, been defined according to ethnocultural, genealogical, and at times overtly racial criteria (Brubaker 1992). These criteria have inhibited public acknowledgement of past and present migration into German-speaking territories, although historians have amply documented its occurrence over at least the past four centuries (Bade 1992, Sassen 1999). With the 1990 reunification, however, Germany entered a period of rapid and dramatic transformation, the effects of which have also left their mark in the realm of migration policy. The most significant steps were taken in 1999-2000 and again in 2004, when mounting concerns about the viability of the welfare state and the global competitiveness of German corporations prompted the federal government to encourage immigration for the first time and ease access to naturalized citizenship.

Most people of Turkish origins can trace their presence in Germany, either directly or indirectly, to a bilateral labor recruitment agreement signed by the West German and Turkish governments in 1961. Prior to that year, West German corporations and state institutions had relied on influxes of German exiles (*Vertriebene*) from eastern and southeastern Europe as well as settlers (*Übersiedler*) from the Soviet occupation zone (and, later, East Germany) to fulfill the urgent demand for wage labor (Münz, Seifert and Ulrich 1997). With the construction of the Berlin Wall, however, West Germany definitively turned to labor recruitment from Mediterranean Europe and North Africa as its primary means of remedying labor shortages that threatened to impede the country's ongoing economic expansion.<sup>6</sup>

Under the terms of these agreements, labor migrants (known in German as *Gastarbeiter*, or “guest workers”) would remain for only a limited duration, returning to their respective sending countries

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<sup>6</sup> The first recruitment initiatives actually preceded the Wall: the West German government signed agreements with Italy in 1955 and with Greece and Spain in 1960. As federal statistics indicate, however, labor recruitment reached its highest levels in the middle and late 1960s (Jamin 1998:150).

once their labor power was no longer necessary. Over the next twelve years, more than 860,000 migrants from Turkey, including at least 140,000 women, came to work in West Germany's mining, manufacturing, and service sectors, with recruitment reaching its peak from 1969 to 1971 (Eryılmaz 1998:133-134, Jamin 1998:150). Yet by the time the West German government officially ended its recruitment initiatives in 1973 (with the onset of the global economic recession and oil crisis), many of these workers had decided to extend their stays and relocate their families to West Germany. Such a move contradicted the initial expectations not merely of Turkish and West German government officials, but of many recruited workers themselves. Most had seen temporary wage labor in West Germany as a promising means to secure a more comfortable, higher-status lifestyle in Turkey. Indeed, many hoped for a permanent, and triumphant, return as self-made men and women after only a few years abroad (Çağlar 1994, Schiffauer 1991, Wolbert 1995).<sup>7</sup>

Recruited workers initially stayed in barrack-like dormitories maintained by their German employers on or near their work sites (von Oswald and Schmidt 1999), but usually moved into low-rent apartments with the passage of time and the arrival of their families. In West Berlin, most took up residence in working-class districts like Neukölln, eastern Schöneberg, Tiergarten, Wedding, and above all Kreuzberg. By the mid 1970s, immigrants from Turkey had formed dense and conspicuous enclaves in wide swaths of these areas, though they never came to constitute the absolute majority in any of them. These districts had been central elements of Berlin's geography in the early twentieth century, but with the 1961 construction of the Wall, almost all of them suddenly became peripheral to the western portion of the city, and many experienced demographic stagnation or decline as substantial numbers of residents moved to more affluent parts of the city. As a result, the areas in which immigrants settled came to be both socially and spatially marginal to the rest of West Berlin, a situation that went hand-in-hand with their low value for both real estate developers and urban planners. Developers, in particular, saw little

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<sup>7</sup> The reasons for immigrants' shifts in life strategy were numerous and often mutually reinforcing: the emotional distress of separation from kin, the inability to accumulate wealth as quickly as expected, concern about Turkey's instability immediately before and after the second military coup in 1971, the waning vitality of kinship and village/neighborhood ties back in Turkey, and, no doubt, an appreciation of the relative security and material amenities of life in West Germany.

point in maintaining their properties in these districts, especially when they could still turn a tidy profit from needy and largely powerless tenants. Thus, by the time immigrants from Turkey moved into these areas, many of the tenements had reached an advanced state of deterioration.<sup>8</sup> This dilapidation was nowhere more evident than in the eastern reaches of Kreuzberg, in the immediate vicinity of the Wall, where the immigrant population from Turkey was at its densest and most visible.

### **Locating Trust, Authenticity, and Moral Action**

Although many former guest workers had chosen to extend their stays in West Germany by the early 1970s, most still hoped to return to Turkey at some (usually indefinite) point in the future in order to lay claim to a measure of upward social mobility. Accordingly, immigrants' residential strategies were partially structured by a combination of economic necessity and the desire to save money. Yet many also came to feel an abiding affinity for the enclaves as places where they "sought and found a whole way of being in the world" that sustained them (Daniel 1990:232-233). In the first instance, many immigrants appreciated their proximity to mosques and other locations where ritually significant events occurred, as well as the ready access to the products and services offered by a fledgling ethnic economy. They also took some comfort in the density of relationships they could maintain with kin and fellow immigrants. Perhaps most broadly, though, they valued the familiar cultural forms and styles of sociability that immigrants managed to reconstruct in the course of migration and that remained prevalent in the enclaves. In particular, these areas allowed immigrants to continue organizing many of their social relations and business transactions according to a morally laden logic of generalized exchange.<sup>9</sup> Such open-ended reciprocations of gestures, goods, money, services, and labor were (and are) a regular feature of everyday life in both rural and urban Turkey, and they were (and are) central to sociability in the diaspora. In this

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<sup>8</sup> For more detailed descriptions of tenement housing within the immigrant enclaves, see Elkins and Hofmeister (1988), Ladd (1997:96-110), and Mandel (1996:149-151).

<sup>9</sup> For anthropological accounts of the social logic of exchange in Turkey, see Delaney (1991), Schiffauer (1987), and White (1994). I would not claim that these exchange relations are unique to Turkey, since they bear at least passing resemblance to comparable modes of social transaction elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa (e.g., Abu-Lughod 1986, especially pp. 65-69; Meneley 1996), if not further afield.

and other ways, then, immigrant enclaves became trusted havens carved out of an encompassing landscape of *gurbet*—a Turkish-language term that denotes not only a foreign place far from one’s homeland, but also the existential condition of being a stranger in a place that affords little security or acknowledgement.

This suffusion of the enclaves with a sense of trust was especially cogent given that other stretches of West Berlin, while not wholly unfamiliar to many immigrants, nevertheless remained spaces marked by a certain degree of unease. First-generation immigrants in particular tended to be on their guard in these other parts of the city. They had to strain to understand and make themselves understood in German, and they had to be vigilant so as to avoid inadvertently committing a *haram* (religiously proscribed) act like consuming pork, a staple in the German diet. Yet elder immigrants’ concerns were in many instances more diffuse than these examples suggest. Regardless of the particular circumstances, they usually maintained a low profile and sought to avoid drawing undue attention to themselves. As one friend of mine who grew up in West Berlin recalled, his parents regularly warned him and his siblings “to be quiet in front of Germans, not to make them angry (*Almanlar önünde susun, kızmasınlar*).”

In the intervening years, many people of Turkish origins did acquire a much greater familiarity with those portions of West Berlin that lay outside the immigrant enclaves. Indeed, they often came to identify explicitly with neighborhoods like Kreuzberg or with the city of (West) Berlin in a manner that did not extend to Germany as a whole (White 1996:25). On several occasions, for example, I heard immigrants announce, “I’m a Kreuzberger” or “I’m a Berlin Turk” while also insisting, “I’m not German.” Yet in articulating these highly localized forms of identification, immigrants from Turkey were actually drawing on a practice quite characteristic for German cities, including Berlin. Due in large part to the capital’s relatively recent absorption of areas that had long been independent settlements, Berliners—non-immigrant Germans included—have often affiliated quite strongly with the particular quarter (*Kiez*) in which they live (Schiffauer 1997:123). Thus, even as they reconstructed a sense of their own “Turkishness” and located it in urban space, people of Turkish origins also drew on “location practices” of distinctly local provenance.

### *Authenticity and Lack*

Of course, the people of Turkish origins I knew did not inhabit the enclaves in some uniform way: they instead invested these locales with multiple meanings, even as they operated against a background of common cultural understandings (Basso 1995:xv-xvi). As a case in point, many immigrants equated Berlin with the maintenance of an authentic Turkish culture.<sup>10</sup> The city's "Turks" were ostensibly more mindful of upholding "Turkish tradition" than those who lived elsewhere in Germany, and they were more tightly bound into characteristically "Turkish" familial relations. Commonsense explanations for this perceived authenticity often invoked the size, concentration, and predominance of the city's population of Turkish origins. Berlin's status as the single largest population center of immigrants from Turkey in Germany was common knowledge among immigrants themselves, and the city's popular media frequently reiterated the point. In addition, I noted a widely held perception among both immigrants and non-immigrants that immigrant populations from other countries were not significant enough in Berlin to draw attention away from "Turks" as the primary focus of discussion related to immigration and immigrant incorporation. Perhaps even more than elsewhere in Germany, then, being "foreign" in Berlin meant being "Turkish." Other German cities may have had substantial numbers of immigrants from Turkey, but they could not ultimately muster the same density and richness of "Turkish" life that existed in Berlin.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> I am concerned here with immigrants' claims about authenticity, not with analytically determining what this authentic "Turkish culture" might be. In fact, the question of what precisely constitutes genuine Turkishness has been subject to renewed debate in Turkey thanks to the emergence of robust Islamist political parties that challenge basic tenets of Kemalist secular nationalism (Navaro-Yashin 2002, especially pp. 19-43). These debates, which continue unresolved, have been transmitted to the diaspora and elaborated there as well. Indeed, several people I spoke with implied that it was precisely the existence of these cultural-political contests in Berlin's diasporic milieu that vouched for that milieu's authenticity.

<sup>11</sup> Berlin's status as the largest center of the Turkish diaspora can be traced to a specific constellation of historical and socioeconomic circumstances. The city's comparative infrastructural disadvantage, in tandem with its geopolitical isolation from the rest of the Federal Republic, meant that West Berlin firms did not begin intensive labor recruitment until 1968, whereas companies in the rest of the country had begun to import foreign workers as early as the mid 1950s. By this time, major sending countries in the early years of labor recruitment, above all Italy, Spain, and Greece, were no longer providing substantial numbers of guest workers (Elkins and Hofmeister 1988:219-220). Labor migration from Turkey, however, began in earnest only in 1964 (Jamin 1998:150). West Berlin's comparatively late turn to foreign labor, combined with the shifting composition of recruited workers, thus led to a marked preponderance of guest workers in West Berlin from Turkey and, in a distant second place, Yugoslavia (Elkins and Hofmeister 1988:219-220).

By contrast, other immigrants noted moments when recognizably Turkish and (Sunni) Muslim ways of being were not maintained, when life in Berlin or Germany as a whole did not and could not have the same fullness that they associated with life in Turkey. These perceptions harken back to the notion of Germany as *gurbet*, as a place of exile where Turks are out of place. For Murat Ekin, a middle-aged teacher who arrived in Germany as a young man, this sense of affective and moral lack was particularly marked during Sunni ritual occasions like *kurban bayramı*, the three-day sacrificial holiday that coincides with the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Speaking in Turkish just before Christmas in 1999, he explained:

We don't celebrate Christmas. But we don't celebrate *kurban bayramı* either. Religious holidays don't really exist for Turks in Europe.... For example, if the holiday is on Wednesday or Thursday, we're working. We don't celebrate. Or we celebrate near the time of the holiday. If the holiday is on Wednesday or Thursday, we visit our families on the weekend. We eat, we exchange *bayram* greetings, we celebrate as if it were a holiday. But it's a little bit without feeling, you know? There's no holiday mood. It's not like in Turkey.

Murat noted that some “religious people” in the diaspora (he apparently meant people who were a good deal more devout than he was) attempted to arrange their lives in accordance with the Muslim calendar and to fulfill their ritual obligations. They called in sick during the three days of the holiday, or they tried to slaughter a sheep in their kitchen or bathroom. Murat and his wife, however, preferred to send money to relatives in Konya so that “they can slaughter the sheep in our name and distribute the meat to the poor.” Indeed, poverty provided Murat with his primary rationale for having the sacrifice done in Turkey rather than in Berlin. “There are no poor people in Germany,” he stated unequivocally. In response to my questioning look, he went on, “there are beggars, of course. But the state looks after them. There's social assistance, the Employment Office, and so on. But in Turkey there are a *lot* of poor people!” Murat here alluded to the fact that the Turkish state, given the country's economic straits and an inadequate governmental infrastructure, could not reliably “look after” its impoverished citizens. “Poor people” hence had to rely on informal networks of support, and it was to these networks that he and his wife were contributing. More importantly, though, Murat indicated that “the poor” was a category of people necessary for the proper performance of sacrifice and ritual giving and the accumulation of divine merit. Their absence in Berlin and Germany as a whole thereby underscored the fact that, for Murat and

others, the necessary conditions for Sunni Muslim ritual enactments did not entirely obtain in diasporic locales.<sup>12</sup>

### *Reciprocity and Moral Action*

On the other hand, some immigrants did manage to anchor moral significance in the city's geography. One example would be Emine Temizel, a close friend of mine in her late fifties, who had arrived as a recruited laborer almost thirty years previously. She was in many respects an unusual woman who explicitly distanced herself from other, what she considered more "typical" immigrants, whom she regarded as excessively narrow-minded in matters of religion, gender relations, and "culture" (that is, art, theater, and film). Nevertheless, she continued to understand herself as Turkish and, like many immigrants, continued to associate Turkishness with specific forms of sharing (*paylaşma*), hospitality (*misafirperverlik*), and interpersonal love (*sevgi*), even as she lamented that these forms were on the wane both in Turkey and in the diaspora. In a turn of phrase worthy of a social scientist, she indicated that being Turkish entailed a particular, morally laden way of "entering relationships" (*ilişkiye girmek*).

Emine had lived in several parts of West Berlin, but none of them had captured her imagination or offered her the same conveniences and opportunities as Kreuzberg, where she resided at the time. By way of example, she once noted how she would be able to enjoy a good breakfast the next day even though she had no bread at home and most stores would be closed on account of the Easter holiday. "You can buy flat bread (*pide*) at a Turkish fast-food restaurant," she said. "One does not go hungry in Kreuzberg (*Kreuzberg'te aç kalınmaz*)." Her statement, I suspect, alluded to more than simply the fact that immigrant-owned stores and restaurants tended to be open when most others were not.<sup>13</sup> It invoked a

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<sup>12</sup> For comparable understandings of sacrifice, ritual giving, and poverty among Pakistani immigrants in Great Britain, see Werbner (1989:151-155, 160-165).

<sup>13</sup> Entrepreneurs of Turkish origins have a reputation for flexible, improvisational business practices that occasionally circumvent legal restrictions. Immigrant-owned commercial stores often stay open later than the legally established closing time, and immigrant-owned bakeries and fast-food restaurants frequently stock beverages and basic groceries (like flat bread, or *pide*) as a way to attract additional business. Because these are not legally registered as commercial stores, they can remain open when other grocery stores legally cannot, particularly on Sundays and important holidays.

moral understanding, a compassionate attention to others' need, that she considered especially prevalent in the immigrant enclaves. Indeed, many immigrants recognized this ethic and associated it with "Turkish culture" more broadly. They also found it lacking among non-immigrant Germans.

A butcher at a local immigrant-owned grocery store used a very similar scenario and set of images to explain the difference he perceived between "Turks" and "Germans." Helpfulness (*yardımseverlik*) and hospitality (*misafirperverlik*), he explained, were the attributes that most characterized "Turks." "Everyone helps their neighbor. You give to someone, later you receive something from him, in the end there's a balance. One does not go hungry in Turkey (*Türkiye'de aç kalınmaz*)." This ethic of generalized reciprocity and assistance marked for him a fundamental moral divide. "Think for a second," he urged me. "It's Sunday and you don't have any bread. Can you go to your [presumably non-immigrant German] neighbor and say, 'give me one or two loaves of bread?'" I knew that he expected only one answer, and on this occasion I obliged him: "no, generally you can't say that." "It's not said!" he agreed. "Or a man goes to a fast-food restaurant. 'I'm hungry,' he says, 'and I don't have money. Give me one or two loaves of bread please.' Turks give, but what does the German say? One word: 'out'! Turks say, 'sit down, friend, have something to eat.' But Germans say, 'no, out!'" At this point, he demonstratively pointed his finger to an imaginary door in the distance. "Why is the man hungry? They don't ask. Later the man commits theft, and the police are called."

The butcher's narrative did, in fact, capture something of the poverty that existed in districts with concentrated immigrant populations. Nevertheless, it is also fair to characterize it as a moralizing account that entered the realm of caricature, chauvinism, and romantic generalization. Some people of Turkish origins would have been embarrassed by it, or would have dismissed it as an example of unsophisticated ethnonationalist feeling that ought to be left behind. Still, I have heard narratives like these often enough to have some confidence that I did not simply call them forth through my presence or my (occasionally ill considered) attempts to elicit ethnographic information. Rather, these and similar narratives offered moral coordinates for a considerable number of immigrants, particularly those who affiliated themselves strongly with Turkey and "Turkishness." Food (especially bread, a dietary staple that can be eaten at all

meals) and drink (especially tea) constituted readily available and meaningful items through which ideologies of morally charged social relations could be enacted. Eating, hospitality, and the giving of food, in turn, became “key scenarios” (Ortner 1973) to which many immigrants turned in order to specify moral dimensions of Turkishness and how it differed from Germanness. And finally, at least some immigrants drew on these culturally meaningful occasions to locate valued modes of sociability in particular geopolitical territories, like Turkey, and urban localities, like Kreuzberg.

### **Diasporic Nationalism and the City’s Shifting Centers**

Immigrants’ senses of place were not restricted to the enclave districts, however, but encompassed other portions of the city as well. In this section, I examine their lived relationships with the conventional West Berlin “center,” an area in the immediate vicinity of the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church, which lies to the west of those neighborhoods where people of Turkish origins are concentrated. More specifically, I attend to the ways that people of Turkish origins have recently appropriated this locale for displays of nationalist fervor following major Turkish soccer victories. In order to comprehend these celebrations and their spatial significance in particular, we need to situate them in relation to Turkish nationalist discourses, Berlin’s postwar history, and the transformation of the city since reunification.

My ethnographic focus is the night of May 17, 2000, when the most successful Turkish soccer team in recent memory, Galatasaray, won one of the most prestigious tournaments in Europe, the UEFA Cup. Once the dramatic victory was complete, thousands of immigrants took to the streets of Berlin in exuberant celebration. They upset the city’s usual conventions of sensory and public order by blaring Turkish pop music from their cars, throwing firecrackers, shooting cap guns in the air, and dancing *halay* (a circular step dance, frequently performed at social gatherings, weddings and circumcision celebrations) in the streets. Carloads and busloads of revelers cheered and waved to one another in traffic as they glimpsed the red and yellow of a Galatasaray jersey, scarf, or flag. Horns blared as fans, holding their arms aloft triumphantly, leaned out of car windows and piled onto hoods and roofs. Cell phones rang

constantly as friends and relatives called to congratulate one another, and fans greeted others they knew on the street with hugs, handshakes, and light kisses on the cheek. One friend of mine joked that May 17 had become a Turkish national holiday, a fitting accompaniment to May 19, which in Turkey bears the title “National Liberation and Youth and Sports Day.”

### *Soccer and Turkish Nationalism*

As the joke about the holiday suggests, many fans regarded Galatasaray’s victory as a national accomplishment. Chants of “*Galatasaray, Galatasaray, Cim Bom Bom,*” for instance, were inevitably accompanied by “*Türkiye, Türkiye!*” One acquaintance of mine, a young man with secularist and social democratic political sensibilities, stated simply, “now we have respect.” This brief utterance encapsulated much of the mood that evening, and it accorded with a prevalent, state-sponsored nationalist narrative. According to this narrative, the Republic of Turkey, following the mission established by its founder Mustafa Kemal, has sought since its inception to adopt “modern,” “Western” civilization and be acknowledged as a “modern,” “Western” polity. The early Republicans, like their reformist Ottoman predecessors, in turn located modernity in Europe, and they cast “European” practices, objects, and relations as exemplars worthy of Turkish emulation.

Hence, the “we” in the young man’s statement both presumed and invoked the imagined community of the Republican Turkish nation, and it positioned immigrants in Berlin, Germany, and presumably Europe as a whole within it (see Billig 1995:93-127). Although people of Turkish origins in Germany commonly perceive differences between themselves and people who still reside in the Republic, in this instance the young man drew no distinction between Turks in Turkey and those living abroad. Further, his statement tacitly situated Europe, the embodiment of Western modernity, as the relevant other compelled to feel “respect” for the Turkish nation in light of Galatasaray’s victory. Finally, the word “now” implied that such respect had not previously been forthcoming. It connoted a sense of vindication in the face of a prior lack of acknowledgement. The victory was consequently a sign of Turkey’s progress, and one that even reluctant Europeans could not fail to recognize. Galatasaray’s success was a

sure demonstration that the Republic, even if Europe had not yet acknowledged it as a fellow “Western” country, had at least arrived on Europe’s sporting scene.

The matches of the Turkish national team and professional club teams against European opponents have been key arenas for the expression of nationalist sentiment since the Republic’s foundation.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, these matches have over the years become sites for multiple, sometimes contending Turkish nationalisms, and the emotions invested in them have grown increasingly volatile. Prior to the 1950s, Kemalist republicanism reigned as fans, sports journalists and state officials regarded the simple fact of Turkey’s participation in international competition as a sufficient affirmation of national existence. By the 1960s, however, ethnonationalist, pan-Turkist and even quasi-fascist versions of nationalism had emerged, and soccer matches became venues for chauvinistic campaigns (for instance, against Greeks during the escalating hostilities on the island of Cyprus). By the 1980s and ‘90s, international matches were invested with outright hostility, resentment, and revanchism, especially against purportedly treacherous Europeans who harbored ill will against “the Turks.” As the campaign against Kurdish nationalists intensified in the early 1990s, even domestic matches became arenas for nationalist expression against those who would ostensibly divide the state from within.

In short, soccer has become an opportunity to rally the beleaguered nation-state during times of social and economic stress and/or to exact revenge against its various enemies. As a result, the sport and its associated meanings partake of central moments of ambivalence in Turkish nationalist discourse, particularly regarding the nation-state’s relationship with Europe. Turkey and the Turks are by turns strong and weak in comparison to Europeans, and Europe is both “an ideal of wealth and development” and “the conniving cultural and political enemy” (Bora 2000:384). A particularly common slogan at international matches evokes the Ottoman military campaigns of the past: it urges “Europe” to “hear our voice, what you hear is the footsteps of the Turks” (*Avrupa, Avrupa, duy sesimizi, işte bu Türkler’in ayak sesleri*). Many immigrant fans thereby plot Turkish soccer matches within an imperial genealogy, casting

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<sup>14</sup> The following paragraphs rely heavily on the accounts of “soccer culture” in Turkey by cultural critics Tanıl Bora (2000) and Can Kozanoğlu (1999).

themselves as Ottoman descendants who are now reasserting their presence in the empire's former (or rightful) dominion.

In a similar fashion, “the effort to win Europe’s approval” and “the anxiety that Turkey might ‘fall into disgrace before Europe’” are consistent themes in soccer-related coverage (Kozanoğlu 1999:120). Turkish-language mass media frequently construct elaborate visions of passionate national unity in support of Turkish teams as well as European admiration for these teams, their fans, and individual players and coaches. Following Galatasaray’s victory over German club Borussia Dortmund in March 2000, for instance, the daily newspaper *Hürriyet* (2000) declared that the team had written a “Turkish epic” and that “Europe is applauding magnificent Galatasaray and the Turks’ superb enthusiasm. This is the longed-for European Turkey.”

In turn, the complexity of the nationalist sentiments related to soccer is matched by the multiplicity of the actors who promote them. State functionaries, the police forces, and the mainstream media in Turkey have all been key actors in framing matches in Republican nationalist terms, but by no means have they been the only agents involved. In particular, the Idealists (*İdealistler*, alternatively *Ülkücüler*), a group of pan-Turkist organizations that support the ethnonationalist Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*), have also been involved in passing out banners, disseminating chants and hand signals, and otherwise promoting militant strains of nationalist sentiment among spectators.

The post-match celebration, meanwhile, has its own specific antecedents. In the German context, both non-immigrants and immigrants have celebrated their national teams’ victories with car convoys and bouts of flag-waving and chanting. In my experience, however, such public expressions of German nationalism are primarily restricted to occasions like the European and World Championships when national teams are competing against one another. They are less frequent in relation to victories by German professional club teams in international competition, and somewhat muted when they do occur. In Turkey, on the other hand, raucous public celebrations with nationalist overtones became regular occurrences following Galatasaray’s victory over the English team Manchester United in 1993. Since then, journalists and television commentators have openly encouraged these celebrations following club

and national team victories, even as they have also warned fans to revel safely and responsibly.<sup>15</sup> Meanwhile, Idealists have attempted to orchestrate celebrations “on the ground” and even to intimidate passersby into joining the ranks of the assembled crowds.

In a manner consistent with this history, then, the post-match celebration in Berlin possessed a complex character. Alongside the Galatasaray flags, jerseys, scarves, and hats, fans also waved the Republican flag and wore sports apparel with the Republic’s crescent-moon-and-star motif. While Republican iconography predominated, however, it was hardly the only national imagery evident. I noted several people waving red flags with three white crescent moons, a symbol particularly associated with the Idealists and the Nationalist Action Party, and sizable knots of men raised their arms aloft and made another sign of ethnonationalist sentiments, the “gray wolf” (*bozkurt*) hand signal. These displays of ethnic and national pride drew expressions of dismay from several of my republican and left-leaning friends. They regarded them as unseemly, even offensive displays of a chauvinistic nationalism. Interestingly, both German- and Turkish-language media coverage of the celebration did their best to erase these displays. In the ensuing days, local newspapers and magazines in both German and Turkish only published photos of fans with Galatasaray and Republican paraphernalia, thereby policing legitimate and illegitimate expressions of Turkish ethnic and national pride (see, e.g., *Berliner Zeitung* 2000a, Güngör 2000b, Concept Verlag & Werbeagentur 2000).

### *The Place of the Celebration*

The post-match revelry was concentrated in two distinct centers: one was Kreuzberg and northern Neukölln, and the other was the area surrounding the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church, Zoo Train Station, and the northeastern end of the Kurfürstendamm (or Ku’damm). I was not surprised by the

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<sup>15</sup> After the Turkish national team’s victory over Switzerland in April 1995, for example, fans across Turkey fired live ammunition into the air, and stray bullets killed six people and wounded eight others. Journalists and commentators have since encouraged people to take to the street with banners and flags, but to leave their guns at home. The cap guns used in the Berlin celebration were thus a tamer version of an already established practice.

enthusiasm in Kreuzberg, but I was curious why precisely the area around the Memorial Church had drawn so many fans. The explanation I eventually received was that this was a “central” place.

Indeed, in the years between the world wars, the neighborhood had been Berlin’s second largest center for retailing, dining, and entertainment, only eclipsed by the area around Potsdam Square, in what was to become East Berlin. After the city’s division, the Ku’damm became West Berlin’s premier street for upscale shopping, and the surrounding vicinity became its primary location for banking, insurance, and other high-end services. In fact, the quarter’s built space was quite literally the product of (and not the mere backdrop for) an unfettered and acquisitive form of private enterprise spurred by tax concessions and other governmental assistance. Virtually no centralized planning occurred, and the result was a vital, bustling area with a profusion of crowds, neon signs, high-rise buildings, and consumer goods—not to mention petty crime, drug commerce, and adult entertainment. In the words of one government position paper, it was the “crystallization point of Berlin-specific urbanity” (Hilgenberg 1986), a site where the very city-ness of the city was on display.

At the same time, the Memorial Church was a landmark meant to remind West Berliners of the destruction and hardship that the war had wrought. The church had been partially damaged in the Allied bombing of the city, but public initiatives in the late 1950s had persuaded local authorities to preserve its shattered tower rather than demolish and remove it, as had been customary with many other ruined buildings (Ladd 1997:177). Thus, the area was also intended as a memorial space, even when the commercial character of the surroundings usually overpowered the attempt at public remembrance. At least partially as a result of this memorialization, the Ku’damm and the Memorial Church were also among activists’ preferred sites for political demonstrations from the late 1960s through the middle 1980s. In 1985, in fact, 47 of 106 registered demonstrations in West Berlin occurred along the Ku’Damm, which finally prompted local government officials to seek alternative routes and spaces (Hilgenberg 1986).

Immigrants from Turkey and elsewhere were not immune to the area’s vitality and excitement, although they were not inevitably at ease in some of the more upscale and/or exclusively German-

speaking locales. In particular, they frequently carved their own sites of sociability out of the wider surroundings: during the intensive labor recruitment of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Zoo Train Station and Wittenberg Square to the southeast had served as important meeting-places on holidays and days off for recruited laborers from Turkey. It was there that recruited workers, especially single men, could meet acquaintances who worked for other companies, buy and share Turkish-language newspapers, question recent arrivals about current developments in Turkey, and depart for excursions elsewhere in the city. These areas were welcome alternatives to the shop floor and the company dormitories, where industrial discipline and cramped quarters severely limited the opportunities for sociability (Elkins and Hofmeister 1988:225, Eryılmaz and Jamin 1998:236-238). In the intervening years, many people of non-German origins have continued to rely on these locales as places in which to congregate, socialize, and pass their leisure time.

Thus, by temporarily occupying this prominent and multiply meaningful location, fans were not merely announcing their affection for Galatasaray and their various nationalist affiliations with Turkey. The celebration was also a claim on space, an attempt to “make it one’s own” (Çağlar 1994:54-55, Peteet 1995:174), in the historical context of migration and settlement. In this case, though, fans appropriated a conventional city center, a stage of heightened visibility, to announce more forcefully and insistently their presence as diasporic subjects in a setting where they have not been wholly welcomed.

### *Reunification and Shifting Centers*

It is important to note, however, that the area around the Memorial Church and the Ku’damm have lost something of its symbolic preeminence since reunification. In the intervening years, urban planners, local and national political elites, and global capital have cooperated to return the historical center of the city—the district of Mitte, in the former East Berlin—to the economic, “high cultural,” and political prominence it enjoyed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In particular, locations like Potsdam Square, the Hackesch Market, Friedrichstrasse, and Unter den Linden have been transformed into (or refurbished as) upscale capitalist consumption spaces as well as quarters for

corporations and their supporting high-end services. At the time of Galatasaray's victory, it was these areas that occupied pride of place in Berlin's hierarchy of commercial, administrative, and bourgeois leisure zones, while the Memorial Church and the Ku'damm were of markedly reduced significance.

Reunification and the re-establishment of Berlin as the seat of the federal government have also entailed a reorganization of the city's memorial spaces. The Wall no longer separates the Federal Republic from long-standing embodiments of German history and national identity like the Brandenburg Gate and Unter den Linden. These locales have once more become central and accessible sites of public remembrance for all of Germany, although in some cases there have been adjustments in their ideological significance.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the memorial landscape is not simply being restored, but consciously elaborated and fortified: the long-debated Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, located just south of the Brandenburg Gate, has recently joined the plenitude of other established landmarks.

In line with the reconfiguration of memorial space, there has been a further shift in the sites most coveted for demonstration and dissent, which has drawn further public attention away from the Memorial Church and the Ku'damm. The Brandenburg Gate and Unter den Linden have (re)emerged as the preeminent sites of political protest, their appeal only heightened by their proximity to nodes of formal political power, including the German parliament. Indeed, some of the constituencies recently seeking to demonstrate in these locales have troubled local and national authorities. Both during and after my fieldwork, neo-Nazis and other sympathizers of the right extremist National Democratic Party of Germany (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) have marched through or directly past the Brandenburg Gate, along Unter den Linden, and/or past the site of Memorial to the Murdered Jews of

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<sup>16</sup> The most prominent example of such memorial revision is the *Neue Wache*, or New Guardhouse, on Unter den Linden. Completed in 1818, the building had initially housed soldiers who guarded the Prussian king, but during the years of the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) it had been transformed into a memorial to the dead of World War I. The National Socialists left this memorial virtually unchanged, and it was only during the years of the German Democratic Republic that the *Neue Wache* was cast, in line with socialist premises, as the "Memorial to the Victims of Fascism and Militarism." In 1993, however, the Kohl government rededicated it to the "victims of war and tyranny," a category that could theoretically incorporate widely disparate groups—Jewish and Roma concentration camp inmates, soldiers killed in combat, civilian casualties of wartime bombing, dissidents in the GDR, and German expellees from Poland and the Soviet Union—into a single, overarching German experience. Not surprisingly, critics have strongly objected to this depoliticized conception of victimhood. On the history of the *Neue Wache* and the controversies surrounding it, see Ladd (1997:217-224).

Europe.<sup>17</sup> In response, several local political figures have called for an executive order or other procedural measure that would declare highly symbolic sites in Mitte off-limits for all demonstrations with a right extremist bent. Berlin's Interior Senator (*Innensenator*) even proposed a general ban for the Brandenburg Gate, the Neue Wache, and the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe that would preempt all but the most exceptional (that is, government-approved) demonstrations (Miller 2000).

Given these recent changes, it is plain that the celebration of Galatasaray's victory at the Memorial Church went "against the grain" in important ways. It and its geographic location did not accord with broader transformations in the lived spaces of reunified Berlin—most notably, with the reconstitution of the city's center in Mitte. Indeed, if the quarter around the Memorial Church remained a "central" place for Galatasaray fans, it could only be considered as such from the perspective of West Berlin before the fall of the Wall. The post-match celebration thus subtly underscored how the city, more than ten years after reunification, remained effectively divided for many people of Turkish origins.

### **Race, Space, and German Nationhood after Reunification**

The particular salience of the distinction between "West" and "East," in turn, must be understood first in relation to narratives of German nationhood that link race with territorial space and, second, in relation to the consequences of political division and reunification. These racialized narratives, which draw particular inspiration from eugenic and racial hygienic thought, initially emerged in the nineteenth century, before and during the course of German nation-state formation and imperial endeavor. They received their most pointed articulation, however, in the discourse of Weimar-era paramilitary groups like the Freikorps (Theweleit 1989) and the National Socialists (e.g., Burleigh and Wippermann 1991). They have commonly proposed an ideal state of affairs whereby white Germanness occupies a pure geographic territory more or less unadulterated by non-white (and therefore non-German) elements. From this perspective, racial difference represents an incommensurable contaminant that threatens to disrupt and

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<sup>17</sup> For journalistic accounts dealing with the largest right extremist marches during the period of my fieldwork, see, e.g., Richter (2000) and Kopietz, Majica and Ehlert (2000).

dissolve the moral and physical integrity of the German collectivity. Since World War II, narratives like these have been consistently condemned, along with the rest of Nazi racial ideology, in the public spheres of both West and East Germany and in the reunified Germany after 1990. Yet they nevertheless continue to inform the representation of Jews, non-European immigrants, refugees, and applicants for political asylum among neo-Nazis, right extremists, and their sympathizers. For those sociopolitical actors who subscribe to them, Germany has reached a troubling and even dangerous level of contamination, and the proportion of non-white elements should be limited and even reduced so that the nation can begin (once more) to approximate the ideal of racial and spatial purity. Neo-Nazis and their sympathizers commonly consider people of Turkish origins to be among those collectivities that fall outside the parameters of whiteness and, hence, of the German nation.

To be sure, such racialized narratives are not the only available means to conceive the German nation, and they have been thoroughly discredited, at least in the realm of mainstream public discourse. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of uncertainty in contemporary Germany about whether the difference that people of Turkish origin embody is ultimately “cultural” or “racial” in character.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, many ethnocultural definitions of the nation, which remain prevalent in everyday life despite (and even because of) recent policy shifts, retain conceptual parallels with more overtly racialized understandings, including their idealization of national homogeneity and their recourse to genealogical reckoning as a means to determine national membership. And finally, contemporary residents of Germany, regardless of their ethnicity, rely on more than cultural markers like language use, attire, and embodied gender relationships to allocate the people they meet into relevant social categories. They also continue to use interpretive schemes that reductively classify individuals according to phenotypic features. Indeed, both non-immigrant Germans and immigrants of non-German origins seemed to rely on more or less the same

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<sup>18</sup> The confusion is compounded by a dominant discourse of difference that posits “culture” as a fixed inventory of behavioral and attitudinal attributes uniformly “possessed” by its “members.” The attribution of essential content to reified “culture,” in turn, effectively casts it as a quasi-natural mandate that can be further grounded in presumed biological difference. This conflation of culture and biology is hardly restricted to Germany, but instead prevalent in much of contemporary Europe (see, e.g., Balibar 1991, Baumann 1996, Gilroy 1987, Stolcke 1995).

dominant frameworks, with the convergence particularly evident among younger people of Turkish origins who have lived much or all of their lives in Germany.

These schemes utilized highly conventionalized and dichotomous body images to construct seemingly unambiguous types. Immigrants and non-immigrants alike, for example, commonly reckoned “Germans” as normally having comparatively light skin, hair, and eye color: in fact, some of my acquaintances of Turkish origins replicated long-standing racial imagery when they argued that the quintessential “German” possessed blonde hair and blue eyes in particular. Both immigrants and non-immigrants, meanwhile, frequently considered “Turks” to have typically “dark” skin and “dark” or “black” hair and eyes. Furthermore, these interpretive frameworks were so deeply habituated that they organized everyday dispositions, such as those governing language use, in powerful ways. Several friends of mine reported that even though they knew I could speak and wanted to speak Turkish, their first inclination during our initial interactions was to address me in German. A few, like Murat Ekin, attributed this proclivity to my “foreign-sounding” name. Others, however, chalked it up to my fair complexion, brown hair, and facial form, which they categorized as quite “German.” Several of my family’s ancestors had, in fact, emigrated from Germany in the late nineteenth century, but I suspect that my friends’ responses would have been substantially similar had my family hailed from elsewhere in Europe. In the absence of contradictory contextual cues or specific knowledge of a person’s nationality, the vast majority of people of Turkish origins at least initially presumed that virtually any “white” people they encountered were “Germans.”

These classificatory frameworks can be traced to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century anthropological theories of physiognomy, phrenology, and racial taxonomy, and they are ultimately based on a series of aesthetic rather than putatively objective judgments (Mosse 1978:17-34). As numerous critics of “scientific” racism have pointed out, they are singularly unable to comprehend actual phenotypic variation, and they cannot account for the millennia of migration that, particularly in the case of Turkey, have brought a great deal of readily apparent variation into a single geographic region and nation-state. As a result, immigrants and non-immigrants alike were confounded on several occasions

during the course of my fieldwork by individuals who did not conform to the dominant interpretive schemes. Cases of “misidentification” did occur, with sometimes embarrassing and humorous, sometimes more disturbing consequences. Yet such “mistakes” did not mitigate these schemes’ taken-for-granted character, and in the case of neo-Nazis and other right extremists bent on intimidation and violence, they provided one of (if not the) central interpretive framework(s) through which assailants identified their targets.

In addition, these reductive schemes did not account for contingent sociohistorical differences within each presumed (ethno)racial category that were relevant to “members.” “Non-Turkish” people who were particularly committed to these frameworks did not acknowledge or even perceive the regional, ethnic, religious, political and socioeconomic distinctions to which people of Turkish origins closely attended. At the same time, people of Turkish origins often conceived and spoke of “Germans,” in particular, as a more or less monolithic social category with few if any apparent complexities or relevant internal distinctions. Consequently, many people of Turkish origins did not routinely acknowledge individuals and groups that would have complicated their conceptual and aesthetic schemes. This was particularly the case with settlers (*Aussiedler*) from the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European socialist states, many of whom arrived in the late 1980s and early ‘90s. Many people in Germany, regardless of their ethnicity, would classify them as “white” and “German” on purely aesthetic-phenotypic grounds. Yet despite their ability to document their German ancestry (and, in some instances, demonstrate a measure of cultural maintenance), settlers have often lacked the linguistic and cultural competencies commonly equated with being German by virtue of being born and raised in other states. Accordingly, many people of Turkish origins did not regularly consider the possibility that some of the “Germans” they encountered had probably arrived in the Federal Republic more recently than they had.

There is one distinction among “Germans,” however, that people of Turkish origins consistently deemed significant: that between “Westerners” (*Wessis*) and “Easterners” (*Ossis*). Needless to say, this social distinction parallels the spatial one many immigrants drew between West Berlin, and the former West Germany more broadly, and “the East.” For many people of Turkish origins, the most significant

difference between the two demographic and geographic segments of the country lay in the prevalence of “anti-foreign” and racist sentiment: although they did not generally deny the existence of racism in “the West,” most people of Turkish origins believed “the East” was an especially conducive matrix for intimidation and violence against “foreigners.” Germany’s twentieth-century history of division and reunification becomes particularly significant here, for many people of Turkish origins turned to it to explain and justify why they considered the former East particularly suspect and dangerous.

Immigrants from Turkey and their descendants drew liberally on mainstream public narratives concerning the former East Germany and its multi-faceted difficulties. Like many other residents of Germany, immigrants with whom I spoke regularly pointed to the high structural unemployment in the former East Germany following reunification as well as the persistent shortfalls in infrastructure and material wealth vis-à-vis the former West. They thereby regarded the region’s political-economic woes, both before and after reunification, as an important precondition, if not direct cause, of the heightened xenophobic and racial resentments evident in the former East. At the same time, people of Turkish origins commonly emphasized that prior to reunification, the new provinces’ population was composed almost entirely of “Germans” who had little if any exposure to “foreigners” thanks to the minimal immigration of people of non-German origins during the years of the German Democratic Republic.<sup>19</sup> Immigrants tended to reason that this long-standing lack of experiential familiarity allowed pejorative representations of “Turks” and others to circulate without the resistance that concrete social interaction would (ostensibly) provide. By contrast, they often reasoned that the former West Germany had significantly lower unemployment and a higher standard of living, and West Germans had somewhat

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<sup>19</sup> Migrants from Poland, Hungary, Vietnam, Algeria, Cuba, Mozambique, Angola, the People’s Republic of China and North Korea settled in the former East Germany beginning in the 1960s. Most of them were contract workers, or *Vertragsarbeiter*, who arrived as ostensible apprentices seeking occupational training, but who worked while in East Germany as de facto industrial laborers. Others were officials in their countries’ respective communist parties, university students, and academic scholars. These migrants, particularly the contract workers, were concentrated in communal domiciles in selected districts of larger cities and smaller towns. They had limited social contacts with “ordinary” East Germans, and most had returned to their native countries prior to or shortly after the fall of the Wall. 190,000 ethnic non-Germans lived in East Germany in 1989 (the most in the history of the GDR), but they comprised less than one percent of the total population. Contract workers never constituted more than 1.4% of the industrial work force. For a historical outline of East German labor recruitment, see Gruner-Domić (1999).

greater exposure and hence familiarity with “foreigners” thanks to more extensive labor recruitment.<sup>20</sup>

The result, according to many immigrants, was that East Germans were especially susceptible to the notion that people of Turkish origins were different, culturally and/or racially, in some irreducible way and that they were not legitimate members of the nation. In these respects, people of Turkish origins were thus very much in line with prevailing public explanations of right extremist sentiment and violence in the former East.<sup>21</sup>

### **“The East”: Avoidance, Spatial Tactics, and the Management of Anxiety**

There was indeed some reason for immigrants to regard the former East Germany as a suspect, threatening, and potentially if not actually dangerous space. During the years of my field research, the Federal Office of Constitutional Protection (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*) reported ninety incidents of right extremist violence in Berlin, about three quarters of which occurred in the eastern portion of the city. 205 incidents, meanwhile, were reported in the province of Brandenburg, which surrounds Berlin, during the same period (Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000:35 and 2001:42, Verfassungsschutz Berlin 2000).<sup>22</sup> In line with these statistics, people of Turkish origins consistently perceived that xenophobia and racism were particularly marked in the former East Germany, and that they were accordingly more vulnerable to harassment, intimidation, and physical assault there than they were in the former West Berlin. Given these concerns, many of them simply preferred to avoid the former East Germany if they could help it, even when they might have conceivably derived material benefits from regular journeys there. Many young people of Turkish origins, for example, pointedly refused to apply for apprenticeships

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<sup>20</sup> The notion that social intercourse across perceived cultural-racial boundaries, in and of itself, (inevitably) promotes mutual respect and understanding is well established in German public discourse related to migration and multiculturalism, particularly in its more optimistic “progressive” strains. Viewed comparatively and historically, however, such confidence in reified social relations strikes me as misplaced.

<sup>21</sup> Other commentators have also sought to explain racism in the former East in relation to the German Democratic Republic’s political culture (Steinmetz 1997:337). They have charged that East Germany’s insistent self-definition as an anti-fascist polity paradoxically hindered public and personal confrontation with the Nazi past. In addition, they have suggested that the German Democratic Republic reproduced authoritarian structures of rule, with the result that fascist ideologies retained a certain plausibility and appeal. In my experience, however, immigrants from Turkey only infrequently drew on such arguments when attempting to explain why the former East was threatening.

<sup>22</sup> I offer a more detailed analysis of these statistics below, in the section entitled “Putting Right Extremism and Immigrant Unease in their Places.”

and jobs with companies located in the former East Germany, a decision that further circumscribed their often limited occupational prospects.

This disinclination was particularly apparent in 2000-2001 following the announced relocation of the Turkish general consulate. The general consulate, located for decades in Wilmersdorf, was the site where immigrants most frequently engaged with Turkish state officials. During the time of my fieldwork, four hundred visitors per day went there to extend their passports, make arrangements for military service, fulfill the bureaucratic requirements for marriage, or withdraw from Turkish citizenship (Berliner Zeitung 2000c). At least initially, the general consulate remained in operation when the Turkish embassy, parallel to the German federal government's move to Berlin, relocated from Bonn in 1999. But this state of affairs violated German federal policy, according to which any single country could only operate one diplomatic mission in the capital.

Turkish and German officials initially saw three conceivable remedies to the problem. The first would relocate the general consulate on the embassy's grounds. The Turkish consul general, however, declared that there was insufficient room on the premises for such an arrangement (Gülfirat 2001b). The second would lower the status of the office in Wilmersdorf from "general consulate" to "consulate," a step that many countries had taken after Berlin had once more become the headquarters of the federal government. Such a shift in status would translate into staff and budget reductions, however, and Turkish officials were concerned that this option would prevent them from keeping up with the current number of visitors' requests. The final option would retain the office's "general consular" status but move it from Wilmersdorf to Potsdam, a city of 200,000 immediately to Berlin's southwest.

Turkish officials ultimately decided that the last alternative offered the most serviceable compromise. Potsdam was close enough to the capital that commuters could still use the Berlin public transportation network to reach it. Moreover, Turkish and local officials in Potsdam had discussed what they considered a particularly convenient location for the general consulate in the city's train station (Berliner Zeitung 2001a). Yet despite these mitigating factors, Potsdam still lay in the former East Germany, and the announcement of the general consulate's relocation met with vociferous protests from

immigrants, association spokespeople, and the Turkish-language press. Although opponents sometimes complained of the longer commuting times and higher travel expenses that the relocation would entail, immigrants' concerns about even brief journeys into "the East" were the true crux of the matter. Many people of Turkish origins simply did not want to enter this portion of the nation-state, no matter how close to West Berlin the proposed general consulate might have been.

In the end, these protests bore fruit as local politicians, including Berlin's mayor, took up the cause. They urged the Foreign Office to make an exception to federal policy, and Foreign Minister Fischer eventually announced that the general consulate could remain in its old location and with its old status: Turkey would be the only country with two diplomatic missions in the capital. Yet even as many immigrants and journalists greeted the policy change with relief, some grumbled that the Turkish government had offered people of Turkish origins in Berlin only lukewarm support. A few editorials even wondered if the announced relocation had been Turkish officials' attempt to rid themselves of "demanding" citizens who made their jobs difficult (Gülfirat 2001a and b). Thus, the debate over the general consulate revealed a vein of cynicism regarding the Turkish state that ran quite deep among immigrants in Berlin. This cynical cast of mind was informed by similar public sentiments in Turkey, and as I shall contend below, it further inflected immigrants' senses of place.

### *Beyond Avoidance*

To be sure, a small but growing proportion of people of Turkish origins, particularly among younger adults, did choose to live in the former East Berlin and East Germany: the number of Turkish citizens residing in the eastern sections of Berlin, for example, had risen from four hundred in 1991 to four thousand nine years later (Schulze 2000). In addition, at least some immigrants and their descendants continued to live in West Berlin while traveling to the former East Germany for work, school, occupational training, leisure, or other reasons. A few people I knew even indicated that they enjoyed the interior districts of East Berlin, especially the upscale and/or gentrifying districts of Mitte and Prenzlauer Berg, but they were rather exceptional. Instead, most people of Turkish origins were not

entirely comfortable in “the East.” It was a locale where the trust with which they had invested more familiar areas of West Berlin was “on trial” (Daniel and Knudsen 1995), if not entirely suspended. In particular, many people of Turkish origins figured that “the East” was a realm where even heightened vigilance might well prove insufficient: they could not reliably predict how non-immigrant East Germans would greet their presence there, and they felt they could do little to alter the social dynamic if local residents interpreted that presence in adverse ways. As a consequence, I sensed that many people of Turkish (and other non-European) origins believed that the most they could do was pay attention and maintain a low profile. Such a sense was perhaps continuous with the concerns that first-generation immigrants expressed in the 1970s and 1980s about excessive conspicuousness in West Berlin.

How then did immigrants and their descendants negotiate “border crossings” between the former East and West Germany in light of, and despite, their lingering doubts? Although people of Turkish origins discussed the various precautions they might take and weighed their relative merits, there was no widely established, commonly shared set of scripts and routines that might have organized such journeys. To a certain degree, then, people of Turkish origins were left to their own devices to define the specific conditions under which they would travel in “the East,” the modes of comportment they would adopt there, and the ways they would deal with their apprehensions. Several people I knew, for example, told me that they would travel in “the East” only as a member of a larger group, only by means of a privately owned car rather than by train or another form of public transportation, and/or only with some means—like hand-held mace or pepper spray—with which they could fend off would-be attackers. In particular, they generally saw a car as a means to exert much greater control over how long they remained in particular locations and how quickly they could leave. With public transportation, by contrast, they felt constrained by an inflexible timetable, and they could not determine in advance whom the other passengers in the bus, suburban train, or regional commuter train might be. Indeed, several of my friends perceived that reliance on public transportation, especially the suburban and regional commuter trains, heightened their vulnerability more than it provided potential avenues of escape. After all, right extremists, neo-Nazis, and their sympathizers were as aware as they were of the constraints that public

transportation imposed. Judging from the press reports of several racially motivated assaults during my fieldwork, racists often targeted “foreigners” on trains and in train stations, particularly during late hours of the evening and night when fewer people traveled and trains arrived and left less frequently.

In short, my acquaintances had developed specific tactics, in de Certeau’s (1984) sense, for traveling in the former East. These tactics created a certain “play” and room for maneuver within the understandings of space, race, and racism that structured “the East” among immigrants and non-immigrant Germans alike, even as they were simultaneously constrained by them (de Certeau 1984:29-42, 91-110). Unlike de Certeau, however, I would not suggest that these spatial tactics were the product of idiosyncratic individuals interacting with the urban landscape and power-laden attempts to impose a racialized order upon it. Rather, the tactics were themselves socially mediated by, and circulated among, immigrants in everyday conversation and practice (Lemon 2000:18). Particular actors did, however, retain a measure of autonomy in either avoiding “the East” altogether or engaging, as they deemed situationally appropriate, in one of a range of tactical actions.

#### *Anadoluspor in Eggersdorf*

In addition, immigrants and their descendants’ tactics were not simply restricted to matters of how they moved in and through “the East,” but also embraced styles of action through which they attempted to manage a sense of vulnerability. To illustrate such tactical “affect negotiation,” I shall continue the soccer theme by examining the practices and commentary of the adult men of *Anadoluspor* in relation to a so-called “training camp” in the former East Germany. In the following account, I attempt to convey how “the East” both surfaced and receded in the ebb and flow of interaction among the men. Their anxieties were not omnipresent or overwhelming during the trip, but neither were they completely absent. In particular, I am concerned with how the men used bawdy and black humor both to articulate and to displace anxiety about “the East,” as well as how this humor fit within certain currents of contemporary Turkish political culture.

In the summer of 2000, Anadoluşpor hired a new coach for the men's "first team," a Swiss citizen of Italian origin named Paolo Mastroani. Paolo subsequently attempted to forge a sense of solidarity with the players, all but three of whom (myself included) were of Turkish or Kurdish origins, by claiming that he was a "southerner" (*Südländer*) like them. He thereby suggested that, thanks to cultural similarities in the Mediterranean region from which they all (purportedly) hailed, they shared a similar temperament and would understand one another well. Nevertheless, Paolo had a complexion and hair color that was lighter than most of the players, and he "blended in" phenotypically with non-immigrant Germans in a way that they generally could not. He also lived and owned his own business in a town in Brandenburg, well away from the districts where most members of Anadoluşpor lived.

Paolo's plans for the club included periodic training weekends with overnight stays in small boardinghouses, during the course of which we would relax and focus our energies before important matches. So it was that in August 2000, he announced a training camp in Eggersdorf, a small town in the former East Germany southeast of Berlin, on the weekend of our first match of the season. Paolo's home and business were not far away, and he meant to draw on personal and entrepreneurial contacts to arrange outings over the course of the weekend: for example, he arranged a visit to the swimming pool and sauna of a local hotel where he knew the managers.

Prior to Paolo's arrival, the only times that Anadoluşpor journeyed into "the East" were for away matches against clubs located in the former East Berlin. At least initially, though, I did not observe any players express reservations about this impending trip. I suspect this absence was traceable to a recent club-arranged outing, following a preseason match, to an Indian restaurant on Oranienburgerstrasse in Mitte. Although I never heard Paolo admit it in so many words, I gathered that he had taken some initiative in the arrangement of this activity. It certainly fell completely outside the routine of post-practice and post-match gatherings, located exclusively in Kreuzberg, which had developed at Anadoluşpor before he was hired. Moreover, no comparable activities were ever undertaken after he left

the club.<sup>23</sup> Nor was the break from accustomed club practice lost on the members. Turan Karaca, one of the more outspoken and well-liked players, noted the change with puzzlement. Prior to the outing to the Indian restaurant in Mitte, he twice admitted, “I don’t understand why we’re driving there.” No one contradicted him or attempted to provide a justification for the outing, so I imagine that at least some of the men shared Turan’s confusion. Several players also confessed that they did not know their way in Mitte, even to the Oranienburgerstrasse, which was at the center of the first area (known as the “barn quarter,” or *Scheunenviertel*) in the former East Berlin to develop a hip café, restaurant and club scene following reunification. Despite their professed unfamiliarity with the area, however, about thirty members of the club participated in the outing, which proceeded without incident. This short trip must have provided a precedent for further ventures into “the East.” In any case, no one (to my knowledge) expressed surprise or misgiving when Paolo announced the training camp in Eggersdorf.

On the Friday afternoon that the camp began, twenty-six of us met at Anason, the club’s café and hangout in southern Kreuzberg. Several players did not arrive at the designated time, a circumstance that many of the members ruefully regarded as typical not merely for Anadoluspor, but for “Turks” in general. As we passed the time watching television and playing cards, several players matter-of-factly stated their concern that we would be served pork at the boardinghouse where we would be staying. They figured that the proprietors, whom they presumed to be non-immigrant East Germans, would either be ignorant of the fact that “Turks don’t eat pork” or would violate the players’ dietary conventions deliberately. Yusuf Pazarkaya, one of my close friends in the club, explained how, during a prior group outing (apparently unrelated to Anadoluspor), the non-immigrant German owners of a boardinghouse had ground pork before the group’s very eyes and begun to cook it. They had apparently made no concessions to their guests’ dietary preferences, and they had offered no alternative to the meal with the pork. This was the first time that any of the men had voiced reservations about the trip to Eggersdorf, and the thought that a

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<sup>23</sup> Paolo resigned after only three months as coach, following a disastrous beginning to the season. Anadoluspor subsequently returned to its accustomed form of sociability after practices and games, which amounted to gathering in Anason, the club’s café, to play cards, drink beer and tea, and watch televised soccer matches.

similarly unpleasant event awaited us unsettled several of them.<sup>24</sup> But they did not dwell on it for long. Turan Karaca was soon relating, with his usual comic delivery, a rumor he had recently heard about food contamination at a local pizzeria. It fell within that genre of urban legends in which restaurant employees surreptitiously “sully” (with bodily fluids) the food they serve to their customers. The men were both amused and disgusted by his story.

After waiting more than an hour for the latecomers, we finally departed, driving in caravan fashion in several cars. This arrangement was common whenever we drove into the former East Germany for matches (five or six times during the course of my fieldwork), but in my estimation it had more to do with not getting lost than with any explicit strategy of safety in numbers. I rode with three teammates, Yusuf Pazarkaya, Ahmet Kaynar, and Ümit Can, in Yusuf’s minivan. Yusuf was in his mid-thirties and worked as an equipment manager for a local Mercedes-Benz factory, while Ahmet was in his mid-twenties and worked as an independent taxi driver. Ümit, in his early twenties, was an engineering student at a Berlin technical college, but he and his father made extra money by buying and selling used cars. Since all of them worked with cars in one way or another, much of the conversation during the hour-long trip revolved around various auto manufacturers, the new models coming on the market, their new features, and so on. Both Yusuf and Ümit also told stories about how they had driven long distances into “the East,” in one case “almost to Poland,” to buy used cars. Neither of them reported any unfortunate incidents associated with these trips. But as we drove through a heavily forested area where the trees pressed close to the road, Ümit shifted the topic of conversation. “It’s really beautiful around here. I like it a lot,” he commented. “But Turks generally don’t leave Berlin. You’ll excuse me, but they’re doing the same shit all the time. They’re only thinking of work and vacation.”<sup>25</sup> Ümit thereby attributed immigrants’ lack of interest in the scenic areas of Brandenburg to an ethnicized preoccupation

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<sup>24</sup> Orthodox Islam proscribes the consumption of pork, but the vast majority in both Turkey and the diaspora avoid it regardless of their religious inclinations. Most of the men at Anadoluspor, for instance, were not particularly devout, but I can recall only one occasion when I observed a member of the club eating pork.

<sup>25</sup> Here Ümit used the Turkish-language term *izin*, which would normally translate as “permission.” Among immigrants and the descendants, however, the term denotes the usually annual visits they pay to home villages and relatives in Turkey.

with work and, through the mediation of periodic visits, maintaining a relationship with Turkey. But he was also quick to invoke immigrants' concerns about racism and anti-foreign sentiment. As we neared our destination, he complained about how pedestrians seemed to stare as we drove by. "How they're looking at us! We're people too!" he exclaimed. It seemed to me, however, that Ümit was staring quite intently at them as well, perhaps in anticipation of a disparaging or threatening gesture. Yusuf, for his part, gently cautioned him against hasty conclusions, and even seemed to question the extent to which Ümit's unease was warranted. "We're driving three cars one after the other. That doesn't happen once a year around here!" Ümit, for his part, apparently accepted Yusuf's warning. Rather than offering a rejoinder, he merely quipped, "It's obvious from the roads."

As it turned out, the dietary concerns that the men had expressed earlier were unfounded. The club leadership had informed Paolo of the players' preferences, and even before we had left, he had relayed the information to the boardinghouse's owners. Other concerns, however, became apparent once we had arrived and were jogging as a group around a small lake in the forest near the boardinghouse. At one turn on the trail, we encountered five non-immigrant Germans, three young men and two young women, standing around a campfire. All of the men had very short hair, but none of them wore combat boots or other clothing usually associated with skinheads. Two of them did, however, restrain big dogs that appeared to fall among the breeds that local authorities classified as "attack dogs" (*Kampfhunde*), their hands firmly gripping the dogs' collars to ensure that they did not chase us.<sup>26</sup> We passed in silence, but shortly thereafter several players jokingly exclaimed, "they've attacked Vural!" when our shortest teammate could not be seen at the front of the group. (He was actually at the back, unscathed, with his thirteen year-old son.) Soon thereafter, someone else joked, "they're coming after us from behind!"

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<sup>26</sup> During the period of my fieldwork, attack dogs like pitbull terriers were potent symbols of masculinist power, and they were popular status symbols among a wide swath of adolescent and young adult men, including neo-Nazis and people of Turkish origins (Haak 2000, Stiller 2000). Based on the number of attack dogs registered with local authorities, the animals appeared especially en vogue in Brandenburg and the eastern districts of Berlin as well as among residents of predominantly working-class districts (Berliner Zeitung 2000b). Following a spate of violent attacks, including an incident in Hamburg where two attack dogs killed a six year-old boy, municipal governments in Berlin and other cities passed laws that required owners to leash and muzzle their dogs in public spaces.

We eventually made our way to an enclosed beach on the edge of the lake. The beach was actually a private establishment, and normally we would have needed to pay admission to gain admittance. Paolo knew the owners, however, and had pre-arranged this stop as well. As we entered, two of the elder players on the team cried out, “We’re running into a trap! There’s no escape! (*Wir laufen in die Falle! Kaçış yok!*)” But we proceeded to play a high-spirited game of volleyball without incident before jogging back to the boardinghouse. Nevertheless, as we once caught the aroma of a nearby barbecue, our goalkeeper, Mehmet Pinar, exclaimed, “The meat smells good!” He then added darkly, “They must have caught Atilla!” Atilla was our team “manager” and a member of the club’s official leadership; he had driven his own car and arrived after the rest of us. One implication that might be drawn from Mehmet’s comment was that we had avoided trouble thus far because we had stayed together as a group. Individual immigrants without accompaniment like Atilla, on the other hand, were liable to be attacked.

But for one exception, all of these comments were delivered in Turkish. I suspect that the linguistic decision-making in these instances was shaped by the fact that Paolo was running with us the entire time, and that the players did not want him to understand what they were saying. (They typically spoke a fluid combination of German and Turkish around him, but entirely in German during team meetings when he was present and whenever they addressed him directly.) The men did genuinely appreciate his efforts, and no one wanted to alienate him or imply that they were uncomfortable with his plans as coach. All the same, the commentary and joking drew knowing, appreciative laughter from the rest of the team.

Over the course of the afternoon, anxieties about our presence in “the East” had taken form as morbid fantasies of dietary contamination, being hunted by dogs, and even being cannibalized. Only the initial worries regarding pork consumption had been uttered with any measure of “sincerity,” but the later remarks, in spite of their “joking” tone, were no less pointed or telling. Indeed, it is likely that these moments of black humor were quite effective in articulating a common apprehension about the potential for racist violence and, through the fabrication of increasingly threatening scenarios that were both

macabre and tongue-in-cheek, attempting to defuse the attendant sense of vulnerability. The later remarks in particular thus constituted an artful attempt to acknowledge and cope with feelings of unease while also working to maintain an amiable relationship with a person, Paolo, who both was and was not a member of the group.<sup>27</sup>

In fact, black humor was a discursive strategy that had become increasingly prevalent in Turkey in the last decade. In her analysis of the 1994 municipal electoral victories of the Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*) in Istanbul, Yael Navaro-Yashin notes that middle class secular residents expressed their sense of uncertainty and panic about the new local regime through jokes, sarcastic stories, and rumor. These forms of informal discourse particularly imagined “worst case scenarios” in which the Islamists would force Istanbulites to wear “Islamic attire” (veils for women, beards and prayer beads for men), restrict women’s movement in public spaces, and close down urbane forms of entertainment like cafés, theaters, and discotheques. Secular residents thereby articulated concerns that they would have to give up those habits of movement, attire, and consumption to which they were accustomed and which they associated with modernity and civilization (Navaro-Yashin 2002:22-29). In depicting these modes of discourse, Navaro-Yashin arrives at a conception of black humor that closely resembles that practiced by the members of Anadoluspor that day. For her, it is “the sort of humor that exaggerates the anticipated calamity to render it ridiculously funny, thereby relaxing the seriously anxious” (ibid.:23).

Such a mode of emotionally laden discourse is not restricted, however, to urbane middle class secularists or to local Istanbul politics. Similar bouts of black humor have become common in Turkey as state officials of all political stripes have been embroiled in corruption scandals and seemingly proven incapable of remedying un- and underemployment, high rates of inflation, and the persistent weakness of

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<sup>27</sup> Of course, much the same could be said about me, and I have wondered what these events might reveal about my relationship with the club’s members. My sense, based upon my own and others’ impressions, was that I had become an acknowledged and accepted member of Anadoluspor by this point. Many of the men came to speak with me in both Turkish and German, and it seemed that, after a period of sometimes lengthy accommodation, whatever could be said in front of other members could also be said in front of me. Besides, since I knew both of the languages that members regularly spoke at the club, there was no easy way to rely on code shifting to “shield” me from particular utterances. There were limits, however, to my being “just one of the guys.” Try as I might, it was a rare occasion when another man would allow me to pay for his drinks or food, although others frequently covered my expenses. Even at the end of my fieldwork, I had not entirely learned, nor was I entirely allowed, to enter into exchange relations in the same fashion as other members.

the welfare state. Indeed, the sour public mood became particularly acute in early 2001, following an economic crisis in which the Turkish lira lost almost half its value in less than two months. The free-fall had been prompted by a high-profile and at times juvenile argument between Prime Minister Ecevit and President Sezer about rampant state corruption, a dispute that became grist for widespread, resentful sarcasm in the media and all sectors of the populace (Erzeren 2001). Indeed, black humor is but one aspect of a pervasive mood of cynicism and resignation in contemporary Turkey, particularly where individual politicians, formal political parties, and state institutions are concerned. Hence, the men of Anadoluspor were, on the one hand, appropriating discursive means informed by a cast of mind with particular relevance in contemporary Turkey. Indeed, such means would be readily accessible to them through their consumption of news accounts and popular culture from Turkey as well as their ongoing relations with friends and relatives in their country of origin.

On the other, they might—and I emphasize “might”—also have been drawing on a moral-historical metaphor related to German history. I am tempted to interpret the joke about the barbecue as a veiled evocation of the Holocaust, during which racialized others were quite literally incinerated in ovens. In such a case, the men would be likening contemporary “foreigners” to Jews and other victims of bureaucratized mass murder and contemporary non-immigrant Germans to Nazi perpetrators. This frame of interpretation, in other words, essentially considers recent violence against “foreigners” of a piece with prior atrocities. Such modes of historical analogy did, in fact, circulate among both people of Turkish origins and non-immigrant Germans. On multiple occasions, members of Anadoluspor explicitly set contemporary debates about citizenship, anti-foreign sentiment, and German national identity in historical relation to National Socialism. And on a more strident note, a couple members were prone to casting contemporary “Germans” as unreconstructed “Nazis” in moments of anger, particularly when the interactions occurred in the former East Germany. Nevertheless, I hesitate to make too much of this line of argument because the men involved in the training camp did not elaborate their commentary with further, more direct references. Given the prominent role that National Socialism plays in German

political culture and public memory, however, it is plausible to imagine that at least some of them had historical parallels in mind.

These uncertainties notwithstanding, it is plain that the men's remarks were intimately tied to our presence in "the East." A similar line of commentary certainly never occurred during my participation in team activities in the western part of Berlin. Even when the men's comments during the run through the forest did not explicitly refer to geography, they cannot be adequately interpreted without taking the men's experienced sense of place into account. Eggersdorf was not a mere backdrop without influence on unfolding social process; rather, the members of Anadoluspor were embedding their interactions within a compelling imagined geography of East Germany.

It is important to note, however, that the men's concerns about "the East" did not wholly dominate the weekend's conversations and activities. They also played soccer, debated the merits and shortcomings of Turkey's political parties, lamented other members' unseemly behavior, complained about the food at the boardinghouse, and celebrated another Galatasaray victory in international competition. Some of them also played cards, smoked, and drank alcohol on Friday and Saturday evening much as they would have had they been in Anason in Kreuzberg rather than a boardinghouse in Eggersdorf. Anxiety related to "the East" was thus only one strand in the weekend's complex weave. The tenor of the weekend, however, would also have been different had that strand been removed.

### **Putting Right Extremism and Immigrant Unease in their Places**

I am not aware that any of the players actually had traumatic experiences in Eggersdorf. Indeed, I have dwelled more on immigrants' suspicion and anticipation of violence in the former East than any actual incidence of it. So readers may be forgiven for wondering to what extent my acquaintances and other immigrants' concerns were justified. In an attempt to shed light on this question, I turn to statistics compiled by the Federal Office for Constitutional Protection that cover the decade following reunification. During this period, the number of reported anti-foreign, anti-Semitic, and other "right extremist" offenses increased significantly, and immigrants' anxieties were closely tied to this post-

reunification conjuncture. To provide additional local nuance, I also rely on figures from the Berlin Senate Administration for Internal Affairs (*Senatsverwaltung für Inneres*) for the city of Berlin in the year 2000, when the bulk of my fieldwork took place.<sup>28</sup>

My position is that immigrants' worries about the former East Germany are not wholly unfounded, but that they also need to be critically considered.<sup>29</sup> Federal and local statistics indicate that "offenses with a demonstrated or suspected right extremist background" have, relative to population, occurred disproportionately in the former East Germany in the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. Between 1990 and 1995, the figures in the provinces of the former East Germany were actually roughly comparable to those of the former West (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2001:36, Steinmetz 1997:337-338). Beginning in 1996, however, the number of right extremist offenses per 100,000 residents in the former East began to diverge more markedly. This is the case both when the entire spectrum of right extremist offenses and the violent offenses alone are considered.<sup>30</sup> In particular, the rate of violent offenses per 100,000 residents for 1996-2001 is anywhere from two to four times higher in the former East compared to the West (see also Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001:40). For Brandenburg, the province that surrounds Berlin, the rate of violent right extremist offenses ranged from 2.29 (1997) to 3.76 (1998) per 100,000 residents in the last half of the 1990s (see Verfassungsschutzbericht 1998:23, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000:36, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001:42). These figures consistently placed it in the top quarter of per capita right extremist violence among all provinces in Germany. As for Berlin, approximately seventy-five percent of all right extremist offenses occurred in eastern districts in the year

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<sup>28</sup> Two caveats are in order here. First, these figures represent only *reported* right extremist offenses. Incidents that have gone unreported, and that are hence not included in official statistics, have undoubtedly occurred; in addition, periods of heightened public attention to right extremist activities have likely translated into periods with higher reporting rates. Second, these statistics are social products of regimes of knowledge and classification, and hence do not "reflect" lived realities in any transparent way. Nevertheless, they provide an approximate, partial account of right extremist activity that, with due caution, can help to contextualize immigrants' anxieties.

<sup>29</sup> The statistics noted in this paragraph include anti-foreign and anti-Semitic offenses as well as right extremist offenses against (presumed) left extremists and other political opponents. Crimes against "foreigners" have consistently constituted the largest portion (about sixty percent) of the total in the later 1990s (Verfassungsschutzbericht 1998:19, 2000:32).

<sup>30</sup> In the federal and local statistics, "violent offenses" (*Gewalttaten*) include homicide, attempted homicide, assault, arson, bombing, and "breach of the peace" (*Landfriedensbruch*). "Other offenses" (*sonstige Straftaten*) include vandalism, threats and coercion, dissemination of propaganda, desecration of Jewish cemeteries and monuments, and incitement (*Volksverhetzung*).

2000. Almost eighty percent of the offenses for which perpetrators could be determined, meanwhile, were committed by residents of the former East Berlin. The figures for violent offenses were similar (over eighty percent of offenses committed in the former East Berlin, over seventy-five percent of perpetrators resident in eastern districts) [Verfassungsschutz Berlin 2000].

These statistics indicate that right extremist offenses, particularly the violent attacks that concern immigrants most, have a distinct concentration in the former East Berlin and East Germany. Indeed, there are areas where it is genuinely inadvisable for ethnically non-German and non-white individuals to travel alone or in small groups. At the same time, the rates of per capita violence in the former East Germany, including the province of Brandenburg, were not so high that people of Turkish origins had to reckon with a racially motivated assault every time they traveled there. In my experience, however, most immigrants were not willing to take any chances: they instead tended to essentialize “the East” as an undifferentiated, uniformly threatening space (see also Güngör 2000a, 2000c). Often immigrants did not distinguish between a district like Prenzlauer Berg (with comparatively fewer reported incidents in 2000) from Mitte and Hellersdorf (the districts with the highest reported numbers), or a city like Potsdam from one like Cottbus. Further, immigrants’ anxieties were often uncoupled from particular incidents of violence or intimidation. Fears remained diffuse, and they were sustained less by first-hand experiences than by media coverage in the German- and Turkish-language press, second-hand anecdotes, and rumors.

Simultaneously, whenever immigrants in Berlin spoke of anti-foreign violence, they almost inevitably referred to “the East,” while they usually perceived West Berlin as relatively safe. But it too has seen anti-foreign and anti-Semitic incidents. In 1991, a nineteen-year-old man of Turkish origins named Mete Ekşi died following a nighttime confrontation with three “right-oriented” young men on the southwestern end of the Ku’damm. They had beaten him with baseball bats in the immediate vicinity of the subway station at Adenauer Square. One immigrant activist explained that he had been particularly troubled by Ekşi’s death not only because he was a peaceable and concerned young man, but also because the incident had taken place “in the middle of the city.” That is, the activist perceived the Ku’damm as a prominent, central place in a fashion very similar to those fans who, not far away, celebrated

Galatasaray's victory nine years later. Ekşi's death continued to be remembered in "progressive" circles—a prize awarded to individuals and organizations involved in anti-racist initiatives was named after him—but my impression was that it was not a prominent part of personal and public memories among local people of Turkish origins more broadly. The Ku'damm and Adenauer Square were certainly not imbued with the same significance for most immigrants in Berlin as Mölln or Solingen, two towns in West Germany where eight people of Turkish origins died in arson attacks in 1992-1993.

And yet, despite these spectacular and widely reported attacks, immigrants in Berlin were less likely to cast the former West Germany as a site of violent anti-foreign sentiment. Indeed, they often attributed to the former West Germany more or less the same sense of trust and safety they lent to West Berlin. A somewhat polarized spatial discourse along an East-West axis thereby emerged, with the consequence that the very real existence of anti-foreign sentiment in West Berlin and the former West Germany was occasionally downplayed, if not altogether denied. This was so even as populous western provinces like Nordrhein-Westfalen, Niedersachsen, and Baden-Württemberg had some of the highest absolute numbers of violent right extremist offenses in the late 1990s (Verfassungsschutzbericht 1998:22, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2000:35, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2001:41). In fact, despite the disproportionate prevalence of right extremist offenses in the former East Germany, the majority of incidents took place, and continues to take place, in formerly Western provinces.

In short, immigrants in Berlin tended to be rather preoccupied with East Berlin and Brandenburg and to regard them as their primary zones of reference where anti-foreign sentiment was concerned. In one sense, this fixation was plausible and understandable: there *was* proportionately more violence in these areas than in the locales where they usually resided, and their proximity impinged quite directly on immigrants' located senses of trust and safety. But one could also draw the conclusion that while people of Turkish origins were rightly worried about "the East," they could (and perhaps should) have been just as concerned with "the West."

## **Senses of Race and Place**

Social actors invest geographic localities with forms of affective, moral, and political significance. These senses of place are socially mediated and culturally constructed, and they are complexly situated within larger histories of discourse, built landscape, and political economy. They are also multiply determined: no single contextual feature exhaustively structures their premises and material expressions. Lastly, these senses of place vary. On the one hand, different senses of place align with social differences. Yet even when members of a single collectivity draw on widely shared funds of experience and knowledge, they also fashion varying cultural cartographies of the localities in which they live, and they reside in them in different ways. Actors' senses of place thus provide a means to trace the intricate formation of social difference and the relation of particular groups to larger collectivities. In the case of recent immigrants, they offer productive insights into the discursive, affective, and embodied dimensions of their incorporation into their nations of settlement.

People of Turkish origins conceived the city of Berlin and the former East Germany in a manner that embraced trust and suspicion, safety and danger. They imagined the western part of Berlin, and particularly immigrant enclaves like Kreuzberg, as more or less familiar locales where they could engage in valued social relations and cultural forms, and where they often (but not inevitably) located ethnic authenticity and modes of moral action. They also associated these areas with physical safety, and they tended to extend a more or less similar sense of safety to the former West Germany as a whole. By contrast, immigrants usually regarded the former East Berlin and East Germany as antagonistic, potentially dangerous areas. They perceived that narratives of (ethno)racial and spatial purity were particularly prevalent in the former East, and that they were thus particularly vulnerable to intimidation and attack as “non-white” “foreigners.” They accordingly hesitated or simply refused to enter these portions of the city and nation-state, and as the soccer celebration and the debate concerning the general consulate suggests, this unease informed their practice in sometimes subtle ways. When immigrants did journey into the former East Germany, they operated tactically by setting preconditions and taking precautionary measures, and they managed their anxieties through forms of “affect negotiation.” At least

in the case of Anadoluspor, the latter partook of black humor and a cynical cast of mind with particular relevance in contemporary Turkish political culture. Yet I must stress that as significant as racist violence was in immigrants' spatial understandings and practices, it did not entirely determine their senses of place. These were also shaped by continuities with social relations and cultural forms found in Turkey, public discourse in both Germany and Turkey, and local forms of place attachment.

Immigrants' senses of place thus comprehended a great deal of social and geographical complexity. Yet they also generated partial, polarized accounts of Berlin and Germany that emphasized some elements of unfolding social processes while minimizing others. Many of these accounts presented reductive, dichotomous understandings of what people looked like, what they did, and where they could (and dared not) go. They were also accorded veracity and compelling force even when everyday events and alternative sources of knowledge pointed out their limitations. Most people of Turkish origins, for example, operated with stereotypical schemes of phenotypic classification that ironically converged with those employed by most non-immigrant Germans, despite the "misidentifications" they occasionally confronted or themselves committed. Local and federal statistics on right extremist activity, meanwhile, complicate the readiness of many people of Turkish origins to focus on the former East, rather than Germany as a whole, as the site of "anti-foreign" violence.

In the long run, however, I believe it is both politically and analytically important to acknowledge immigrants' concerns about racially motivated assaults as understandable and legitimate. Whatever their formal citizenship status, most people of Turkish origins in Berlin were unwilling and indeed unable to move through the entirety of the city and the nation's territory without anxiety, and this anxiety, in turn, did much to anchor their perception of attenuated inclusion in (if not the outright exclusion from) the German nation. Speaking more generally, I would also suggest that close ethnographic attention to (im)migrants' spatial sensibilities offers an analytical lens that, in all likelihood, would be relevant to other populations in other geographic, institutional, and historical settings. In order for migration scholars to take these senses of place fully into account, however, they must be prepared to consider not merely translocal patterns of movement and residence, but distinctly localized ones as well.

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