

Missing a Link?

The Relation between Immigrant Directed Policies and the Position of Turkish Immigrants in France, Germany, and the Netherlands

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the position of Turkish guest-workers and their offspring in France, Germany and the Netherlands. It provides an overview of the policy trends in the field of immigration and incorporation in these countries and hypothesizes the effects of these trends on the position of immigrants in the domains of labor market, education, citizenship and identification. After an outline of the migration of Turkish workers to Europe, the hypotheses are tested. Differences in citizenship and identification can be partly linked to policy differences. For unemployment and educational attainment the relation with immigrant and incorporation policy is hard to establish. Therefore other explanations are explored. Problems with data comparability severely complicate making a good comparison and testing of explanations. The paper will conclude with suggesting a way of gathering better comparable data.

1. Introduction

Immigration and immigrant incorporation are highly contested issues all over (western-)Europe. As in other domains, there are attempts to come to an EU-policy for the domain of immigration and immigrant incorporation. There are already some agreements such as the Dublin-agreement (which affects the right to request for asylum) and two directives on discrimination (one on racial discrimination and one on discrimination in employment). However as in most other policy domains the different interests and policy traditions of the member-states complicate the formulation of policies at the EU-level.

Much research has been done on the position of immigrants in Western-Europe both by means of case-studies (see, for example, Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000; Tribalat, 1995) and comparative studies (see, for example, Joppke, 2000; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005; Soysal, 1994; Weil, 1999; Doornik, 1998). However there is far from a consensus on the effectiveness of policies and the significance of national differences in policies, especially in the light of a growing policy convergence (Weil, 1999; Soysal, 1994). In this paper I want to make a further contribution to these debates by comparing the Netherlands, France and Germany. These countries have historically implemented different policies to deal with immigrants and immigration (Doornik, 1998; Brubaker, 1992; Koopmans et al., 2005), and therefore comparing the position of immigrants in these countries can help shed some light on the relation between policy trends and outcomes. A complicating factor in the debates surrounding policy effects is a lack of good comparative data (Favell, 2003; Doornik, 1998). Different countries use different statistical categories and the make-up of the immigrant population also varies across countries. To minimize this last problem this paper focuses on the position of a specific group of immigrants, namely Turks. Turks form a significant part of the immigrant population in several western-European countries (see table 1). Research on the position of Turkish migrants shows that despite variation across countries, Turkish immigrants and their descendents are in a disadvantaged position all over Europe (see, for example, Doornik, 1998; Muus, 2003; Koopmans, 2003).

The question I will try to answer in this paper is to what extent the position of Turkish immigrants can be connected to immigration and incorporation policies in the host countries. In order to answer this question I will firstly give an overview of policy trends in the field of immigration and incorporation in France, Germany and the Netherlands. I will discuss the extent to which there are differences between policies and develop hypotheses on what differences in outcomes these are likely to lead to. The subsequent section gives an overview

of Turkish migration to Europe and discusses the position of Turks in the three countries on the basis of a couple of often used indicators of incorporation: labor market (unemployment), education, citizenship and identification. These first two terrains are aspects of what is often referred to as structural incorporation. The latter belongs to socio-cultural incorporation. Citizenship can be perceived in two ways: as full rights for immigrants (including political rights) and as the desire of immigrants to become part of society (Doomernik, 1998). Subsequently I will analyze to what extent differences in policy trends and the position of immigrants can be linked and explore alternative explanations. The paper concludes by setting forth a new research proposal that can contribute to fill in the blanks in the debates surrounding immigrant incorporation.

2. Policy trends in France, Germany and the Netherlands

France: 'La république, une indivisible et laïque'

Compared to most other countries in mainland Europe, France has for a long time had an open attitude towards immigration. The low birth rate in France especially after 1860 created a need for immigrants (Doomernik, 1998). After the Second World War the government formulated a framework for immigration and set up the Office National de l'Immigration (ONI) to direct migration. However a lot of immigrants entered illegally and were later legalized by ONI. Many immigrants came from (former) colonies in the Maghreb but also from Spain and Portugal. It was not till the mid-1970s economic recession, that the French government tried to restrict immigrant inflow (Doomernik, 1998). According to UN data, net migration to France has been 4.5 million in the period 1950-2000; 7.6% of the 2000 population.

Not only has French migration policy been favorable towards immigrants, so has French citizenship law. France has historically had an open civic conception of citizenship, with a high *ius soli* component (Brubaker, 1992; Chambon, 2004). All third generation immigrants (of whom both parents are born in France) automatically gain French citizenship. The second generation does as well, but they can choose to renounce French citizenship when they reach the age of majority. First generation immigrants can attain French citizenship after a period of five years, but have to demonstrate knowledge of the French language, a degree of cultural assimilation and have sufficient income (Weil, 1999; Koopmans et al., 2005). France also allows dual nationality.

France has historically attempted to assimilate immigrants into the French nation and culture (Chambon, 2004; Brubaker, 1992). With the inflow of large numbers of immigrants

from former French colonies in the Maghreb this approach became strained over the issue of religion (Doomernik, 1998). Debates started about toughening naturalization criteria to prevent the emergence of a large group of 'faux français'; people with a French passport who have little affinity with the French nation. After a failed attempt by the Chirac government to restrict the *ius soli* component in the citizenship law in the late 1980s, in 1993 the Pasqua law was adopted. This law required second generation immigrants to manifest their free will in order to gain French nationality. However the subsequent socialist government withdrew this law only five years later.

Minority directed policies are virtually absent in France. There are some policies specifically directed at immigrants, but only to those who are not nationals. As soon as immigrants gain French nationality only general policies apply (Doomernik, 1998). In 1981, after the Left came to power for the first time in many years, foreign residents gained the right of association (Soysal, 1994). The main policies targeted at immigrants are directed through the FAS (Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés et leurs familles). These funds are used for language courses and training for newcomers. Although there are few immigrant directed policies, some general policies mainly affect immigrants. For instance those targeted at the Banlieux where mostly immigrants live. France has a highly centralized government and a relatively small civil society. The FAS subsidizes organizations that help immigrants but only a small amount goes to organizations that are set-up and run by immigrants (Soysal, 1994). Up to the recent installment of a Muslim council by the government there were no structures through which immigrant groups were consulted by the government. The recent installment of the Muslim council by the government seems to be a breach with past policies that denied pluralism in the public sphere. However the recent ban on the wearing of headscarves (by students) in public schools, implemented with a reference to state-neutrality, demonstrates the France is not decisively moving towards a higher degree of pluralism.

Due to the focus on a unitary citizenry there is hardly any data collected on immigrants that have French citizenship. A study published by Tribalat in 1995 on immigrants in France that included French citizens of immigrant descent caused a lot of commotion, because it went against the ideology of a unified French nation (Doomernik, 1998). These same ideas about unity were the reason that France in June of 1999 refused to sign the EU Charter on Regional Minority Languages since the term 'minority' was used in the document (Body-Gendrot, 2005). France has anti-discrimination legislation that is also part of the penal code. In addition there is an anti-discrimination section in the labor code, but there are no measures of affirmative action because this would also contradict the ideal of unity.

Germany: "kein Einwanderungsland"

Germany has a history of labor immigration going back to the time of the industrial revolution (Doomernik, 1998). Between 1950 and 1993 net immigration to Germany amounted to 12.6 million people (Joppke, 1999). In 2003 8.9% of the population was a foreign national. After the end of guest-worker recruitment in 1973, asylum seekers soon became an important group of immigrants. In 1980, the inflow of asylum-seekers passed the 100,000 mark. In that year 50% of asylum-seekers were Turkish (Joppke, 1999). The high numbers of asylum-seekers was due to the right to receive asylum; article 16 of the constitution. This article is a product of Germany dissociating itself from its Nazi-past (ibid, p 85). After the article was revised applications dropped (Joppke, 1999). Despite its history of immigration, Germany has continuously presented itself as 'not a country of immigration' (Doomernik, 1998; Brubaker, 1992; Joppke, 1999). During and after the guest-worker era Germany applied strict rules regarding family reunification - especially compared to the Netherlands. It is hard for immigrants to get a permanent residence permit (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung*). They need to have lived in Germany for at least eight years and show language competence and socio-economic integration. Being on welfare can be grounds for not receiving a new permit. Until recently it was also very hard to acquire German citizenship. However people of German ancestry who lived outside of Germany could easily enter the country and gain citizenship. These so-called '*Aussiedler*' came in massive numbers after the fall of communism.

The reunification of Germany and therewith the recovery of national unity, created a more open attitude towards immigrants (Joppke, 1999). Citizenship laws were opened up in 1990 and 1993. These changes introduced *ius soli* components. In addition to easier naturalization, quota for *Aussiedler* were established. An attempt for further liberalization in the early 1990s was successfully countered by big a campaign of the Christian Democratic Parties (CDU/CSU) (Joppke, 2000). Nevertheless with help of those same parties, in 2000 new legislation introduced *ius soli* for all children with at least one parent who has legally lived in Germany for over eight years. The demand for identification with German culture was dropped but a language test was implemented. Dual nationality is not possible.

In Germany authority is split between the central government and the *Bundesländer*. The *Länder* can determine their own policies on issues such as education, healthcare and immigration but they have to remain within the framework as set out by the central government. This general framework contained few immigrant directed policies. During the past decade, some job training and language programs were set up (Doomernik, 1998). Anti-

discrimination measures were limited; it was not until an EU-directive required so, that Germany included anti-discrimination in its penal code in 2005.

There are some differences between the policies of the Länder. For instance the conservative Land of Bayern had mother tongue teaching for immigrant children, but this was based on segregationist ideas and was meant to prepare the children for their return. Bayern even had an almost totally separated school system for immigrant children until the 1990s (Böcker, 2004). Semi-public institutions – welfare foundations - play an important role in immigrant incorporation. They were responsible for the reception of guest-workers (Soysal, 1994). Responsibility for the guest-workers was split according to religion.

Germany has acknowledged few immigrant cultural claims. Although Christian churches and other established religious and ethical communities are educational partners, Islamic groups have experienced difficulties in obtaining these same rights (Mannitz, 2004). Saharso has shown that in the debates surrounding the wearing of headscarves by teachers the argument of religious neutrality is invoked (2005). However especially Christian-Democratic politicians have argued that Germany has a Christian tradition that should not be banned from public life. By law Christianity and Judaism are official religions in Germany, but Islam is not, which means Muslims have fewer religious rights. Mannitz contends Christianity is seen as vital trait of German culture (Mannitz, 2004). Cultures and religions that are not part of German history and German self-conception rarely receive public recognition.

The Netherlands: de zuil

The Netherlands also have a long history of diversity. Lucassen & Penninx have estimated that the percentage of foreign born in the population in the period 1591 – 1800 was never less than 5% and peaked at a little over 10% in 1620 (1997). Like France the Netherlands, has had large immigrant flows from her former colonies (Suriname, Antilles, Indonesia) and from the guest-worker recruitment countries. During the 1990s it also received a high numbers of asylum seekers. Presently the percentage of foreign born is again about 10%. The Netherlands have an open citizenship policy. Immigrants can obtain Dutch nationality after 5 years of residence and passing a small language exam. Dual nationality is officially not allowed but in practice there are many grounds for exemption of this requirement. Denizens enjoy many of the citizenship rights, including the right to vote in local elections and work in public service.

The Netherlands pride themselves on a history of religious tolerance that was one of the forces behind the immigration to the country. The co-existence of several population groups (protestant, catholic, socialist and liberal) was institutionalized in the 20th century in

the “verzuiling” (system of pillarisation). The term is a metaphor of a Greek building; each group had its own pillar. Because there was no majority, the groups always needed to consult with each other and eventually reach a compromise. Though the elites of the pillars were in contact, the other members of the pillars lived virtually separate lives. The Netherlands have rapidly secularized since the Second World War, but the institutional structures still bare the marks of pillarisation.

The Netherlands did not want the guest-workers to settle in the country and the ‘fiction of impermanence’ was the leading principle of many of the different policies for dealing with immigrants (Lucassen & Penninx, 1997). In 1979 the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) report “Etnische Minderheden” (Ethnic Minorities) stated immigrants were settlers and not temporary sojourners and that a policy should be implemented to help their incorporation. In response, the government in 1983 published the “minderhedennota” (Minorities memorandum). The policy became known as “integratie met behoud van eigen identiteit” (integration with the preservation of migrants’ own identity). Criteria for funding and consultation stimulated immigrants to organize on basis of collective identities such as ethnicity (Soysal, 1994). Though multicultural society was portrayed as an ideal and culture was seen as a factor contributing to emancipation, policies were mainly focused on the problematic socio-economic position of certain immigrant groups. Only groups in a disadvantaged position could receive subsidies that stimulated them to emancipate within their own cultural framework. In the 1990s the ongoing concern over the socio-economic position of immigrants resulted in a stronger focus on socio-economic position. State support for cultural maintenance was ended and the idea of using the system of pillarisation as means for emancipation was largely abandoned¹. The government policies would from then on solely focus on the labor market and equal opportunity, nevertheless the consultative bodies along migrant-group lines remained intact (Vermeulen et al., 2000). This policy shift was part of a more general attitude change of that time towards a more activating and liberal welfare state with a strong focus on individual responsibility (see, for example, Entzinger, 2003). From being regarded as a means to emancipation, culture is more and more regarded as (part of) the cause of a lot of immigrant problems. The political turbulence caused

¹ Nevertheless immigrant groups continue to use provisions created. They received funds for social and cultural activities, opened several schools and got airtime on the public broadcasting channels. However they did not establish a full grown pillar because the situation was quite different from the start of pillarisation. The groups were quite small and not necessary to form consensus. Although the old pillars differed the building had ‘one roof’ based on the elite – something absent with most new groups - but also on shared characteristics; they were one nation. Some have contended these commonalities were lacking with the new groups (Scheffer, January 29th 2000; Entzinger, 1999, p. 20).

by Pim Fortuijn revolved around immigrants' lack of cultural assimilation. Other parties have adopted this discourse. Nevertheless pluralism has not been totally abandoned; the ethnicity-based consultative bodies are still in place and were recently expanded with the introduction of a Muslim council.

Though immigrant culture no longer is a relevant policy concept, many policies are solely directed at specific ethnic groups. Till 2004 affirmative action laws were in place in order to increase minority employment. Schools receive more money for children of designated immigrant background than for other children². In addition the Netherlands have a fairly extensive anti-discrimination policy. Discrimination is included in both penal and civil law and there is a special committee for equal treatment that has no judicial power, but is nevertheless regarded as highly influential.

Hypothesis

On the basis of a comparison of the policies that France, Germany and the Netherlands have pursued over the last decades, it is possible to formulate several hypotheses regarding the position of immigrants on the chosen indicators: labor market (measured as unemployment), educational attainment, citizenship and identification.

1. Immigrants will have the best labor market position in the Netherlands and the worst in Germany

The Netherlands have had the most policies directed at immigrants' employment. Policies included anti-discrimination measures, affirmative action programs and several special agreements on the employment of minorities³. In addition, since 1985 non-citizens are allowed to work in the civil service. France has had anti-discrimination measures including ones in the Labor law, but no affirmative action or other targeted policies. In France non-citizens are not allowed to work in civil service, but because it is relatively easy to become a citizen, this will not have a big impact. The virtual absence of anti-discrimination legislation and targeted policies in Germany leads to the expectation that immigrant employment will be lowest in Germany. Also in combination with the fact that most civil service jobs are

² For each immigrant child a school receives 1.9 times the amount of money it receives for 'regular' children, schools receive 1.2 times this amount for children of Dutch disadvantaged backgrounds. If the number of "1.9 children" exceeds a certain level, a school receives even more money.

³ The best know agreements are the '1000-job program' for Moluccans and the covenant with mid and small sized enterprises (MKB-convenant)

exclusively for nationals (Böcker, 2004), and contrary to France, citizenship is hard to acquire, making the civil service jobs out of reach for most immigrants.

2. Immigrants in the Netherlands will perform best in schools

The Netherlands provided most extra funds on the basis of ethnicity of school children. If these funds served their purpose, immigrant children will have performed relatively well in school. Because in Germany the responsibility for education lies with the Länder, varying policies have been developed, ranging from Dutch style extra funding in North-Rhine Westphalia to almost complete segregation in Bavaria (Böcker, 2004). The achievements of children will vary over Länder accordingly. France has not provided extra funds for immigrant children.

3. France will have the highest rate of naturalization, Germany the lowest

France has the strongest assimilation tradition of all three countries. Citizenship is easy to acquire, immigrants do not have to give up the nationality of their country of origin⁴ and there is a (strong) republican discourse that stimulates immigrants to see themselves as French. Citizenship also grants political rights and the right to work in the civil service. Because of the combination of low barriers with gains in political rights and positive discourse, France is likely to have the highest naturalization rate. Germany until 2000 had neither an easily acquired citizenship nor encouraged immigrants to naturalize. Citizenship does provide a more secure residence status, facilitates family reunification and grants political rights (Diehl & Blohm, 2003). Despite the high gains of naturalization, the high barriers (till 2000), bureaucracy (Koopmans et al., 2005) and the negative discourse make it likely that Germany will have the lowest naturalization rate. In the Netherlands immigrants without citizenship, have almost full rights, including the right to vote and be elected in local elections. The gains of naturalization are political rights on the provincial and national level and a somewhat less restricted family reunification⁵. The barriers to naturalization are fairly low, also because in practice dual citizenship is often allowed. The discourse is somewhat ambivalent; immigrants are neither encouraged nor discouraged to naturalize. All in all the Netherlands are likely to have an intermediate naturalization rate.

⁴ A study by Venema and Grimm (2002) has shown that the desire to retain the Turkish nationality is the most important reason for Turkish immigrants in Germany not to apply for naturalisation (quoted in Böcker, 2004)

⁵ Dutch nationals are allowed to bring family or a foreign partner over on a lower income, than permanent residents who are not nationals.

4. Immigrants in France will most identify with their country of residence and least with their country of origin. Immigrants in Germany will identify least with their country of residence and most with their country of origin. Immigrants in the Netherlands will identify with both their country of residence and of origin

The French republican discourse that does not distinguish between citizens on the basis of ethnic background. In combination with the easy access to citizenship, it is probable that immigrants in France most identify with France. On the other hand the almost denial of the relevance of immigrant background makes it probable they will little identify with their country of origin. In Germany the exclusionist discourse that till recently was complimented with an exclusionist citizenship policy make it likely that immigrants in Germany will continue to identify with their country of origin and little with Germany. The Dutch policy is a combination of inclusiveness and an emphasis on ethno-cultural background. Likely this creates a condition in which immigrants both identify with their country of origin and with the Netherlands.

3. Turkish migration to Europe

Before testing the hypotheses it is useful to get some perspective on the history of Turkish migration to western-Europe. There is a numerous presence of Turkish migrants in most western-European countries totaling over 3 million people (Öztaş Ayhan et al., 2000). Germany has the largest Turkish origin population of over two million which amounts to almost 3% of the total population (see table 1). France and the Netherlands also have a significant Turkish population, but much smaller than the one in Germany.

Large scale migration of Turks to Western-Europe started with labor recruitment during the economic boom after the Second World War. In 1961 West-Germany was the first country to sign a recruitment agreement with Turkey. In the following years Turkey also signed agreements with the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, France, and Sweden⁶. Till the end of recruitment in 1973 Turkish government agencies send 790,000 workers to Europe of which more than 80% went to Germany. Turkey has no colonial links with any of the recruitment countries but it was no coincidence that Germany was the first to recruit Turkish workers; there is a long standing connection between the German and the Ottoman Empire (Abadan-Unat, 1976).

⁶ Turkish emigration was not limited to Europe, workers also went to Lybia, the Gulf region and the USSR (see, for example, (Abandan-Unat et al., 1976; Martin, 1991).

	Absolute number of Turkish immigrants in 1972 ¹	As % of population ⁵ (1972)	Absolute number of Turkish immigrants at present ³	As % of population ⁵ (2001)
Germany	497,000	0.6%	2,110,223	2.7%
France	18,800	-	261-301,000 ⁴	0.5%
Netherlands	27,200	0.2%	<300,000	1.9%
Austria	23,200	0.3%	138,220	1.7%
Switzerland	9,500	0.2%	<80,000	1.1%
UK	2,700	-	72,500	1.2%
Belgium	8,500 ²	0.1%	70,701	0.7%
Denmark	2,400	-	35,866	0.7%
Sweden	2,800	-	36,559	0.4%

¹ Source: Paine 1974, p 57, based on the data of the Turkish ES

² includes Luxembourg

³ Due to differences in statistical definitions, these numbers are not completely comparable and should only be seen as an indication of the presence of Turkish immigrants. Source: De Tapia 2001, p 16-17

⁴ Depending on the data source

⁵ Source: Eurostat.

Table 1 Presence of Turkish migrants in several European countries in absolute and relative numbers, 1972, 2001

The recruitment process

Turks who wanted to work abroad had to apply to the Turkish Employment Service (ES). Applicants had to be literate and aged 18-35 or, if they were skilled, 18-45. The supply of workers soon exceeded the demand. Recruitment did not fully go according to time of enrolment. Nominative recruitment allowed people to surpass the waiting list. An employer could specifically request a certain worker by name. Often people already abroad tried to persuade an (and often their) employer to nominate a friend or relative of theirs for a job. Over the period 1965 – 1975 33.8% of workers got recruited in this fashion (Penninx & Van Renselaar, 1976). Not all migrants went to Europe via the official channels. Many also came illegally, often as ‘tourists’. Estimates range from 20% (Akgündüz, 1993b) to 40% (Penninx & Van Velzen, 1976) of the total number of Turkish emigrant workers. Chain migration was important for these last two forms of ‘recruitment’ (Den Exter, 1993).

On the basis of a number of sample surveys⁷ in both Turkey and the recruiting countries several assertions can be made: most migrants were not unemployed at moment of departure for Europe, there is an under-representation of workers from rural and

⁷ For several reasons the data on the numbers and origin of Turkish workers are not very precise or reliable. One of the reasons is the scale of illegal migration, another is the complicated priority system that induced fraud, and in addition internal migration that obscures the origins of migrants (see, for example, Abadan-Unat et al, 1976). Paine suggests data from sample surveys can give an indication on the make-up of the migrant flow (1974).

underdeveloped regions, there is an overrepresentation of male workers aged 20-40 and the general educational and professional skills level of the migrant workers was much above the Turkish average(see also, Penninx, 1982).

There is a difference in both the amount of Turkish workers to different European countries as in the characteristics of these workers. Germany took in relatively many skilled workers and women. Origin regions also differ. Companies and countries set up their own recruitment centers which influenced the make up of the Turkish worker population in the different European countries. Dutch employers mostly recruited in South-Central Anatolia. About half of the Turks living in the Netherlands in 1984 originate from North and South-Central Anatolia (CBS, 1987). Swedish interpreters had connections in Konya and mainly recruited there, for similar reasons a large portion of workers in Belgium came from Afyon-Emirdağ (Akgündüz, 1993a). In West-Germany a relatively high percentage has urban origins and comes from the western provinces Thracia and Maramara and many Turks in France are also from Afyon-Emirdağ.

There was also a difference in the relative importance of nominative recruitment for the different host countries. For France it was the main source - 59.4% of official inflow from 1965 to June 1975 -, for the Netherlands it was of minor importance - 14.4% over the same period (Penninx et al., 1976). This could have influenced the make up of the Turkish populations since nominative recruitment is more likely to go along kinship and acquaintance lines. Additionally France had a more relaxed policy towards 'spontaneous migrants' and is likely to have received more of them for that reason. In 1962 it concerned 48% of all entries, in 1968 82% (Muus, Penninx, & Van Amersfoort, 1983). All things considered it is not unlikely that the make-up of the flow of Turkish workers to different countries showed significant variation.

Ongoing migration

At first, recruitment was meant to go according to rotation, but this plan was soon abandoned because employers wanted to keep their experienced personnel (Tränhardt, 2002). In the early phase (1961-1967) return migration was frequent but it decreased over time. By the start of the 1980s, merely 30% of total inflow of Turks in period 1961-1976 to Germany had returned to Turkey (Böhning, 1980 quoted in Penninx, 1982). Dutch data suggest an even lower percentage (Akgündüz, 1993a). The host countries implemented laws to encourage return. France instituted a 'departure premium' in 1977. In 1983, Germany introduced a law giving returning migrants a premium and early retirement funds (Tränhardt, 2002). In 1995 the

Netherlands instituted a remigration law. Germany was most successful in stimulating return migration; in the early 1980s emigration exceeded immigration by about five to six times (Muus, 2003; Böcker, 2004).

Despite the 1973 end to large scale recruitment, Turkish immigration continued through nominative recruitment and ‘tourism’. Family reunification and –formation that started in the 1970s led to a further increase in migration. Currently family formation (marriage migration) is the main source for the continuing inflow of Turkish immigrants to Europe (Öztas Ayhan et al., 2000). There were (and are) differences between countries in the attitude towards family migration, Germany has a much stricter policy than the Netherlands. It for instance had a ‘wartefrist’ which meant family migrants were not allowed to work the first two years after immigration. These measures affected the continuation of the migrant flow. While Turkish immigration to Germany stabilized after 1984, there was an up rise in immigration to the Netherlands during the second half of the 1980s that amounted to the same numbers as in the years of recruitment (Muus, 2003). In France the number of Turkish immigrants doubled between 1975 and 1999 (INSEE).

For about two decades asylum migration was also significant. The semi-military regime of 1971-1973 caused the first wave of political migrants, mostly to Germany (Akgündüz, 1993). The coup d’etat of 1980 caused a second wave. Many Kurds also sought refuge in Western-Europe. Between 1980 and 1995 350,000 Kurdish asylum seekers arrived (Öztas Ayhan et al., 2000). The closing of the door to labor migrants is likely to have heightened the number of people who claimed refugee status to enter Western-Europe. Especially West-Germany, with its at that time lenient legislation, received many Turkish asylum-seekers.

4. After the end of recruitment; where are they now

Nermin Abadan-Unat was one of the first to do extensive research among the Turkish guest-worker populations. She found most had experienced downward labor market mobility compared to their positions in Turkey (see, for example, Abadan-Unat, 1976). At the same time that family reunification was rising, many of the guest-workers lost their jobs due to the restructuring of the economy that especially hit the sectors they were employed in.

The data I use are often based on different statistical categories for different countries and should therefore be interpreted with care. They can only be seen as *an indication* of the relative position of Turkish immigrants⁸.

Labor market status

	France		Netherlands		Germany ³	
	Turks	total	Turks	total	Turks	total
1979					4.2%	3.2%
1980					6.3%	3.5%
1981					11.2%	5.4%
1982					14.9%	7.5%
1983					16.7%	8.6%
1984			30% ¹		14.4%	8.6%
1985					14.8%	8.7%
1986					14.5%	8.2%
1987			23% ²	8% ²	15.5%	8.4%
1988					14.5%	8.1%
1989					11.6%	7.3%
1990			28% ²	6% ²	10.0%	6.6%
1991					11.0%	6.0%
1992					13.5%	6.5%
1993					17.4%	8.3%
1994			30.0 %	7.0%	18.9%	8.8%
1995	29.3% ⁴	11.6% ⁴	28.0%	7.0%	19.2%	9.0%
1996			22.6%	6.2%	22.5%	10.0%
1997			20.8%	5.2%	24.0%	10.7%
1998			15.0%	4.1%	22.7%	9.8%
1999			12.2%	3.4%	22.5%	11.2%
2000			7.8%	3.0%	20.2%	10.0%
2001			8.4%	2.8%	21.3%	10.0%
2002			9.7%	3.3%	22.7%	10.5%
2003			11.8%	4.2%		
2004			11.5%	5.2%		

¹ source, CBS, 1987

² source, SCP 2003, (quoted in Böcker, 2004)

³ source: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, cited by Zentrum für Türkeistudien <http://www.zft-online.de/deutsch.php>

⁴ source: INSEE 1997 (quoted in Doomernik, 1998)

Source CBS statline

Table 2 Unemployment figures of Turks and total population in France, the Netherlands and Germany 1979-2004

⁸ This problem not only occurs with the use of data collected by government agencies but also often occurs with data gathered in case-studies in different countries. Studies that were conducted in one country usually used the dominant definition of immigrants in that country; so including only foreign nationals in Germany and including both first and second generation in the Netherlands, no matter their nationality. A notable exception is the work of Tribalat in France (1995) that attempted to surpass the nationality-based definition.

Unemployed among Turks increased throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s. In all three countries, Turks are in a disadvantaged position relative to the host population but also compared to other groups of immigrants. Table 2 presents the unemployment figures of Turks and of the host country population. For France there are only data that include French citizens of Turkish birth for 1995. In that year unemployment among Turks was the highest of all migrants groups in France with 29.3%. Which was also the highest unemployment compared to Germany and the Netherlands.

Till the 1990s the unemployment of Turks in Germany is lower than in the Netherlands. After that the picture depends on whether unemployed is compared in relative or absolute terms. The unemployment figure of Turks in Germany is higher than that in the Netherlands, but so is the unemployment figure for natives. The relative unemployment of Turks in Germany is lower; two times that of the native population compared to roughly three times in the Netherlands⁹ (see also, Koopmans, 2002). The hypothesis for unemployment is falsified; the position of Germany and the Netherlands are inverted.

The second generation: educational attainment

In France the Turkish second generation has the highest dropout rate of all three countries, but also the highest percentage of entry of higher education (Crul & Vermeulen, 2003). The German situation is a mirror image: low dropout rates combined with a low attendance of higher education. The position of Turkish schoolchildren varies over the Länder, in Länder with an on average higher educational attainment, Turkish children also perform better (Worbs, 2003). The Netherlands are somewhat in between - but closer to France - on both dimensions. On the basis of this information the hypothesis can be confirmed nor falsified because of the different direction of the difference on the two dimensions.

Citizenship

In both the Netherlands and Germany the naturalization rates of Turks are above average (Böcker, 2004). In Germany the average rate is 1.9%¹⁰ and of the Netherlands 9.4% (Böcker, 2004; Böcker, 1994). According to Böckers computations 70% of Turkish immigrants and their children in the Netherlands currently have Dutch nationality, but only 20% in Germany has German nationality. The French rate is lower than the Dutch, and recent Turkish

⁹ The relative position of Turks in the Netherlands is probably even worse; there is a lot of hidden unemployment among the almost one million people that are on disability benefits including many Turks.

¹⁰ Meaning 1.9% of the people with Turkish nationality naturalized that year.

immigrants show low naturalization rates (Muus, 2003). In the sample for the Euro-Turks study of Kaya and Kentel 26.2% of German and 35.5% of French respondents had acquired citizenship (2005). Although Germany does indeed seem to have the lowest naturalization rate, contrary to the hypothesis not France but the Netherlands have the highest naturalization rate.

Identification

The sample of the Euro-Turks study also shows that Turkish immigrants in Germany identify less with their host country than Turkish immigrants in France and more with Turkey (see table 3). A study by Sackmann et al of over a hundred interviews showed almost third of second generation and half of the overall sample only identified themselves as Turks and less than 5% as Germans (Sackmann, Prumm, & Schultz, 2002). A study by Phalet et al. among Turkish second generation youth in Rotterdam shows considerably lower levels of primary identification with the host country and considerably higher levels of identification with Turkey than the Euro-Turks data on Germany and France (Phalet, Vanloteringen, & Entzinger, 2000). In a 1998 study among immigrants groups in the Netherlands, 93% of Turkish second generation said they identified with Turkey (ISEO/SCP, SPVA 1998).

	Germany		Total	2 nd gen	France		Netherlands
	Total	2 nd gen			Total	2 nd gen	2 nd gen
Turkey	49%	25.0%	46%	<33%	36%	22.9%	79%
Host country	22%	35.2%	2%	<5%	25%	30.3%	3%

Source: Germany, Kaya & Kentel 2004, Sackmann, Prumm, & Schultz, 2002; France, Kaya & Kentel 2004, Netherlands (Phalet et al., 2000)

Note: the Dutch data were only gathered in the city of Rotterdam

Table 3 Primary identification of Turks with host country and Turkey

With regards to identification with Turkey, the difference between France and Germany is as hypothesized. The identification with the host country shows an interesting difference between the findings of the two German samples. The Dutch sample shows the highest level of identification with Turkey and a low identification with the Netherlands. Again the data do not allow definitive conclusions.

5. Discussion and suggestion for further research

As mentioned in the introduction, it is hard to find good comparative data that can be used for an international comparison of the position of immigrants. On the basis of the data presented

in this paper it is safe to assume that at least there are differences between countries. The next step is to see to what extent these differences can be contributed to differences in policies or other factors. Does the repudiation of two hypotheses and the lack of support for the other two mean that immigration and incorporation policies are not relevant? Some authors have argued that it does. Crul and Vermeulen for instance argue that incorporation policies do not have a systematic effect on educational attainment of the second generation (2003). They state that the difference in educational attainment of immigrants is a consequence of the *general characteristics of the educational system* of the host countries. Böcker & Tränhardt have argued that the *restructuring of the economic sectors* that employed many Turks went slower in Germany than in the Netherlands, and that this could have had a less negative impact on the unemployment rates in Germany (Böcker & Tränhardt, 2002). Muus claimed there is no connection between the labor market position of Turkish immigrants and the incorporation policies in those countries (2003). However both Muus and Böcker & Tränhardt also argue that the relatively favorable labor market position of Turkish immigrants in Germany can be due to a difference in immigration policies. Germany has a more strict family reunification policy and less secure residence status that limited Turkish migration to Germany and allowed the country to ‘export unemployment’ (Muus, 2003; Böcker et al., 2002). Koopmans contends that at least in the Netherlands, incorporation policies did have an effect on the position of immigrants but one opposite to the aims. He argues that the Dutch stress on ethnic background has made the government reluctant to stimulate Dutch language acquisition among immigrants and has stimulated segregation. These factors in turn have had negative consequences for labor market participation, educational attainment and identification of migrants (Koopmans, 2002).

It is hard to separate the effect of immigration and incorporation policies; how well off would the group of immigrants in Germany have been if they had lived under the Dutch incorporation policies? Or the group in France if the country had had a immigration policy similar to that of Germany? Immigration and incorporation policies are not completely separate entities. Not only because incorporation policies can only effect those who were allowed to enter a country in the first place, but also because both spring from a certain outlook on migration that is related to ideas about membership of the nation. The Netherlands has had a fairly lenient migration and citizenship policy combined with an incorporation policy that focused on differences and a national identity that has thick boundaries. The entrance to membership of the Dutch nation lies not so much at the physical boarder or at the point of citizenship, but at ethno-cultural characteristics. This can explain the combination of

a high rate of citizenship with a low rate of identification. France has an open attitude towards immigration combined with republican ideas about membership. France opens both the borders of the country and of membership, but does not allow for immigrant particularities, for fear of falling apart (Duyvendak, 2004). Germany does not want immigrants to enter permanently or settle unless they are seen as to belong to the German people. In the mono-ethnic ideas on membership there is little room for expression of cultures other than the German one. This can explain the low level of naturalization combined with an intermediate level of identification with Turkey. Of course these differences are a bit of a caricature. Policies are converging. France has become more exclusive and Germany more inclusive over the years. However the point of departure is still different. As demonstrated in paragraph two, though both the Netherlands and France recently set up a Muslim council, these councils operate in a very different political context.

To get a better insight into the relationship between these ideas on membership and immigrant position, new data must be gathered. These data should be based on the same statistical definitions but also on a comparable group of immigrants. Crul and Vermeulen contend that even comparing Turks in different countries is not necessarily comparing the same group¹¹ (2003, 968). Although most regions of Turkey did indeed send immigrants to several countries there are important regional differences. Oztas Ayhan et al. found significant differences in the background and emigration country of Turkish migrants in the four Turkish regions they compared (2000). As shown in paragraph three there are likely significant differences in the characteristics of the Turkish immigrants population in different countries. A good comparative dataset therefore needs to take into account these differences. The best way of doing so is by drawing a sample based on selected regions of Turkey and period of migration. By drawing a sample that is homogenized for these two variables it will be possible to get better data and hopefully gain more insight in to the effect (or lack of effect) of ideas on membership for immigrants' position.

¹¹ They go on to state that the socio-economic backgrounds of Turkish labor migrants turn out to be more or less equal in part because immigrants in different countries originate from the same villages (ibid, p 696).

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