

PUBLIC SENTIMENT ON IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. A CROSS-NATIONAL MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT: *Despite the fact that foreigners' presence is less visible than in Western states and has yet to become politicized, alarming levels of unfavorable attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been reported. Therefore, how different are the post-communist publics in terms of their collective representations of immigrants and immigration policies among themselves and, taken together, compared to Western European countries? To what extent individual and societal characteristics can explain cross-national and inter-regional distribution? Drawing on and extending existing contributions, I construct an explanatory model that incorporates both individual and contextual characteristics. Using data from the 1995 module of International Social Survey Programme and a set of societal indicators, I conduct several cross-national multilevel analyses in CEE. Results indicate that nativism, regime legitimacy and protectionism had the most consistent pattern of effects, even in the face of multiple controls for other micro- and macro-level factors. In general, a college-level education acts as a suppressant of unfavorable attitudes. Compositional differences account for some but not all of the cross-country dispersion. At the macro-level, politico-economic history separates Visegrád Group members from other post-communist states. Results also lend credit to the concurrence of unemployment rate and proportional presence of foreigners as a rather consistent predictor across the CEE countries. Finally, there is strong indication of a long-run self interest effect: Eastern Europeans evaluate immigrants and immigration policies not just on the basis of their personal circumstances, but also in response to contextual characteristics such as economic circumstances and immigrant group size.*

INTRODUCTION

Immigration occupies a dominant position on the agendas of most Western European countries, with important political and social consequences (Hollifield 1997:30). The collision between the elitist discourses on the expansion of the European Union (EU) and “deep integration,” on the one hand, and existing national loyalties, on the other, may have contributed to immigration’s increasing visibility (Citrin and Sides 2004). True, the newcomers fill in an economic need in their countries of adoption, as many states face alarming demographic trends (such as aging populations, declined fertility rates) and resource-draining welfare programs. Yet, rightist political parties that oppose existing immigration policies have gained considerable electoral success in Western Europe, and such a trend is more and more noticeable in other corners of the continent. Immigrants themselves have acquired the status of public personae by becoming important issues of popular opinion in a European climate in which prejudice, closure, exclusion and hostility have surfaced with great force (MacLaughlin 1998). Thus, an Eurobarometer opinion poll conducted in 1997 in the 15 EU member states revealed that 66 percent of respondents identified themselves as being at least “a little racist,” of which roughly a half openly expressed an alarming level of racism.

If Westerners’ low level of tolerance toward foreigners has been documented in a number of interesting cross-national analyses which linked visible expressions of anti-immigrant sentiment to the politicization of group identities and demands for tight control over the borders, comparatively little is known about this phenomenon in the ex-socialist states of central and Eastern Europe (CEE). What is puzzling in regard to the CEE countries is the prominence of xenophobic attitudes virtually without a *large* presence of “foreigners” (Ireland 1997; Wallace 1999). Whereas anti-immigrant attitudes are more direct in Western Europe and the mass publics in the EU member states are more visibly dissatisfied with their governments’ responses to the problems caused by immigration, such processes are less overt in the post-communist countries.

In previous research, determinants of exclusionary sentiments in the Western European countries were reported by McLaren (2003), Pettigrew and Meertens (1995), Quillian (1995), and Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders (2002). Some authors have even expanded their geographical reach to include a small set of CEE states (Citrin and Sides 2004) or a larger one (Coenders 2001; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Kunovich 2001, 2002, 2004). However, there is not a single cross-national study of exclusionary attitudes based on large-scale datasets with an expressed focus on the CEE countries.¹ For one thing, the dearth of comparative studies on popular sentiments toward immigrants and immigration policies in the post-communist states has contributed to the current lack of a broad explanatory theory and to its continued elusiveness. The relevance of investigating unfavorable attitudes in CEE also comes from what Mason and Kluegel (2000a:11) identified as the *need* of paralleling the ongoing creation and consolidation of societal institutions, processes and practices by a constant scrutiny of mass sentiments. As a barometer of

¹ Though centered on the post-communist context, the study by Evans and Need (2002) used data from *national* sample surveys, which makes it susceptible of incomparable measures.

acceptance of and support for state-initiated policies, public opinion may trigger responses to potentially explosive issues such as immigration.

This paper is intended to correct the deficit of studies focusing on post-communist countries; its thesis is built on several statements. To begin with, out-group intolerance in the CEE countries is not a new phenomenon, even though vivid memories from the region's events during the 1990s (e.g., inter-ethnic clashes, the aggressive multiplication of national identities, or the resulting minority enclaves after the break-up of communist ethno-federations) may seem to suggest otherwise. What is particularly striking in the post-communist context is the salience of exclusionism despite only timid attempts at influencing public opinion via electoral mobilization. Second, dissatisfied with the economic and social transformations, mass publics of post-communist societies may have developed a heightened level of ethnic and racial intolerance. Especially during bad economic times, group- and self-interests may act as catalysts of negative attitudes, more so when immigrants' presence is perceived as a threat to the established structures of national identity (Joppke 1999). Third, theoretical arguments suggest that the framing of this issue is different across the CEE countries, both individually and regionally. I represent such a spatial variation via a new dimension of contrasting European contexts: within the countries with a communist pedigree, I operate a distinction between the Visegrád Group² and the other CEE states. This analytic scheme is not based on assumed homogeneity of the countries represented in these categories, but on the fact that their politico-economic trajectories have at times intersected and followed a common path.

Some of these considerations were only vaguely tackled in previous research, as the studies in which unfavorable attitudes of ex-socialist publics were tangentially addressed have tended to amalgamate European states and to treat them similarly despite obvious differences. Not only has such a procedure masked important differences between countries, but it has also mistakenly assumed that the same theoretical models developed and tested on Western European samples could adequately explain post-communist realities. I argue in my contribution that the extant literature on prejudice, xenophobia, anti-immigrant sentiment, or ethnic exclusionism is just a *starting point*, albeit a promising one, from which to gain understanding of the phenomenon's ramifications in the CEE countries and to subsequently develop an explanatory model.

Previous cross-national research on public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies suffered from several other shortcomings. Some studies are conceptually confusing³ (Coenders 2001;

² The Visegrád Group (V4 Group) reflects the efforts of four countries of the Central European region (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) to work together in a number of fields of common interests regarding European integration. The origins of the V4 Group date back to February 15, 1991, when the former presidents of Czechoslovakia (Václav Havel), Hungary (Árpád Göncz) and Poland (Lech Walesa) met in the town of Visegrád located in Northern Hungary.

³ Coenders (2001) proposes a measure of 'ethnic exclusionism' which is constructed from questionnaire items reflecting attitudes toward *undifferentiated* (ethnically, racially, culturally, etc.) immigrants; Kunovich (2001, 2002, 2004) collapses the distinction between 'immigrants' and 'immigration policies' into an ambiguous concept ('anti-immigrant prejudice') with no apparent face validity.

Kunovich 2001, 2002, 2004), while other show data misuse in the construction of measurement models⁴ (Evans and Need 2002; Kunovich 2001, 2002). Furthermore, some studies resorted to methodologically problematic substitutions to replace for the missing data (Coenders 2001; Kunovich 2001), and yet some did not adequately test the cross-country dispersion in the predictors' effects (Citrin and Sides 2004) or offer systematic explanations for this variance in the post-communist states (Coenders 2001; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Kunovich 2001, 2002).

Building on these and other studies, I address these deficiencies in several ways. Thus, I seek to establish the extent to which relevant theoretical contributions developed and tested on Western European samples are suitable approaches to the study of exclusionary attitudes in the CEE countries. More specifically, I synthesize various approaches in the form of a multilevel explanatory model and then thoroughly test the derived hypotheses using data from the 1995 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and a set of macro-level indicators. Further, I improve upon previous micro- and macro-level measurements and test for the effect of national identity structures in a more systematic manner than has been performed thus far. To summarize, this study sets out to answer two questions: (1) how different are the post-communist publics in terms of their collective representations of immigrants and immigration policies among themselves and, taken together, compared to Western European countries, and (2) to what extent can individual and societal characteristics explain cross-national and/or inter-regional dispersions of unfavorable sentiments?

THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXPLANATIONS OF EXCLUSIONARY ATTITUDES

The present study is grounded in two influential yet related perspectives:⁵ Social Identity Theory and Realistic Conflict Theory. The roots of Social Identity Theory go back to 1906 when Sumner (1906) introduced the concept of 'out-group aggression' and linked it with structures of in-group identification. This line of inquiry was empirically tested by Adorno *et al.* (1950), LeVine and Campbell (1972), and Billiet, Eisinga and Scheepers (1996), who pointed out to the fact that positive attitudes toward in-group (or in-group favoritism) and negative orientations toward the out-group are correlative. Tajfel (1981, 1982) and associates (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner 1982) developed this paradigm into the Social Identity Theory and stated that in-group members' positive self-identification cannot be separated from the process of contra-identifying

⁴ Evans and Need (2002), for instance, treated Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary as one region, whereas Kunovich (2001, 2002) drew on data from former Yugoslavia (all republics!) to create a macro-level indicator for Slovenia only; furthermore, contrary to the ISSP methodological specifications, Kunovich (2001, 2002) chose instead to 'unify' the two German subsamples (Western and Eastern) without offering the motivation.

⁵ Due to data limitations, empirical testing of inter-group contact, a third 'grand' tradition is restricted. According to this paradigm, the quality and quantity of the connection between groups is directly responsible for the development of negative attitudes (Hewstone, Rubin and Willis 2002; McLaren 2003; Pettigrew 1998a; Voci and Hewstone 2003). However, common sense suggests that frequent and positive contact may not always result unfavorable attitudes or lesser prejudice -- in a competitive context, proximity and routine may in fact increase out-group exclusionism rather than reducing it.

with the outsiders. The main theme of the Realistic Conflict Theory (Bobo 1988, 1999, 2000; Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997; Esses, Jackson and Armstrong 1998; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson and Armstrong 2001) revolves around the idea that economic competition between individuals and groups nourishes prejudice and hostility. Individual antagonism may, of course, have other causes than mere economic reasons, but central to this theory is the fact that competition over resources is real. At the group level, research has indicated that negative attitudes toward out-groups develop under certain conditions, such as higher concentrations of immigrants and deteriorating economic environments (Quillian 1995). But severe circumstances such as rapidly declining economies or a massive presence of foreigners into 'homeland' may not only foster increased antagonism (the *sine qua non* condition of the Realistic Conflict Theory), but they may also act as catalysts for in-group identification. The resulting immigrant exclusionism may therefore be a factor of both economic competition at the individual or collective level and perceptions of an eroded group unity that rests at the foundation of long-forged national identifications. In this theoretical framework, both competition and identification appear to be necessary conditions of negative attitudes toward immigrants and favorable immigration policies in either 'traditional' countries of immigration or new recipient states.

Recent attitudinal studies in Europe have explored the effect of both individual and societal characteristics, lending credibility to the Realistic Conflict and Social Identity Theories in a number of ways. In an attempt to systematize the individual-level predictors of prejudice, Pettigrew (2000) reported that many of the American 'mini-theories' explaining differences in exclusionism, such as intention to vote, political interest, national pride, conservatism or education, are supported within the European context. Though evidenced by several statistical models, the 'remarkable' constancy of the micro-level predictors that was noted by Pettigrew (2000) vanishes in thin air when societal variables are introduced in the analysis. In fact, of all individual characteristics considered by Pettigrew, the only one which has shown some consistency was education.

Building on the negative association between educational level and unfavorable attitudes, other studies have nevertheless offered a more complete picture by accounting for the possible effect of societal characteristics. For instance, Coenders and Scheepers' (2003) analysis stresses the important role of socialization via education in the formation of attitudes and determines that a high level of ethnic exclusionism is related to lower educational attainment in religiously heterogeneous and homogeneous societies alike. When democratic tradition is added into the equation, a test for the differential effect reveals that education has a stronger effect on exclusionary attitudes in the societies with a long tradition of political pluralism than in the young democracies or democratizing states in CEE. These results are only partly supported in a study which investigated the cross-country dispersion in the effect of schooling on ethnic prejudice and tested for the 'universal' liberalizing effect of education (Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002). Length of uninterrupted democracy and the degree of religious heterogeneity are reported to be better predictors of a causal relationship between education and ethnic prejudice than certain structural factors whose strong effect one would normally assume, such as ethnic composition and unemployment rate.

Likewise, Evans and Need (2002) reach a similar conclusion regarding the limited role played by the relative size of national minorities and a declining economy in explaining intra-national and cross-country attitudinal variation in ethnic polarization over minority rights. Further, McLaren's study (2003) establishes that the level of immigration to a country has a mediated effect (through group perceptions of threat) rather than a direct one.

Starting with the pioneer work of Quillian (1995) on racial and anti-immigrant prejudice in Europe, a stream of research has reported that certain socio-economic characteristics (such as economic conditions and the size of the subordinate racial and immigrant minorities relative to the dominant group) are key structural conditions predicting exclusionism. Developed as the 'group-threat hypothesis,' Quillian's (1995) contribution is reminiscent of the Realistic Conflict Theory, as inter-group competition for resources has a central role in explaining the cross-country variation in levels of exclusionism. This proposition was later put to a test by Kunovich (2001, 2002). His multilevel analyses support the 'group-threat hypothesis' and reveal the presence of a higher level of anti-immigrant prejudice in the CEE countries than in the West, despite the null effect of immigration rates on exclusionary sentiments in the former.

Finding inspiration in the Social Identity Theory, another line of research explored the relationship between various dimensions of national identity (clustered as 'positive' and 'negative' attachments) and unfavorable attitudes. Mummendey, Klink and Brown (2001) established that 'nationalism' (defined as a detrimental attachment) and 'patriotism' (viewed as a positive form of identification) are distinct forms of in-group evaluation and are differently associated with out-group rejection in both Britain and Germany. Coenders (2001) and colleagues (Coenders and Scheepers 2003) reported a similar type of positive-negative polarization of nationalistic attitudes in a sample of 23 countries: whereas 'chauvinism' (conceptualized as blind attachment to the national in-group) is positively and strongly correlated to ethnic exclusionism, the effect of 'patriotism' (defined as positive attachment to the national in-group) is rather weak and inconsistent. In a study focused on Norway and Sweden, Knudsen (1997) found that 'national chauvinism' (seen as a nation's superior world position based on exclusiveness and exclusion) and 'regime legitimacy' (support for a country's social and political system based on openness and inclusion) are strong determinants of 'xenophobia' (negative attitudes toward new immigrants). Knudsen (1997) further documented important cross-national differences between the two Scandinavian neighbors: Norwegians are more xenophobic and chauvinistic than the Swedes but, at the same time, the former are also more supportive of their socio-political establishment than the latter. Continuing this line of research, Hjern (1998a) aptly criticized Knudsen's confusion of both nationalism and cultural pride with national identity, and yet reached a remarkably similar conclusion: the average index value of 'positive nationalism' (which largely corresponds to Knudsen's 'regime legitimacy') is higher for Norwegian than for the Swedes. Arguing against a clear-cut positive (or 'good') nationalism, Hjern (1998a) documented a strong relationship between an overall nationalist score and unfavorable attitudes, and further explored (Hjern 1998b) the relationship between national identity and xenophobia in three different countries with different immigration policies and

citizenship laws⁶ different citizenship laws (Germany, Australia and Sweden). He distinguished among four paradigmatic forms of national identity (civic, ethnic, ‘multiple,’ and ‘pluralist’) and established that, unlike the civic dimension, embracing the ‘multiple’ type results in the greatest probability of being xenophobic. Remarkably, each of these forms of national affiliation displayed a similar relationship to exclusionism in all three countries. The applicability of yet another theoretical distinction (national identity and national pride) in explaining unfavorable attitudes was assessed in a subsequent analysis by Hjern (1998c) in which a fourth form of immigration regime,⁷ the ‘imperial model,’ was proposed. He reported a similar pattern of causality among national pride, immigration attitudes, integration and assimilation across all four countries. Exponents of a ‘multiple identity,’ the British appear to be the most xenophobic, followed by the Germans (the ethnic model), the Swedes (corresponding to a ‘pluralist’ identity) and the Australians (the civic type). Despite these interesting conclusions, Hjern’s analytical models can be criticized on the grounds that, by leaving out individual characteristics, they underestimate the cross-national dispersion of exclusionist attitudes and thereby offer only a partial picture. A more recent study of Hjern (2001) deals with some of these deficiencies and investigates the effect of education of xenophobic attitudes, but other potential cleavages such as class structure or citizenship status remain unaddressed. Notwithstanding differences in the national systems of education, Hjern (2001) reported an inverse relationship between the level of schooling and rejection of immigrants in all of the ten countries examined, exemplifying five different forms of identity.⁸

Other scholars were also preoccupied by the heuristic value of the distinction between the civic and ethnic components of national identity in advancing the general understanding of inter-group relations and, more specifically, of unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and permissive immigration policies. Taking Belgium as a case study for multinational states, Maddens, Billiet and Beerten (2000) established that a republican-civic representation of Belgian identity yields to different patterns of exclusionism in the ethnically homogeneous regions of Flanders and Walloon. Thus, those with a strong Flemish affiliation are more likely to bear negative attitudes toward foreigners than the Flemish with a robust Belgian-civic identity, whereas the Walloons with a dominant ethnic identification have more positive attitudes toward foreigners than the other members of the Walloon community with a strong Belgian affiliation. Fetzer (2000a, 2000b) too explored nationalist closure in relation to unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and established that economic self-interest is a stronger predictor of nativism and exclusionism than cultural marginality in three

⁶ In Hjern’s (1998b) analysis, Germany exemplifies the ethnic model (citizenship based on *jus sanguinis*), Australia the multicultural model (citizenship granted on *jus soli* and *jus domicili*), and Sweden the semi-multicultural model (citizenship primarily given on *jus soli*, but also on *jus domicili*).

⁷ Termed “imperial” (Castles and Miller 1998) or “U.K.” (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994), the model exemplified by Britain granted immigrants from the former colonies a special (privileged) status that enabled them to acquire citizenship relatively easy. This *laissez-faire* regime is tolerant of different cultural expression while being non-interventionist (no active integration policies or explicit goals to attain multiculturalism).

⁸ Hjern (2001) paired the ten countries as follows: (1) Australia and Canada (multicultural); (2) Sweden and Holland (semi-multicultural); (3) Germany and Austria (ethnic); (4) Italy and Spain (“Mediterranean” – long periods of residency necessary for immigrants in order to naturalize); and (5) Czech Republic and Hungary (“Eastern,” with a legacy of communist influence, institutionalized nationalism and the adoption of exclusionary politics).

Western states (France, Germany and United States). Likewise, Jackson, Brown, Brown and Marks (2001) determined that national pride is a measure of self and group interests that has a constant effect on popular attitudes toward foreigners in Western Europe.

These theoretical and empirical contributions provide a point of encounter between the Realistic Conflict and Social Identity Theories and lay out the foundation for a general understanding of contemporary attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies in the CEE countries. I represent the formation of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies as a multi-layered process bridging between individual and contextual factors denoting of economic and symbolic threat, as well as socialization via education. In doing so, the intention is not just to identify the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ micro- and macro-level determinants of these negative sentiments, but also to evaluate whether explanations developed in Western Europe find applicability in the case of post-communist publics.

MODELING EXCLUSIONARY ATTITUDES IN THE CEE COUNTRIES: FORMAL EXPECTATIONS

Micro-level Context

From the perspective of Realistic Conflict Theory, anti-immigrant hostility results from the competition foreigners pose to individual and group material being. The expectation here is that the level of exclusionism varies between social strata, as historical legacy and the torments of post-communist triple transition (economic, political and nation-territorial) have left indelible imprints on the personal biographies of the citizens in the region. This dissimilarity in life experiences and socio-economic opportunities is especially visible in the economic sphere, as it has a more tangible impact than the political sector and affects everyone’s employment or cost of living (Mason and Kluegel 2000a:6). Economy reorientation and the adoption of the principles of market competitiveness have had dramatic consequences not just for the society in general, but also for its individual members: a drop in the real wages and standard of living, spiraling unemployment, malnutrition, alcoholism and stress. A fundamental psychological orientation was needed to cope with the traumatic effect of discontinued biographies during the transition process, which was not easily acquired given the enduring effects of socialization. People who have spent most of their lives during communism and “invested their careers into one set of institutions” (Wallace 1999:6) could hardly transfer their skills and experience to an emergent market economy. An increased sense of insecurity about the future forced many into early retirement and subsidized poverty. Therefore, the effects of transition were unevenly distributed between social categories; in general, the better educated and skilled segment of the labor force were not as affected by economic restructuring as the unemployed, underemployed and manual (low-skilled) workers. Marginalized and largely redundant to the needs of the new economy, the low-wagers are also a most vulnerable category of finding themselves in direct competition for jobs with foreigners (with whom they share similar social positions) and, therefore, of developing exclusionary attitudes.

Another indicator of social position, education may additionally indicate which individuals are most prone of holding negative sentiments toward immigrants and freer or unrestricted immigration policies. The positive correlation between more formal schooling and decreased exclusionism has been supported with some constancy in cross-national attitudinal studies (Coenders 2001; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Citrin, Green, Muste 1997 and Wong; Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Kunovich 2001, 2002, 2004; Pettigrew 2000; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders 2002). Indeed, higher levels of education usually place individuals in a superior class position and in specific niches on the labor market that remain largely uncontested by immigrants.⁹ Thus, in terms of individual conditions, the expectation is that (1) *unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and permissive immigration policies will be more prevalent among the social strata in comparable structural positions as the foreigners, specifically among (1a) individuals from lower or working class, and (1b) those with a level of education below college.*

Cross-national variation in exclusionism may be due not just to dissimilarities in educational level but also to differences in the national systems of education. Indeed, as Hjern (2001:37) remarked, an “educational system works within the boundaries of a society and does so by the use of existing symbols of and myths of national images.” Socialization experiences via education therefore may reflect certain dimensions of national identity which, depending on personal circumstances and societal conditions, may later surface in attitudinal form. In light of the negative-positive polarization that was empirically tested in Western Europe (Hjern 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 2001; Knudsen 1997; Maddens, Billiet and Beerten 2000), unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and unrestricted immigration policies in the CEE states are expected to reflect personal perceptions and visions of national identity in either exclusive (ethnic closure) or inclusive (civic openness) terms. Following the dissolution of the communist ethno-federations, many states in the region embarked on a process of (re)defining their national identities, reflected by the adoption of new citizenship laws. The model of citizenship that was implemented could be described as a hybrid between civic and *Völkisch* elements, as it was premised upon a clear dissociation from the populations perceived as foreigners and on visions of ethnic homogeneity (e.g., the Baltic States¹⁰ or the Czech Republic¹¹). Thus, issues of nativism gained importance in the post-communist context when old questions of national boundaries, of who the established inhabitants were and of legal rights have been brought to the fore. Denoting a sense of superiority and contempt for foreigners, chauvinism has been a preferred theme of the

⁹ As a methodological imperative, the influence of education on unfavorable attitudes should be assessed concomitantly with that of other micro-level characteristics, to eliminate for possible confounding effects.

¹⁰ The first constitutions of Estonia and Latvia denied citizenship rights to its Russian minority. Many former Soviet citizens of Russian descent chose to relocate in the Russian Federation, but many more opted to stay in the successor states of the USSR. As of today, the Russian ‘diaspora’ scattered across the former Soviet Union is the largest in Europe.

¹¹ The Czech citizenship law following the post-communist break-up, which was formulated to exclude the Roma, quickly became the target of international criticisms.

‘new nationalists’¹² -- populist politicians with a prominent communist pedigree who try to coagulate the energies of the disenfranchised segments of the population against those deemed as alien to the *ethnos* (Mudde 2000a, 2000b; Prizel 2000; Tismaneanu 2000). At the same time, if defense of a communal way of life is perceived as rational, then concerns about national identification should too be mirrored in the form of an economic and cultural protectionism aimed at preserving a sense of unity. The upheaval experienced during the transition period as well as increasing concern with the globalizing tendencies¹³ may have yielded a contra-identification with anything foreign -- a process which finds a source of inspiration in the Soviet-era policies of cultural and economic insularity. In addition, national identification also rests on the positive values of inclusion and openness, which are embedded in support for a country’s socio-political system and economic accomplishments. Popular perceptions of regime legitimacy reflect a civic identification with the nation, although it is important to note in this context that the publics of the CEE countries have entered the transition with a long history of alienation and distrust of communist politics and that the legitimacy of the governing bodies is compounded by very real socio-economic problems. Thus, in terms of individual perceptions of identity, I anticipate that (2a) *unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and permissive immigration policies will be more prevalent among the individuals who are highly nativist, chauvinistic and protectionist* and (2b) *unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and permissive immigration policies will be less prevalent among those are strongly supportive of a country’s politico-economic regime.*

Macro-level Context

The CEE countries differ substantially in terms of their economic and democratic paths, both during and after the communist period. Their current state of economic performance and democratic robustness is a function of a distant path, as well as more recent achievements. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia enjoyed a head start in the transformation process and further distanced themselves from the rest. By virtue of their politico-economic history (e.g., a high rate of industrial development and exposure to Western values during the interwar period, sustained internal challenge and open protests against the political establishment during communism, and an accelerated pace of market reforms and substantial foreign direct investments during the 1990s¹⁴), the Visegrád Group members experienced a level of success in the region that would most likely have a mitigating effect on exclusionary attitudes. Attracted by these favorable circumstances (including prospects for a rapid inclusion into the EU), immigrants have come in greater number in these four countries, a situation which may have created the conditions for increased competition

¹² Delanty (1996) characterizes the “new nationalism” of the post-communist period, in contrast to the inclusive “old nationalism” of the nineteenth century that served the purpose of nation-state building, as one of exclusion and exclusiveness.

¹³ This type of protectionist isolationism may be dictated by the effects of the prospective ascension into the European Union, namely the fear of being potential or real carpetbaggers and the need to make a national market economy competitive.

¹⁴ See Kopstein and Reilly (2000) for an overview of the post-1989 developments in the CEE countries.

and conflict. Nevertheless, I anticipate that (3) *unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and permissive immigration policies will be less prevalent among the Visegrád Group members, ceteris paribus.*

Realistic Conflict Theory suggests that societal conditions such as the state of the economy and immigrant group size affect the material interests of in-group members and determine the actual level of competition within a country which explains attitudinal variation in exclusionism. Research in Western Europe reported that personal circumstances play little role in explaining unfavorable sentiments (Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong 1997), as individuals often put public good ahead of self-interests (Funk 2002). Cross-national studies in the CEE countries reported a similar ‘sociotropic’ effect:¹⁵ people usually pay more attention to the aggregate economic condition and the overall well-being than to their financial circumstances or personal security. When a country’s economy is deteriorating and there are no immediate prospects for recovery, foreigners are commonly perceived as a long-term problem that goes beyond immediate material self-interest. But in an improving or prosperous economy the precondition for lesser unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies? Common sense suggests that wealthier economies offer increased opportunities for higher education and upward mobility, and so, the proportion of those who are likely to find themselves in direct competition with the immigrants is considerably smaller than in the slow-recovering economies. However, one aspect which should not be overlooked is that wealthier economies are the preferred target of immigration precisely because of the favorable prospects newcomers may have, suggesting that a concurrent effect of economic circumstance and the size of the foreigner group is a possibility. In terms of economic conditions, I predict that (4) *unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and permissive immigration policies will be more prevalent in the countries with deteriorating economic conditions, specifically in those with (4a) a lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and (4b) a higher unemployment rate.* Yet, considering the relative homogeneity of bad economic circumstances across the region, the effects of these two macro-level indicators may not show up very strongly in a multi-level analysis of the CEE states alone. Regarding the proportion of foreigners relative to the dominant group, I also anticipate that (5) *unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and permissive immigration policies will be more prevalent in countries with a higher concentration of immigrants.* Finding inspiration in Quillian’s (1995) group threat hypothesis, I further propose that (6) *unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and permissive immigration policies will be more prevalent in the countries where the level of competition (expressed through the interaction between the size of the immigrants group and the rate of unemployment) is relatively high.*

¹⁵ Especially during the first years of the economic and political transition, CEE citizens appeared to be more concerned about social justice and issues of fairness than about their own personal conditions (Kluegel, Mason and Wegener 1995, 1999; Kluegel and Mason 2000; Mason and Kluegel 2000b). However, as the transition progresses, people are expected to be more egocentric.

DATA, MEASUREMENTS AND MODELS

Data

I test these hypotheses using data derived from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) of 1995 and focusing on nine countries from Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East Germany,¹⁶ Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. For reasons of comparability, I have also included in my analysis eight states from Western Europe, but which were not incorporated in the multilevel model: Austria, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and West Germany. The decision to cover all nine post-communist countries that participated in the 1995 ISSP study rather than just a few implied a choice of comprehensiveness, which should warrant a meaningful exploration of cross-national similarities and differences.¹⁷

ISSP is an ongoing multinational project attempting to gauge attitudinal differences over time that uses standardized procedures for data collection and measurement equivalence.¹⁸ The 1995 “Aspects of National Identity” survey dealt with topics regarding localism, national identity, ‘global issues,’ minorities and immigrants in 24 national contexts (including East Germany), and was conducted among probability-designed representative samples. The pooled samples analyzed here consist of an adult population aged 18-75 totaling 10,058 for the CEE states and 10,076 for Western Europe. Despite some inherent methodological limitations,¹⁹ the 1995 ISSP dataset contains standardized measures that should warrant performing cross-country comparisons and generating valid inferences, and therefore fits well with the objective of this study.

Measurements

One of the most challenging aspects in cross-national research is to obtain valid and reliable indicators for theoretical constructs. In other words, the question is one of attaining functional equivalence in the face of national idiosyncrasies and very different social realities (Alwin, Braun, Harkness and Scott 1994). Thus, the publics of different countries may have dissimilar representations of what the term

¹⁶ The 1995 ISSP survey was conducted separately for the two parts of Germany (West and East), a methodological consideration justified by an obvious dissimilarity in societal contexts since 1945.

¹⁷ Several authors (Bollen, Entwisle and Anderson 1993; Przeworski and Teune 1970) noted that a small number of national samples (fewer than six cases) presents an array of problems, the most troubling of which is the limited degrees they allow.

¹⁸ All member-states of the ISSP project apply identical questionnaires (same length, question wording and response format) developed in English, from which target-language instruments are developed and validated through iterative back-translations for each country in order to ensure measurement equivalence of the constructs representing concepts.

¹⁹ Several authors (Park and Jowell 1998; Svallfors 1996) noted that the 1995 ISSP survey posed a number of issues such as: inconsistencies in question framing across nationwide samples, minor deviations from established fieldwork procedures, and the cross-country incongruence of some socio-demographic variables (‘occupational classification,’ ‘income level,’ ‘political orientation,’ etc). The rate of non-responses also raised concerns, but the reported cross-country variation of 25-45 percent equaled the ratio commonly reported by the independent survey organizations.

'immigrants' refers to,²⁰ a situation which can lead to measurement errors. Several analyses of the factor structures were conducted prior to the actual analysis, to determine the item loadings and to control for potentially faulty measures. Based on face validity and the robustness of loadings (principal components method of extraction), five indices were constructed and assumed to represent the theoretical constructs in my model (anti-immigrant sentiment, nativism, chauvinism, regime legitimacy, and protectionism). The exact question wording for the individual items in these indices is given in the Appendix. Reliability checks (Cronbach's α) for four of the five measures in the pooled sample of CEE countries revealed scores above the 0.6 level.

The factor analytic models and item groupings representing four theoretical constructs match up with prior analyses of the ISSP dataset. Thus, anti-immigrant sentiment measures up identically with Hjerm's (1998a, 1998b, 1998c and 2001) operationalization of 'xenophobia,' and also gains validity from Knudsen's (1997) indicator of 'xenophobia'; nativism is based on Jones and Smith's (2001) measure of 'ascribed national identity,' as well as that of 'exclusionism from in-group membership' (Coenders 2001; Coenders and Scheepers 2003); chauvinism rests on Knudsen's (1997) dimension of 'national chauvinism,' Hjerm's (1998a) 'nationalist sentiment' and the index of chauvinism developed by Coenders (2001) and Coenders and Scheepers (2003); finally, regime legitimacy reflects the following prior measures: 'regime legitimacy' (Knudsen 1997), 'political national pride' (Hjerm 1998c) and 'patriotism' (Coenders 2001; Coenders and Scheepers 2003). From a methodological standpoint, it is relevant to note that these earlier studies validate the measures that I take to represent the theoretical constructs of anti-immigrant sentiment, nativism, chauvinism, and regime legitimacy. Finally, based on the strength of individual item loadings, the measure of protectionism that I propose has at least face validity.

The same types of factorial analysis and internal consistency checks for the five constructs in my model were replicated in each CEE country separately. Table 1 displays the Cronbach's α scores in these multi-item measures. The relatively low reliability coefficients may affect the overall quality of the subsequent comparisons: seemingly stronger and weaker effects in some countries and regions relative to the others may not be the product of national dissimilarities, but of differences in reliability checks. In general, the reliability of measures appears to be a little higher in the West compared to CEE,²¹ but they follow the same pattern in the two regions (elevated scores for nativism and regime legitimacy, and lower coefficients for chauvinism,

²⁰ For instance, Pettigrew (1998b:80-1) distinguished between seven categories of immigrants in Europe, each with a different status: (1) national migrants (e.g., the Saxons of Romania); (2) citizens of the European Union countries living in other EU countries; (3) ex-colonial people (e.g., the Indians and Pakistanis in Great Britain or the Surinamers in the Netherlands); (4) guest workers (e.g., the Turks in Germany and Switzerland); (5) refugees and asylum seekers; (6) accepted illegal immigrants; and (7) rejected illegal immigrants. See also Castles (2000) for a typology of immigrant categories.

²¹ Not reported in Table 1. The Cronbach's α scores for the pooled sample of Western European countries were as follows: 0.72 (anti-immigrant sentiment), 0.76 (nativism), 0.71 (chauvinism), 0.72 (regime legitimacy), and 0.60 (protectionism)

anti-immigrant sentiment and protectionism), demanding only some caution when making inferences from these data.

(Table 1 about here)

a) Dependent Variables

The four items in the measure of anti-immigrant sentiment taps public exclusionism of immigrants (see Appendix). The order of responses for the first and third statement was reversed to maintain the same semantic orientation for all. Individual responses reflect agreement or disagreement with each of the four expressed statements and are measured on a five-point Likert scale. A high score on the anti-immigrant index translates into predominantly negative attitudes toward immigrants.

Attitudes toward immigration policies are represented via a set of three separate variables: support for reduced immigration, opposition toward admitting political refugees, and support for stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants (see Appendix). The last indicator (support for stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants) was recoded. The values of these measures range from 1 to 5, with a high score signaling preference for restrictive immigration policies.

b) Independent Variables

The first independent variable at the individual level in my study is intended to give an indication about one's level of schooling. But comparing educational levels among individuals from different countries poses a methodological problem: while sociological theories use 'education' in largely similar way, the manner in which this concept is operationalized cross-nationally may be quite different.²² For reasons of comparability, I have used the seven educational levels that appear in the ISSP classification scheme to create a dummy variable, *college education*, intended to distinguish between those with a college degree or higher (coded as '1') and those below this level (individuals with only primary education, some secondary and completed secondary education). To represent social class, I used the information available in the 1995 ISSP secondary data to create cross-country comparable measures. After recoding the original response choices from a questionnaire item on social class self-identification, three dummy variables were created (1 = yes): *lower class*, *working class*, and *middle-upper class*. Besides these 'objective' micro-level predictors, several socio-psychological measures were produced in order to capture the effects of various forms of identification with the nation on the outcome variables. A total of four multi-item indices were created, in part inspired by previous research: *nativism*, *chauvinism*, *regime legitimacy* and *protectionism* (see the Appendix for the exact question wording for each item in these dimensions). All individual statements in these four 'subjective' measures

²² Common measures of education include: (1) number of schooling years completed; (2) age at which education ended; and (3) degrees, diplomas and certificates.

were recoded, so that higher scores are indicative of greater identification with one national dimension or another.

Multiple sources were consulted in order to construct reliable and theoretically informed macro-level measures from the existing statistics. Because of differences in definition, classification, internationally-recognized data repository organizations such as the World Bank, United Nations, International Labor Office or European Commission's EUROSTAT sometimes report different numbers for the same notion and time period. One should also be aware of the fact that the reliability of national statistics may pose a problem (e.g., underestimation of unemployment figures in the CEE countries). To the extent possible, I have tried to overcome these problems by consulting a variety of sources and by confronting each other before assembling a dataset of comparable measures. Table 2 presents this list of macro-level indicators.

(Table 2 about here)

I use two aggregate-level indicators to measure a country's economic conditions: *Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rate*²³ and *unemployment rate*.²⁴ To control for fluctuations over time, these indicators represent the averages of the growth/decline per annum and yearly unemployment rate in each country for a period of five years preceding the administration of the survey.²⁵ The proportional presence of foreigners relative to the dominant population is directly measured through *immigrant group size*,²⁶ an average of annual percentages for a period of five years prior to the survey. Data in Table 2 reveals that substantial variation across the CEE countries exists in the two indicators of economic condition, but less so in that of immigrant group size. However, while the percentage of immigrants relative to the dominant population is relatively low, the very novelty of immigration in these countries may make even small immigration rates highly salient. Accordingly, what are objectively small cross-national differences in the proportional presence of immigrants may generate a substantial difference, psychologically. To capture the influence of perceived threat, I have created another, more complex aggregate measure: *the concurrence of immigrant group size and unemployment rate*. This interaction gives a better measure of the aggregate level of competition in a country and will help put to a test the group threat hypothesis advanced by Quillian (1995). The final macro-level construct in my analysis, *Visegrád Group Member*, is a dummy variable (1 = yes) representing the convergent politico-economic history of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

²³ GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers (whether natives or non-natives) in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. Annual percentage rate of GDP accounts for market prices based on constant currency (World Bank 2003).

²⁴ Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labor force and unemployment differ by country (World Bank 2003).

²⁵ In most CEE countries, the 1995 ISSP survey was conducted during 1995, but the field investigation in Slovenia took place in 1994, whereas the collection of data in Russia and Slovakia occurred during 1996.

²⁶ Refers to inflows of foreign populations. The definition and categorization of immigrants differ by country.

Model

I use multilevel linear modeling (Bryk, Raudenbush and Congdon 1996; DiPrete and Forristal 1994; Goldstein 1995; Guo and Zhao 2000; Raudenbush 2001; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Raudenbush and Sampson 1999; Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong and Congdon 2000; Snijders and Boskers 1999) and the software program HLM5 to test this study's hypotheses. Multilevel models have been developed to analyze data with a complex structure and to specify the effect of social context on individual-level variables. Neglecting the hierarchical structure of social processes and phenomena may lead to biased estimates of the parameters and their standard errors (Guo and Zhao 2000:444) and to erroneous confirmation of the hypothesis (Scheepers et al. 2002:22; Hello et al. 2002:15).

In the hierarchical models that I developed, individuals within countries and countries stand as the units of analysis at the micro- and macro-levels, respectively. To the individual-level data which came from the 1995 ISSP module, I have attached a higher-order dataset of macro-level factors. These aggregate scores are not derived and completely independent from individual-level variables, and all respondents within the national subsample receive the same measure of a higher-order variable. A multiple regression analysis is performed within each level-2 independent variables, but the country-level effects are estimated simultaneously. Both individual- and country-level sets of predictors are analyzed in relation to each other. The general two-level hierarchical model consists of the following submodels corresponding to the individual and aggregate levels, respectively:

Level-1 Submodel

Let Y_{ij} be the responses of an individual i ($i = 1, 2, \dots, n_j$) nested within the j th ($j = 1, 2, \dots, J$) country on the outcome variables anti-immigrant sentiment, support for reduced immigration, opposition toward admitting political refugees and support for stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants, X_{qij} ($q = 1, 2, \dots, Q$) the level-1 predictor q for case i in unit j , β_{qj} ($q = 0, 1, \dots, Q$) the level-1 coefficients (β_{0j} the intercept and $\beta_{1j} \dots \beta_{Qj}$ the slopes or regression coefficients) and r_{ij} the level-1 residual (error term). The effect of the individual-level explanatory variable X_{qij} on the dependent variable Y_{ij} is described by the following linear regression model:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{ij} &= \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}X_{1ij} + \beta_{2j}X_{2ij} + \dots + \beta_{Qj}X_{Qij} + r_{ij} = \\ &= \beta_{0j} + \sum_{q=1}^Q \beta_{qj}X_{qij} + r_{ij}. \end{aligned} \quad [1]$$

The variance of the level-1 random effect r_{ij} is assumed to be normally (independently and identically) distributed, with a means of zero and a variance of σ^2 : $r_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$.

Level-2 Submodel

At the aggregate level (in this case, the country), each of the level-1 regression coefficients β_{qj} (slope(s) and intercept) becomes an outcome variable that is predicted from level-2 factors:

$$\begin{aligned}\beta_{qj} &= \gamma_{q0} + \gamma_{q1}W_{1j} + \gamma_{q2}W_{2j} + \dots + \gamma_{qs_q}W_{S_qj} + u_{qj} = \\ &= \gamma_{q0} + \sum_{s=1}^{S_q} \gamma_{qs}W_{sj} + u_{qj},\end{aligned}\tag{2}$$

where γ_{qs} ($q = 0, 1, \dots, S_q$) are the level-2 coefficients ($\gamma_{00}, \gamma_{10}, \dots, \gamma_{S_q0}$ are intercepts and $\gamma_{01}, \gamma_{02}, \dots, \gamma_{0s}$ represent slopes predicting $\beta_{0j}, \beta_{1j}, \dots, \beta_{qj}$ respectively from the level-2 variables); W_{sj} is the level-2 predictor; and, u_{qj} is a level-2 random effect.

At the country-level, the assumption is that the level-2 errors u_{qj} are independent from the level-1 random coefficients r_{ij} , having a multivariate normal distribution with an expectation of zero and (co)variances $\tau_{qq'}$, collected into a $(Q + 1)$ by $(Q + 1)$ dispersion matrix, \mathbf{T} .

Assuming that the individual- and country-level predictors (X_{qij} and W_{sj}) are fixed, after substituting [2] into [1], the following algebraic expression is obtained:

$$\begin{aligned}Y_{ij} &= \gamma_{00} + \sum_{s=1}^{S_0} \gamma_{0s}W_{sj} + u_{0j} + \sum_{q=1}^Q (\gamma_{q0} + \sum_{s=1}^{S_q} \gamma_{qs}W_{sj} + u_{qj})X_{qij} + r_{ij} = \\ &= \gamma_{00} + \sum_{s=1}^{S_0} \gamma_{0s}W_{sj} + u_{0j} + \sum_{q=1}^Q \gamma_{q0}X_{qij} + \sum_{q=1}^Q \sum_{s=1}^{S_q} \gamma_{qs}W_{sj}X_{qij} + \sum_{q=1}^Q u_{qj}X_{qij} + r_{ij}.\end{aligned}$$

My study includes several variants of this general hierarchical model. The level-1 predictor variables in these submodels are located on their natural metric. As individual- and country-level variables are successively introduced in the analysis, a total of three models will be estimated: a one-way ANOVA with random effects model (no predictors are specified at either levels); a set of models that includes clusters of individual-level variables with their slopes varying cross-country; and a set of random intercept models (which enables the estimation of an unsystematically varying level-1 intercept across the countries as a function of successively added macro-level factors).

RESULTS

Comparing Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration Policies, East and West

Before proceeding with the multivariate analysis for the CEE countries, I first provide an overview of the side-by-side comparison of the dependent variables in my model. Figures 1 through 4 present the

country and regional means in the dimensions of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies for the 17 European states. The first point to be made about these results is that the means for every outcome variable are higher in CEE than in Western Europe (based on independent *t*-test, the difference in means for each measure is statistically significant). This finding is line with previous reports on the predominantly stronger levels of exclusionism for the post-communist states compared to Western European countries (Kunovich 2001, 2002). As one can notice, there is a sizeable cross-country variation in the means for this measure -- a non-trivial issue in international comparative research.

(Figure 1 about here)

As evidenced by the results presented in Figure 1, Westerners are equally split between favorable and unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants (the mean value is centered at the 3.00 mark). By contrast, the mean level of anti-immigrant sentiment in the CEE countries is leaning more towards exclusionism than acceptance. Only in Poland and former East Germany do we find country means which put them closer to Western Europe than to the rest of post-communist states. In the West, the least favorable attitudes toward immigrants are to be found in Italy and Norway, countries which began experiencing immigration in greater numbers somewhat recently (beginning with the 1980s).

(Figure 2 about here)

When it comes to policies regulating immigration flux, it appears that citizens of both CEE and Western Europe support measures restricting the number of immigrants who are admitted (see Figure 2). On aggregate, the citizens living in the two parts of Europe favor reduced immigration in virtually the same degree, though intra-regional variance is observable. In the East, Russians are the most approving of unrestrictive immigration policies, presumably in support of the high-number repatriation of the fellow nationals scattered throughout the territory of former Soviet Union. Hungarians' relatively high level of opposition toward liberal immigration policies, although distressing, should be sought in the favorable context for ethnic migration during the period immediately following 1989. After the communist closure, Hungary has opened its borders and witnessed a significant inflow of ethnic Magyars from the neighboring states of Romania, Slovak Republic and Vojvodina. After the initial welcome, Hungary soon reached a saturation point and was forced to close down its doors -- a decision which may have surfaced at the level of attitudes.

(Figure 3 about here)

I present in Figure 3 the average country and regional values for opposition toward admitting political refugees. The general picture for both CEE and Western Europe is that admission of political refugees finds support in all countries, though Easterners appear to be more restrictive. Also, a substantial variation in the degrees of accepting politically persecuted people is observable within the post-communist states. The relatively low levels of opposition toward admitting political refugees in some CEE countries may be tied to a favorable public climate which, not too long ago, has sympathized with those who courageously opposed communism in the name of human rights and tried to escape from the persecutions they endured.

(Figure 4 about here)

The level of support and sympathy for political refugees is not matched by similar attitudes for illegal immigrants. On aggregate, the respondents from both CEE and Western Europe are highly resistant at accepting those who crossed the state borders fraudulently (see Figure 4). With the exception of Spain, the mean value for this indicator is toward the negative side of the scale (above the 4.0 mark) for all the other 14 countries of Europe (this item was not included in the survey questionnaires for Norway, Russia and Sweden). Whether as westbound transit migrants or as aspirant settlers, illegal immigrants have disproportionately targeted some CEE countries (Visegrád Group countries and the Baltic States), presumably attracted by their geographical location or by the favorable economic prospects generated via EU admission. However, this demographic trend is not reflected at the attitudinal level, as all Easterners are predominantly supportive of stronger policies to exclude unlawful immigrants.

Multilevel Analysis

Tables 3-6 present the results from six different models for each dependent variable of exclusionist attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. The upper part of each table contains the parameter estimates (with standard errors in parentheses)²⁷ of these analyses and the lower portion displays the within- and between-country variance components. The first three models allow an assessment of the compositional explanation for the variation in the dependent variables in simple country means (Model 1), in composition effect of socio-economic location (Model 2), and in composition effect of national identification (Model 3). Known as the null or baseline model, the first model contains no predictors and gives a first-hand indication of the variance components at the micro- and macro-level of analysis. Models 2 and 3 enable an estimation of how much of the differences in simple country means is due to individual characteristics such as educational level and class identification, on the one hand, and nativism, chauvinism, regime legitimacy and protectionism, on the other. Together, these two last models give an indication of the need to include other

²⁷ The number of countries in this study is likely to have an impact on the robustness of parameter estimations and standard errors of cross-national analyses. Given these constraints, important relationships may be difficult to detect and report if the *P*-value is not relaxed, and so the levels of statistical significance were set at 0.05 and 0.1.

variables in the analysis (such as the contextual characteristics) in order to account for the differences in attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies across the CEE countries. These macro-level factors are added in the subsequent models as follows: politico-economic history (or the Visegrád effect) in Model 4, economic condition (variation in GDP per capita and unemployment rate) and the size of the immigrant group in Model 5, and an interaction term between change in unemployment percentage and proportional presence of foreigners in Model 6.

Results from Tables 3-6, Model 1, show that the mean score for each dependent variable varies significantly between countries. A side-by-side comparison of the variance components in the four unconditional (null) models further suggests that the cross-country dispersion in public opposition toward admitting political refugees finds a better explanation at the macro-level than for the other three outcome variables. Nearly 15% of the total variation in resistance toward permitting politically-persecuted people is directly due to contextual characteristics: $0.213 / (1.244 + 0.213) \times 100 = 14.6\%$ (see Table 5).

With the introduction of the first set of micro-level factors in Model 2, the formal hypotheses of this study are put to the test. The parameter estimates for this model indicate that socio-economic location is important in predicting levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and opposition toward admitting political refugees, but not of willingness to expel illegal immigrants. This implies that hypothesis 1 finds no confirmation when it comes to sustaining stronger measures to keep out illegal immigrants, as people from all social strata are equally exclusionist of this immigrant category. Furthermore, this hypothesis is only partially corroborated in Table 4, as class positioning is significant in estimating such attitudes (albeit weakly) just for the respondents grouped in the lower strata of a society. Except for Table 6, educational level appears to be a relatively strong and consistent predictor of exclusionary attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies: having a college degree or higher translates into less exclusionism, a finding which mirrors those reported in previous studies (Coenders 2001; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Evans and Need 2002; Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Kunovich 2001, 2002). The evidence of a composition effect in Tables 3-5 is also indicated by the non-trivial decrease in variance parameters, whereas the results in Table 6 point to the fact that socio-economic factors do not contribute substantially to the explained dispersion in the outcome variable.

In Model 3 the indicators of national identity are introduced in the analysis. The decline in the within-country variance (see Tables 3-6) reveals the presence of a composition effect for national identification, although hypothesis 2 is only partially supported. At the macro-level, dispersion increases but remains statistically significant, suggesting that compositional differences cannot fully explain the variation in the dependent variables across countries. The effects of nativism, regime legitimacy and protectionism are statistically significant and in the anticipated direction for all four outcome variables, but chauvinism is significant only in predicting levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and public opposition toward admitting political refugees. Thus, hypothesis 2a finds partial acceptance but hypothesis 2b is fully supported by Model 3: in general, stronger identification with the nation in terms of nativism, chauvinism and protectionism project more exclusionist attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies, and higher levels of regime

legitimacy predict less unfavorable such attitudes. In order to compare the magnitude of effects, I have paired nativism with regime legitimacy and chauvinism with protectionism, since the metric scale on which the variables in each duo are measured is identical. The evaluation of coefficients shows that nativism has a stronger impact on anti-immigrant sentiment, support for reduced immigration, and support for stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants than regime legitimacy, suggesting that the trend in immigrant exclusionism follows the trend in ethnic attachment. The evaluation of coefficients further indicates that civic identification with the nation has a stronger effect than nativism on opposition toward admitting political refugees, acting as a suppressant of such unfavorable attitudes. As for the other pair, the effect of protectionism is constantly stronger than that of chauvinism: in the CEE countries, the preference for unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies is substantially driven by a sense of cultural and economic isolationism and to so much by a sense of contempt.

The influence of politico-economic history is explored in Model 4. Based on the results of Tables 3-6, one must conclude that hypothesis 3 gets only minimal support. The anticipated difference between the Visegrád Group members and the rest of the CEE countries is not present in the model for attitudes toward immigration. Furthermore, the Visegrád effect runs contrary to the expectations in one case: politico-economic history contributes to the explaining support for stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants in the reverse direction of that initially predicted. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, the likelihood of favoring stricter policies of expelling unlawful immigrants is smaller than in the other post-communist states, *ceteris paribus*. Still, Visegrád Group membership is a statistically significant and strong predictor of popular support for reduced immigration ($\gamma = 0.171$) and opposition toward admitting political refugees ($\gamma = 0.252$). When the first contextual characteristic is added to the analysis, the between-country dispersion remains statistically significant and shows a decrease in Tables 3-5.

In Model 5, the indicators of economic condition are introduced, i.e. variation in the GDP, unemployment rate and immigrant group size. There appears to be no constant pattern of effects for either macro-level factor, a mixed image indicating that hypotheses 4 and 5 are confirmed only in part. The findings presented in Tables 3-6 show that immigrant group size is a statistically significant and substantially strong predictor of cross-country dispersion in levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and support for tougher immigration policies regulating the influx of foreigners and the exclusion of unlawful foreigners. The level of opposition toward admitting political refugees is lower in countries with relatively higher averages of GDP per capita than in those experiencing a slower recovery following the downfall of communism. However, in refutation of hypothesis 4a, this macro-level predictor contributes to the explanation of cross-country dispersion in public support for reduced immigration in a reversed direction, i.e. the higher the GDP per capita rate, the higher the likelihood of favoring measures for curbing the number of immigrants. A similar serendipitous effect is observable for the other indicator of economic condition, average rate of unemployment. Thus, in the CEE countries with relatively lower levels of unemployment, the likelihood of supporting the exclusion of illegal immigrants is greater than in those with a proportionately higher

percentage of people who have lost their jobs or never had one, a finding supporting the sociotropic dimension identified in prior research (Kluegel, Mason and Wegener 1995, 1999; Kluegel and Mason 2000; Mason and Kluegel 2000b). As predicted in hypothesis 4b, the five-year mean of unemployment rate is indeed significantly and positively related to the levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and public resistance toward acceptance of the politically persecuted.

Finally, Model 6 includes an interaction term between the size of the immigrant group and unemployment rate. When looking at the negative signs of the *separate* effects for these two macro-level factors, one should bear in mind that the coefficient for one of them signals an effect on the outcome variables when the other is held at zero. Apart from the negative interaction effect reported in Table 5, which runs contrary to the anticipation and is not readily explainable, the results included in the other tables support hypothesis 6. The concurrent effect of the two aggregate predictors is a self-concealing one, since the effect of one of them (e.g., unemployment rate) is intensified and mitigated by the effect of the other (e.g., immigrant group size). As evidenced by the results from Tables 3, 4 and 6, the context of living among a higher number of foreigners during bad economic time illustrates a case of intense competition which may be favoring exclusionism. Under bad economic circumstances, the presence of a numerically significant immigrant population predicts increased levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, support for reduced immigration and preference for stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants; however, promising economic conditions ponder the effect of a large foreign presence on the outcome variables. Note that, the effect of the Visegrád Group membership on anti-immigrant sentiment increases substantially and becomes statistically significant in both Models 5 ($\gamma = 0.226$) and 6 ($\gamma = 0.277$), thereby supporting hypothesis 3. The concurrence of immigrant group size and unemployment rate explains part of the cross-country variance in levels of opposition toward admitting political refugees and support for stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

As with any other study using secondary cross-sectional data, the findings of this analysis need to be interpreted with some caution: attitudes are context-dependent, they offer only a snapshot of the public opinion's actual dynamics. This analysis has nevertheless advanced the general understanding of inter-group attitudes to lesser investigated set of countries and has offered a rather solid proof to support the Realistic Conflict and Social Identities Theory. It was first revealed that previous scholarly contributions on exclusionism, prejudice and national identity apply more broadly than to only Western European countries, and that a multilevel analytic model does indeed explain differences in attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies across the CEE states. Next, paralleling prior findings in Europe (Burjanek 2001; Wallace 1999) it was established that important, statistically significant differences in the mean values in the dependent variables between the two regions are present.

Although the same categories of factors were believed to affect each of the dependent variables, the results give evidence of a mixed picture of effects, which proves the instrumental utility of maintaining a distinction between attitudes toward immigrants and attitudes toward immigration policies. As it turned out, nativism, regime legitimacy and protectionism had the most consistent pattern of effects in all the models that were estimated, even in the face of multiple controls for other micro- and macro-level factors. In general, a college-level education acts as a suppressant of unfavorable attitudes, but this finding needs further exploration. While the amount of schooling clearly matters, equally true is the fact that the quality of the received education may count as well. Most of the adult population in the CEE countries was schooled before 1989, meaning that these individuals may have been exposed to a less liberating type of instruction and more to an ideological form of education that was strictly controlled and supervised by the communist state. Continuing the process of reforming the national systems of education (which would create opportunities for increased access to higher education and eventually restructure the contents of school curricula) is therefore a priority in the CEE countries. The abandonment of centrist and ethnically-infused educational programs promoting cultural assimilation should positively influence public opinion and help on improving intergroup relations in the long run, but these effects are only intuitive at this stage.

Contextual conditions contribute to a large extent to the explanation of cross-national attitudinal variation. A plausible explanation for why macro-level factors matter to such an extent is provided by theories of socialization. During communism, CEE publics were inoculated with a form of centralized paternalism initiated and promoted by an “omnipresent” and “omnipotent” state. This dependency may have taken the form of a collectivist orientation with consequences too enduring to disappear during a period of only a few years of post-communism. There is strong indication that people in the CEE societies evaluate immigrants and immigration policies not just on the basis of their personal circumstances, but also in response to a sense of economic worsening and a potential threat coming from a numerically strong or culturally different immigrant population (a long-run self interest effect). Although immigration is small in absolute numbers in the CEE countries compared to Western Europe, relatively insignificant differences across the post-communist states appear to play a substantial role. In addition, the novelty of immigration in the region exacerbated by sensationalist media coverage of illegal border crossings and the mere presence of racially and culturally distinct foreign populations may make a strong psychological impact. Central to this argument is that, without taking into account the complex nexus of relations among the macro-level predictors, important effects may remain unnoticed. The predicting power of Visegrád Group membership is only partially accounted for in terms of simple observed effects (Model 4), but, when considered together with other societal factors (whose effects may be additive or multiplicative), a more complete picture emerges.

Relying on policies of economic prosperity, oftentimes imposed by international institutions, as a panacea for all societal problems may not be the right or only answer to the currently low levels of accepting immigrant groups or other minorities. In contradistinction with the strong tendency among the Western technocrats who have assumed economic growth as a solution for everything, I believe that the perverse

effects of free-enterprise capitalism should be first considered. Quite plausibly, economic prosperity may lead to increased general egocentrism and heightened intolerance; moreover, if economic benefits are not distributed across all social strata and a sense of market injustice is widespread, the resulting social convulsions may undermine normal democratic processes and further perceptions of threat. The ongoing process of reforming and stabilizing post-communist economies needs to be doubled by effective measures of social protection for the most vulnerable social categories because, as this study suggests, unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and unrestrictive immigration policies are highly prevalent.

The results of the models estimated in this study point toward the need for a better multilevel specification, considering that important cross-country dispersion in attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies among the CEE publics has yet to be explained. Since immigration is inextricably linked with politics, factors such as democratic experience, electoral outcomes, parliamentary composition, and citizenship regimes probably do play a role in explaining attitudinal differences. Considering ethnicity's salience in this part of the world, one could certainly make a strong argument that nationally-bound ethnic relations between variously positioned groups (e.g., majority-minority or minority-minority) are reflected by the public sentiment on immigrants and immigration policies. Ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic polarization constitute important indicators of a country's inter-ethnic arrangements (more so when such divisions are acute), and so the need to include these measures in subsequent investigations of exclusionist attitudes comes naturally.

The ascension of eight former socialist countries into the European Union signaled a further separation within the CEE. The three-tier image, with the current candidate countries of Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia buffering between these new EU members and the other post-communist states, suggests that fluctuations in attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies may be expected in the future. One possible scenario is that of a gradual orientation of the publics in the Baltic States, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia toward their Western counterpart. But if the costs associated with EU membership prove to be quite high and these eight former communist states become a real 'waiting room' for illegal immigrants or some sort of periphery defending the EU's 'core' countries, opposition toward immigrants and favorable immigration policies may abruptly increase. Considering the long-run self-interest effect that characterizes CEE publics, changes in economic, political and demographic contexts could dramatically affect the level of unfavorable attitudes. A reversal of economic fortunes or a sharp increase in the immigrant group size might spark a renewed and highly intense expression of intolerance, hostility and exclusionism.

Table 1. Reliability Coefficients (Cronbach's α Scores) for Measures of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, Nativism, Chauvinism, Regime Legitimacy, and Protectionism in Europe by Country, ISSP 1995

Country/Region	Anti-Immigrant Sentiment	Nativism	Chauvinism	Regime Legitimacy	Protectionism
Bulgaria	0.47	0.74	0.66	0.73	0.51
Czech Republic	0.64	0.77	0.65	0.78	0.52
East Germany	0.72	0.83	0.73	0.66	0.66
Hungary	0.69	0.74	0.62	0.66	0.51
Latvia	0.76	0.75	0.61	0.79	0.47
Poland	0.52	0.83	0.72	0.67	0.47
Russia	0.55	0.75	0.64	0.69	0.63
Slovakia	0.64	0.71	0.74	0.80	0.49
Slovenia	0.68	0.73	0.66	0.67	0.47
CEE	0.64	0.74	0.69	0.74	0.54

Table 2. Indicators of Economic Condition and Immigrant Group Size in CEE by Country

Country	GDP Growth Rate	Unemployment Rate	Immigrant Group Size
Bulgaria	-6.2 ^a	11.50 ^c	0.03 ^c
Czech Republic	-3.9 ^a	2.80 ^c	0.13 ^f
East Germany	-2.2 ^b	12.70 ^d	1.04 ^g
Hungary	-2.9 ^a	9.00 ^c	0.20 ^g
Latvia	-11.8 ^a	3.00 ^c	0.24 ^h
Poland	-1.3 ^a	12.80 ^c	0.01 ^b
Russia	-9.0 ^a	4.60 ^c	0.62 ⁱ
Slovakia	-2.6 ^{a, b}	11.80 ^c	0.11 ^{f, i}
Slovenia	-4.1 ^a	8.30 ^c	0.20 ⁱ

Note: Figures reported here are averages for the five years prior to the survey in each country.

^a Source: World Bank (1996), Table A.2, p. 173.

^b Source: Fowkes (1999), Table A7, p. 193.

^c Source: United Nations (1999), pp. 275-89.

^d Source: Blau, Hofmann, Meyerle, Munz, and Vogler-Ludwig (1997).

^e Source: Salt and Clarke (2002), Table 1(b), p. 31.

^f Source: International Organization for Migration (1999), Table 1, p. 21.

^g Source: Deutscher Städtetag (1991-1997).

^h Source: OECD (2001), Table A.1.1, p. 304.

ⁱ Source: United Nations (1998), pp. 1086-1091.

Table 3. Hierarchical Regression Models of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment on Individual-Level and Country-Level Variables: 9 CEE Countries, ISSP 1995¹

	Models												
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		
(Constant)	3.515** (0.066)		3.493** (0.060)		2.302** (0.176)		2.269** (0.170)		1.710** (0.226)		1.659** (0.279)		
Individual-Level Variables													
College Education (1 = yes)	--		-0.216** (0.041)		-0.141** (0.026)		-0.141** (0.026)		-0.140** (0.031)		-0.141** (0.030)		
Lower Class ² (1 = yes)	--		0.168** (0.024)		0.077** (0.030)		0.077** (0.029)		0.074** (0.037)		0.076** (0.034)		
Working Class ² (1 = yes)	--		0.100** (0.018)		0.040** (0.013)		0.040** (0.013)		0.041** (0.020)		0.042** (0.020)		
Nativism	--		--		0.191** (0.035)		0.191** (0.035)		0.192** (0.035)		0.190** (0.035)		
Chauvinism	--		--		0.045** (0.016)		0.045** (0.016)		0.046** (0.017)		0.048** (0.017)		
Regime Legitimacy	--		--		-0.100** (0.034)		-0.100** (0.034)		-0.101** (0.034)		-0.101** (0.035)		
Protectionism	--		--		0.179** (0.026)		0.179** (0.025)		0.178** (0.025)		0.177** (0.025)		
Country-Level Variables													
Visegrád Group Member (1= yes)	--		--		--		0.071 (0.054)		0.226* (0.115)		0.277** (0.076)		
Gross Domestic Product Rate (mean of 5 years prior to survey)	--		--		--		--		-0.031 (0.021)		-0.082** (0.015)		
Unemployment Rate (mean of 5 years prior to survey)	--		--		--		--		0.031** (0.014)		0.012 (0.009)		
Immigrant Group Size (mean of 5 years prior to survey)	--		--		--		--		0.243* (0.129)		-1.322** (0.253)		
Immigrant Group Size × Unemployment Rate	--		--		--		--		--		0.159** (0.024)		
		Variance	χ^2	Variance	χ^2	Variance	χ^2	Variance	χ^2	Variance	χ^2	Variance	χ^2
Intercept		0.038**	598.953	0.030**	145.363	0.260**	102.535	0.241**	116.773	0.275**	105.950	0.427**	154.411
Level-1		0.607		0.593		0.526		0.526		0.526		0.526	

¹ Standard errors in parentheses.

² The reference category is 'middle-upper class.'

* = p < 0.1; ** = p < 0.05.

Table 4. Hierarchical Regression Models of Support for Reduced Immigration on Individual-Level and Country-Level Variables: 9 CEE Countries, ISSP 1995¹

	Models												
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		
(Constant)	3.905** (0.0873)		3.924** (0.081)		2.895** (0.126)		2.815** (0.098)		3.002** (0.364)		2.850** (0.236)		
Individual-Level Variables													
College Education (1 = yes)	--		-0.167** (0.034)		-0.107** (0.027)		-0.106** (0.027)		-0.099** (0.033)		-0.103** (0.034)		
Lower Class ² (1 = yes)	--		0.061* (0.042)		-0.011 (0.034)		-0.011 (0.035)		-0.009 (0.042)		-0.009 (0.044)		
Working Class ² (1 = yes)	--		0.027 (0.034)		-0.025 (0.029)		-0.023 (0.029)		-0.024 (0.031)		-0.023 (0.035)		
Nativism	--		--		0.201** (0.036)		0.202** (0.036)		0.203** (0.038)		0.199** (0.037)		
Chauvinism	--		--		0.022 (0.019)		0.022 (0.019)		0.024 (0.020)		0.026 (0.020)		
Regime Legitimacy	--		--		-0.106** (0.034)		-0.105** (0.034)		-0.109** (0.034)		-0.112** (0.035)		
Protectionism	--		--		0.147** (0.016)		0.147** (0.016)		0.147** (0.017)		0.145** (0.017)		
Country-Level Variables													
Visegrád Group Member (1= yes)	--		--		--		0.171** (0.092)		0.333** (0.157)		0.262** (0.088)		
Gross Domestic Product Rate (mean of 5 years prior to survey)	--		--		--		--		0.047* (0.028)		-0.050** (0.019)		
Unemployment Rate (mean of 5 years prior to survey)	--		--		--		--		-0.026 (0.018)		-0.034** (0.011)		
Immigrant Group Size (mean of 5 years prior to survey)	--		--		--		--		0.648** (0.179)		-1.995** (0.308)		
Immigrant Group Size × Unemployment Rate	--		--		--		--		--		0.225** (0.028)		
		Variance	χ^2	Variance	χ^2	Variance	χ^2	Variance	χ^2	Variance	χ^2	Variance	χ^2
Intercept		0.068**	869.751	0.057**	201.016	0.114**	37.542	0.085**	34.793	0.052**	20.408	0.148**	43.708
			(8)		(8)		(8)		(6)		(4)		(3)
Level-1		0.828		0.820		0.767		0.767		0.767		0.767	

¹Standard errors in parentheses.

²The reference category is 'middle-upper class.'

* = p < 0.1; ** = p < 0.05.

Table 5. Hierarchical Regression Models of Opposition toward Admitting Political Refugees on Individual-Level and Country-Level Variables: 9 CEE Countries, ISSP 1995¹

	Models											
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
(Constant)	2.849** (0.154)		2.837** (0.140)		2.220** (0.174)		2.110** (0.215)		0.948** (0.683)		1.514** (0.596)	
Individual-Level Variables												
College Education (1 = yes)	--		-0.216** (0.055)		-0.163* (0.055)		-0.163** (0.057)		-0.163* (0.060)		-0.162* (0.060)	
Lower Class ² (1 = yes)	--		0.163** (0.044)		0.088* (0.054)		0.089* (0.054)		0.083 (0.064)		0.084 (0.064)	
Working Class ² (1 = yes)	--		0.058* (0.035)		0.021 (0.035)		0.019 (0.035)		0.017 (0.039)		0.018 (0.039)	
Nativism	--		--		0.107** (0.027)		0.107** (0.027)		0.110** (0.030)		0.110** (0.030)	
Chauvinism	--		--		0.071** (0.017)		0.071** (0.017)		0.071* (0.021)		0.071* (0.021)	
Regime Legitimacy	--		--		-0.114** (0.047)		-0.115** (0.047)		-0.113 (0.050)		-0.114 (0.050)	
Protectionism	--		--		0.082** (0.019)		0.082** (0.019)		0.080** (0.020)		0.080** (0.020)	
Country-Level Variables												
Visegrád Group Member (1= yes)	--		--		--		0.252* (0.163)		0.282 (0.288)		0.008 (0.271)	
Gross Domestic Product Rate (mean of 5 years prior to survey)	--		--		--		--		-0.134** (0.052)		-0.013 (0.052)	
Unemployment Rate (mean of 5 years prior to survey)	--		--		--		--		0.071** (0.034)		0.069** (0.031)	
Immigrant Group Size (mean of 5 years prior to survey)	--		--		--		--		-0.417 (0.313)		2.801** (0.847)	
Immigrant Group Size × Unemployment Rate	--		--		--		--		--		-0.303** (0.076)	
	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)
Intercept	0.213**	1373.390 (8)	0.173**	380.862 (8)	0.225**	45.782 (8)	0.203**	42.531 (6)	0.290**	59.679 (4)	0.130**	33.094 (3)
Level-1	1.244		1.230		1.198		1.198		1.198		1.198	

¹Standard errors in parentheses.

²The reference category is 'middle-upper class.'

* = p < 0.1; ** = p < 0.05.

Table 6. Hierarchical Regression Models of Support for Stronger Measures to Exclude Illegal Immigrants on Individual-Level and Country-Level Variables: 8 CEE Countries[‡], ISSP 1995¹

	Models												
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		
(Constant)	4.408** (0.051)		4.394** (0.052)		3.619** (0.108)		3.723** (0.140)		3.936** (0.198)		4.157** (0.209)		
Individual-Level Variables													
College Education (1 = yes)	--		0.020 (0.044)		0.072** (0.036)		0.074** (0.040)		0.069* (0.042)		0.068* (0.041)		
Lower Class ² (1 = yes)	--		-0.006 (0.039)		-0.045 (0.038)		-0.045 (0.047)		-0.050 (0.047)		-0.050 (0.047)		
Working Class ² (1 = yes)	--		0.021 (0.031)		-0.006 (0.027)		-0.004 (0.027)		-0.013 (0.028)		-0.012 (0.028)		
Nativism	--		--		0.140** (0.030)		0.140** (0.031)		0.139** (0.031)		0.139** (0.032)		
Chauvinism	--		--		0.018 (0.015)		0.017 (0.017)		0.016 (0.016)		0.018 (0.017)		
Regime Legitimacy	--		--		-0.067** (0.024)		-0.069** (0.025)		-0.071** (0.027)		-0.073** (0.027)		
Protectionism	--		--		0.112** (0.015)		0.112** (0.015)		0.111** (0.015)		0.112** (0.015)		
Country-Level Variables													
Visegrád Group Member (1= yes)	--		--		--		-0.197** (0.067)		-0.012 (0.060)		-0.032 (0.055)		
Gross Domestic Product Rate (mean of 5 years prior to survey)	--		--		--		--		0.008 (0.011)		-0.005 (0.013)		
Unemployment Rate (mean of 5 years prior to survey)	--		--		--		--		-0.040** (0.007)		-0.057** (0.012)		
Immigrant Group Size (mean of 5 years prior to survey)	--		--		--		--		0.413** (0.078)		-1.550 (0.999)		
Immigrant Group Size × Unemployment Rate	--		--		--		--		--		0.149* (0.080)		
		Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)
Intercept		0.020**	278.599 (7)	0.019**	80.215 (7)	0.072**	21.546 (7)	0.118**	31.950 (5)	0.146**	38.585 (3)	0.130**	34.712 (2)
Level-1		0.733		0.730		0.702		0.702		0.702		0.702	

[‡] Question item not asked in Russia.

¹ Standard errors in parentheses.

² The reference category is 'middle-upper class.'

* = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$.

Figure 1. Country and Regional Means of Anti-immigrant Sentiment in Europe, ISSP 1995




Figure 2. Country and Regional Means of Support for Reduced Immigration in Europe, ISSP 1995




Figure 3. Country and Regional Means of Opposition toward Admitting Political Refugees in Europe, ISSP 1995





Figure 4. Country and Regional Means of Support for Stronger Measures to Exclude Illegal Immigrants in Europe, ISSP 1995



APPENDIX

Question Wording for the Items Measuring Attitudes toward Immigrants

Q. 10 There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [R's country]. (By "immigrants" we mean people who come to settle in [R's country]).

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

- Q. 10a Immigrants increase crime rates.
 - Q. 10b Immigrants are generally good for [R's country's] economy.
 - Q. 10c Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [R's country].
 - Q. 10d Immigrants make [R's country] more open to new ideas and cultures.
-

- 1. Agree strongly
- 2. Agree
- 3. Neither agree nor disagree
- 4. Disagree
- 5. Disagree strongly

Question Wording for the Items Measuring Attitudes toward Immigration Policies

Q. 11 Do you think the number of immigrants to [R's country] nowadays should be...

- 1. Increased a lot
- 2. Increased a little
- 3. Remain the same as it is
- 4. Reduced a little
- 5. Reduced a lot

Q. 12 How much do you agree or disagree that refugees who have suffered political repression in their own country should be allowed to stay in [R's country]?

- 1. Agree strongly
- 2. Agree
- 3. Neither agree nor disagree
- 4. Disagree
- 5. Disagree strongly

Q. 23 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
[R's country] should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants.

- 1. Agree strongly
- 2. Agree
- 3. Neither agree nor disagree
- 4. Disagree
- 5. Disagree strongly

APPENDIX (cont'd)

Question Wording for the Items Measuring Nativism

Q. 4 Some people say the following things are important for being (e.g., truly British). Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is...

- Q. 4a To have been born in [R's country]?
 - Q. 4b To have [R's country] citizenship?
 - Q. 4c To have lived in [R's country] for most of one's life?
 - Q. 4d To be able to speak [R's country dominant language(s)]?
-

- 1. Very important
- 2. Fairly important
- 3. Not very important
- 4. Not important at all

Question Wording for the Items Measuring Chauvinism

Q. 5 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

- Q. 5a I would rather be a citizen of [R's country] than of any other country in the world.
 - Q. 5c The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like [R's country] people.
 - Q. 5d Generally, [R's country] is a better country than most other countries.
 - Q. 5e People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.
-

- 1. Agree strongly
- 2. Agree
- 3. Neither agree nor disagree
- 4. Disagree
- 5. Disagree strongly

Question Wording for the Items Measuring Regime Legitimacy

Q. 6 How proud are you of [R's country] in each of the following?

- Q. 6a The way democracy works.
 - Q. 6c [R's country] economic achievements.
 - Q. 6d Its social security system.
-

- 1. Very proud
- 2. Somewhat proud
- 3. Not very proud
- 4. Not proud at all

APPENDIX (cont'd)

Question Wording for the Items Measuring Protectionism

Q. 7 Now we would like to ask you about relations between (R's country) and other countries. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

Q. 7a (R's country) should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.

Q. 7e Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in (R's country).

Q. 7f (R's country) television should give preference to (R's country) films and programmes.

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree
5. Disagree strongly

(Source: ISSP 1995 Codebook, available from *Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung*)

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